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IN MEMORIAM
MELISSA BRITT (FISHER) LEWIS, ESQ.
1968 -2008
This book of the Nova Law Review is dedicated to the issue of Victims'
Rights in memory of Melissa Britt (Fisher) Lewis, class of 2000 and former
Editor-in-Chief of the Nova Law Review. Melissa's life tragically ended on
March 7, 2008, when she fell victim to a senseless crime. During her life,
Melissa was committed to helping the victims of violent crimes. She will be
forever remembered for her tireless contributions to the Nova Law Review, as
well as her unending dedication to her clients, family and friends.
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IN MEMORY OF MELISSA BRITT LEWIS
HEATHER BAXTER
Melissa Britt Lewis may have been the most unlikely candidate ever for
Nova Law Review's Editor in Chief. A rebellious teenager, Melissa dropped
out of high school at the age of 18. She was never one to give up, though, so
she quickly obtained her GED and started college classes. Melissa worked
full-time through college, so it took her close to ten years to obtain her un-
dergraduate degree. But that didn't mean she was finished. Most people
would say, "Enough!" Not Melissa. She wanted to be a lawyer. So, three
more years of school awaited her at NSU Shepard Broad Law Center.
This is when I met Melissa. We were both junior staff members on the
Nova Law Review. I didn't know all about her background yet, but I knew
that she was a non-traditional student and quite a bit older than my class-
mates and me. She quickly became the mother hen of our bunch, cooking
for us and providing us with stories from the real world. To say Melissa
flourished at NSU would be an understatement. She may have waited a
while to get there, but Melissa had found her calling in life and it showed.
She excelled academically, and became the Editor in Chief of the Nova Law
Review. Her leadership skills, coupled with her real life experience, made
Melissa an excellent Editor in Chief. I can personally attest to this, as I
served as Melissa's second in charge that year.
In addition to her Law Review service, Melissa found something else at
NSU that would change her life. Melissa signed up for Trial Advocacy un-
der adjunct professor Scott Rothstein. Scott says Melissa impressed him
beyond measure from the first assignment, and he quickly hired her as a law
clerk in his office (then only two attorneys and a paralegal). Melissa stayed
with Scott as his firm grew and she became a preeminent litigator. She was a
tireless advocate for her clients, working to right the wrongs they had en-
dured in their employment. Her efforts eventually led her to be named part-
ner at Rothstein, Rosenfeldt and Adler, an achievement of which she and her
family were extremely proud.
Though she was a hardworking attorney, Melissa's dedication to her
family was unrivaled. Melissa's three nieces were the apples of her eye. I
can remember the way she looked when she would tell me of her many trips
to Disney World with the girls. Not having children of her own, Melissa felt
privileged to be such a big part of her nieces' lives, and they loved their Aunt
'Lissa fiercely.
Mirroring the effort she put in for her clients and her family, Melissa al-
so believed in giving back to her community. She was a member of Leader-
ship Broward and the Broward County Human Rights Board. Because of her
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involvement with Leadership Broward, she was working on a memorial ded-
icated to victims of violent crime when, ironically, she herself was murdered
on March 7, 2008. It is this tragedy that prompted the Nova Law Review to
dedicate this issue to Victims' Rights, in memory of Melissa.
I feel lucky to have called Melissa a friend. Though it has been a year
since her death, I know I speak for countless others when I say we miss her
every day. It would make her proud to know that she has inspired this issue
of the Nova Law Review, and that, even in death, her memory lives on to
give a voice to those who have lost so much.
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FOREWORD: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
PERSPECTIVES ON DEALING WITH VICTIMS OF CRIME*
BRUCE J. WINICK**
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary field of legal scholar-
ship that looks at law with the tools of the behavioral sciences.' In this re-
spect, it is a descendant of legal realism, which asks us to look at law as it
actually impacts people's lives, and to do so using perspectives and ap-
proaches drawn from other disciplines.2 As Justice Holmes has told us, 'The
life of the law is not logic. It is experience."3
Accordingly, we need to understand how law actually applies in the real
world, how people work with it, deal with it, respond to it. And in order to
do that, we have to be interdisciplinary and we need to understand anthro-
pology, psychology, economics, and all of those other disciplines that help us
see law and the world in a much more enriched way. Therapeutic jurispru-
dence uses these tools and examines law through a particular lens, focusing
on law's impact on emotional life.4 It posits that among the other conse-
quences of law, law is a therapeutic agent. Law is a social force that has
inevitable consequences for people's emotional well-being, often negative
consequences, sometimes positive ones.
The law and economics movement has taught us that we have to be sen-
sitive to law's economic impact, to conduct the cost benefit analysis of law,
and to understand the importance of efficiency.5 In a similar way, therapeu-
tic jurisprudence is concerned with law's therapeutic impact. We seek to
avoid the mistake that we believe the law and economics approach some-
times has fallen into, which is to assume that if a law is inefficient, it there-
* Copyright 2009 by Bruce J. Winick.
** Bruce J. Winick, Laurie Silvers & Mitchell Rubenstein Distinguished Professor of
Law, University of Miami School of Law, Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences,
University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, and Director, University of Miami School of
Law Therapeutic Jurisprudence Center, J.D., New York University School of Law, A.B.,
Brooklyn College. I appreciate the assistance of Cecilia Traini, University of Miami School
of Law, class of 2011.
1. See generally LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) [hereinafter LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY].
2. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y&L. 184, 186 (1997).
3. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THECOMMON LAW I (Gryphon Editions 1982) (1881).
4. See generally LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 1; Winick, supra note 2.
5. Winick, supra note 2, at 190.
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fore should be changed.6 The assumption is that cost-benefit and efficiency
are the most important values. Yet, there are other important values at
stake-justice, fairness, and equality, among others. Therapeutic jurispru-
dence suggests that the therapeutic aspect of law is an important understu-
died dimension. However, a demonstration that a particular law or legal
practice is anti-therapeutic does not, in our view, demand that it be changed.
Although important, this therapeutic dimension of law is not the highest val-
ue served by law. Understanding this therapeutic dimension is crucial to our
understanding of law and how it applies to better see how it affects people
and to see what we can do to reshape it. When consistent with other impor-
tant values served by law, this understanding may suggest the value of re-
structuring law in order to make it more of a healing force. In that sense, it is
a revolutionary concept. But, the therapeutic aspect of law does not neces-
sarily trump other values, and sometimes is outweighed by them. When
these values coincide with the therapeutic ones, the path to law reform is
clear. When they conflict, however, therapeutic jurisprudence does not re-
solve this conflict. It simply sharpens the issues for further analysis and calls
for more empirical research to see whether there may be creative approaches
for reshaping law and how it is applied in ways that strike an appropriate
balance between these competing values.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is really a fairly simple idea. It calls upon us
to examine this therapeutic dimension of law with the tools of the behavioral
sciences, in an effort to determine whether we can restructure legal arrange-
ments to minimize unintended anti-therapeutic effects and maximize their
potential for healing and rehabilitation. We examine not only legal rules, but
legal practices and the way various legal actors-judges, lawyers, police
officers, etc.-play their roles. All of these legal actors can properly be seen
as therapeutic agents. In the way they act, they typically will impose either
positive or negative effects on the emotional life of the people they deal with.
Therapeutic jurisprudence has had a particularly important impact on
judging and lawyering. With regard to judging, we have seen in the past
fifteen to twenty years the emergence of what we now call problem-solving
courts, drug treatment courts, mental health courts, domestic violence courts,
and various hybrid models that take the rehabilitation of the offender as a
very significant goal.7 In these courts, the judge functions as a member of a
treatment team helping to provide what often is needed motivation for the
offender to opt for treatment and to help with treatment compliance. These
6. Id.
7. See generally JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003).
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are voluntary programs. The defendant in criminal court, for example, could
plead not guilty to a drug offense and receive the fair trial that our system
mandates. Alternatively, he could plead guilty and accept punishment.
The problem-solving court model offers a third alternative. If the of-
fender is prepared to recognize that he has a substance abuse problem and
that it is time to deal with it, the drug court can help him to accomplish this
goal. If he voluntarily chooses drug court, he enters a behavioral contract
with the court, he agrees to accept drug treatment and to participate meaning-
fully in it, to submit to periodic urine analysis drug testing, and to report to
court every ten to fourteen days. The judge will know immediately if the
defendant's urine is clean or dirty. If the defendant is doing well, if his urine
is clean, the judge says, "Wow, Mr. Jones you're doing great! It's really
wonderful to see your progress. Let's everyone in the court room give him a
hand." This represents a new role for the judge: the judge as behavioral
shaper, motivator, and compliance checker. Many of these defendants have
never had an authority figure care about them. The judge's encouragement,
therefore, is especially meaningful and helps to build the individual's self-
esteem and self-efficacy, both of which are necessary to attainment of the
goal. All of a sudden the judge is telling him, "Wow, you can do it Mr.
Jones, you're doing great!" And if Mr. Jones has dirty urine that day, the
judge is going to scold him or impose a sanction that has been agreed to in
the behavioral contract that the individual signs in advance. And at the end
of about a year and a half, those who are successful graduate, their charges
are dismissed, and the arresting officer comes to court and presents them
with a diploma. This represents a sea change in the functioning of the courts.
This approach is not well-suited to every court. It is not appropriate for
courts that are designed to decide disputed issues of historic fact. In these
instances, the judge should be a neutral umpire. But so much of what the
courts are called upon to do these days does not involve this traditional adju-
dicatory role. Guilt or what transpired in the past is not an issue. The task is
to determine disposition, to determine what will happen to the individual and
whether the courts can provide help that will prevent a reoccurrence of the
problem. In this respect, courts dealing with problems like substance abuse,
juvenile delinquency, domestic violence, child abuse and neglect, and un-
treated mental illness can largely be seen to function as psycho-social agen-
cies.
We would not necessarily think of judges as the best people to play this
role. Judges, after all, are law-trained, and may not possess the psychologi-
cal and social work skills needed to play these roles well. But unfortunately,
our society does not put the resources that are needed into prevention and
treatment programs in the community that can help people with these prob-
lems at an early stage before they get out of hand. As a result, given the lack
8
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of such services, these problems fester and ultimately explode, and the indi-
vidual is arrested and brought to court. There is always a judge in the back
of the room when I give lectures, that says, "But Professor Winick, I'm not a
social worker." What I tell them is, "Yes, you are. When you are function-
ing in one of these courts, you are functioning as a social worker. You're
either going to be a good one or a lousy one, so get with the program, learn
some of these skills."
Judges who function in these new courts become experts in dealing with
these kinds of social problems. They learn some of the basic approaches and
techniques of psychology and social work, and apply them in the court room.
They learn how to motivate people to understand that they have a problem,
to persuade them that they can effectively deal with it, to link them with
community treatment resources that otherwise might be unavailable or inac-
cessible to them as a result of their problem, and to facilitate their treatment
through compliance checking and encouragement. In short, they help them
to solve the problem that has brought them to court and that otherwise will
likely reoccur. This marks a revolutionary change in the way courts func-
tion. This new development can be seen as therapeutic jurisprudence at the
judicial level.
A leading example in Broward County is Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren,
who started the nation's first mental health court.8 As the public advocate in
Broward County, she learned about therapeutic jurisprudence. When she
was elected to county court, she noticed that many of the minor offenders in
criminal court were there because they had committed nuisance offenses that
were more a product of their untreated mental illness than of criminality. In
response, she started the nation's first mental health court about a dozen
years ago, explicitly based upon a therapeutic jurisprudence model. There
are now more than a hundred mental health courts in the country, probably
twenty-four hundred drug treatment courts, several hundred domestic vi-
olence courts, and many other such courts throughout the world.
Not only has therapeutic jurisprudence revolutionized the courts, but it
has begun to transform the role of the lawyer. Our 2000 book, Practicing
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, applies the therapeutic jurisprudence model to
the practice of law.9 Its subtitle, Law as a Helping Profession, suggests that
8. See generally Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts,
S1I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 507 (2005); GINGER LERNER-WREN, BROWARD'S MENTAL
HEALTH COURT: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2000), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_ProSol
_Trends99-00_FlaMentalPub.pdf.
9. PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION (Dennis
P. Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds., 2000).
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therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to reframe the practice of law. That is what
lawyers are. They are members of a helping profession. Like doctors,
nurses, and others whose task is to help their patients or clients with a life
problem. The role of lawyers is to minister to the problems of their clients.
Clients come to their offices with the worst problems in the world. They are
going through a divorce. They are facing criminal accusation. They are
going through a bankruptcy. A business partner has screwed them. Maybe
they have been in an accident and they have been horribly injured, perhaps
permanently. These are the world's worst problems, and they bring them to
the law office.
How should we as lawyers deal with these problems? We, of course,
are going to deal with their legal problems. But in the process, let us under-
stand that our clients are people who possess the full range of human emo-
tions that inevitably interrelate with the legal problems they are encounter-
ing. Let us look at the client holistically. This is what we teach our doctors
these days. It is not a case of colon cancer that has come to the office, it is a
person that happens to have colon cancer. We need to understand that the
client is a person, a fellow human being. It is our role to understand their
emotional problems, as well as their legal ones, and to minister to the whole
person. As lawyers, we inevitably are therapeutic agents. If we ignore their
problems, we can further exacerbate their psychological difficulties. By con-
trast, an awareness of the predictable emotional problems that accompany
legal difficulties and the possession of a rudimentary understanding of the
interpersonal skills needed to deal with them can help the client to solve the
legal dilemma in a way that also enhances her emotional well-being.
If we adopt this more comprehensive vision of the role of the lawyer,
our clients will be better off both legally and psychologically, and as a result
of the relationship, will be much more satisfied with the professional encoun-
ter. In addition, we as lawyers will experience a heightened sense of profes-
sional satisfaction. Our role as lawyers is to help people, to serve their
needs. And there is great joy in using the legal, analytical, and problem solv-
ing skills we possess to help people. If we can understand this to be our pro-
fessional role, we will find the real joy in the practice of law.
Let me turn my attention to the Nova Law Review and the topic of your
upcoming issue-victims' rights. I am aware of the story of Melissa Lewis,
your dear departed former editor who had a special interest in victims' rights
and worked on this topic and yet, ironically, was herself tragically the victim
of a very serious crime and was killed.' ° What tragic irony that is, let us me-
ditate upon it. It is entirely appropriate that the law review has dedicated this
10. See Heather Baxter, In Memory of Melissa Britt Lewis, 33 NOVA L. REV. 533 (2009).
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issue to Melissa Lewis and to the further exploration of the topic of victims'
rights that she made such an important part of her short legal life.
What does therapeutic jurisprudence have to contribute to our thinking
about victims' rights? Therapeutic jurisprudence focuses our attention on the
emotional life of people touched by the law, and of course, victims are very
much affected by how they are treated by the legal system. They have been
the subject of a crime-sometimes a violent crime. They have suffered pre-
dictable emotional responses as a result of that crime: anxiety, fear, depres-
sion, humiliation, anger, powerlessness, and betrayal. Some develop the
syndrome of post traumatic stress disorder where they relive, periodically,
the high anxiety of the crime situation." Some develop a form of learned
helplessness. They have been victimized and that victimization is something
that gives them a sense of powerlessness.
This sense of powerlessness, which they may tend to generalize to other
aspects of their lives, could develop into what psychologist Martin Seligman
called the syndrome of learned helplessness.' 2 They react in an amotivation-
al way to life. They do not set goals, they surrender to their predicament.
They feel helpless, hopeless, and function in a way that mirrors the symp-
toms of clinical depression. They may not be able to get out of bed. They
feel that life no longer matters. A lot of people who have experienced se-
rious crimes may react in this way.
Now that we have a bit of an understanding of how the crime might im-
pact at least some victims emotionally, let us think about how the law and
legal processes might respond to them. The basic insight of therapeutic juri-
sprudence is that the legal processes that people encounter will impose con-
sequences for their psychological well-being--either negative or positive.
The law reform agenda of therapeutic jurisprudence calls upon us to think
creatively about how these legal processes can be reshaped to minimize their
anti-therapeutic consequences and maximize the potential for the healing of
the victim. We cannot ignore the emotional aspect of their victimization, but
must take it into account in deciding how the legal system should react to
them. We must be careful not to revictimize them by how we deal with them
11. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DSM IV: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 463-68 (4th ed. 2000); JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND
RECOVERY (1997); Anita K. McGruder-Johnson, et al., Interpersonal Violence and Post-
Traumatic Symptomatology: The Effects of Ethnicity, Gender and Exposure to Violent Events,
15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 205 (2000); J.P. WILSON, TRAUMA, TRANSFORMATION, AND
HEALING: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY, RESEARCH, AND POST-TRAUMATIC
THERAPY (1989).
12. MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH
(1975); see Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications
for Mental Health Law, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 6, 42 (1995).
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in the criminal justice process. Yet, often we do just that in the way that
police officers take their statements, in the way prosecutors interact with
them, and in what they experience in the courtroom.
If we view the plight of the victim through the lens of therapeutic juri-
sprudence, the test becomes how we can better understand the psychological
dimensions of their victimization and how we can reshape the legal process
to facilitate their healing and human potential. How can the criminal justice
system help to turn victims into survivors? A concern for the needs of the
victim should, in important respects, be taken into account in redesigning
how police, judges, court personnel, prosecutors, and defense lawyers play
their roles. They should understand how crime has upset the emotional equi-
librium of the victim, and attempt to restore it.
At present, the victim has a subsidiary role in the court process. The
prosecutor decides the important issues of what to charge, whether to plea-
bargain, what charge to plea-bargain to, how to present the evidence, and
whether to call the victim as a witness. The victim frequently has no voice
on these questions. They are peripheral players, and once again feel margi-
nalized and disrespected. They feel powerless once again, a feeling that
might contribute to depression and learned helplessness. In this way, the
criminal justice process contributes to the anti-therapeutic consequences of
their victimization. Instead of perpetuating their sense of powerlessness, we
need to empower them. And yet, the criminal justice system does not em-
power them at all.
How can we begin to think about addressing the emotional needs and
the interests of the victim? Everyone in the criminal justice system who
deals with the victim-judges lawyers, police officers, and court personnel-
needs to be sensitized to these issues and to learn about the emotional res-
ponses that victims are likely to experience. This calls for education de-
signed to increase their psychological understanding and their ability to re-
spond to the victim with empathy and sensitivity.
How can we deal with the high potential for victims to experience a
form of post traumatic stress disorder? One of the leading remedies is to get
people to express about it, to talk about it, either to a therapist or to a neigh-
bor, to journal about it, to open up about it rather than holding it inside where
it will ultimately come back to haunt them.' 3 We need to provide opportuni-
ties in the police station for victims to talk about what happened to them and
how they felt about it. It would be desirable to have social workers within
13. See JAMES W. PENNEBAKER, OPENING UP: THE HEALING POWER OF CONFIDING IN
OTHERS (1990) (describing the psychological and physiological benefits of expression in
dealing with post traumatic stress disorder caused by a variety of traumatic events, including
crime victimization).
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the police and court process who can address the needs of the victim. It
would be beneficial to have them complete an intake form in which they are
asked to describe what happened to them and how they felt about it as a
means of helping them get past it. In the alternative, they could be asked to
dictate their feelings into an audio tape. In addition, asking them to prepare a
victim impact statement that can be used at sentencing can also accomplish
this objective. 14
In our criminal justice process, the prosecutor, not the victim, decides
whether and what to charge, whether to offer a plea bargain, and how to
present the evidence. This is appropriate, as the prosecutor has the responsi-
bility of seeking the public interest. The victim has his or her own interest in
these questions, but it may not truly reflect the public interest. And so we
cannot give the victim a veto on these matters. But at the same time, the
prosecutor should take her views into account. What the victim needs is a
voice, not necessarily a veto, however, the victim's voice is rarely listened to
in our criminal justice process. Under Florida law, the prosecutor is sup-
posed to consult with the victim about plea bargaining and sentencing, but
this is rarely followed.' 5 When the victim learns after the fact that the prose-
cutor has agreed to a plea bargain, and that the case, in effect therefore, is
over, she again will feel disempowered, marginalized, disrespected, and in
effect victimized once again.
Prosecutors need to talk with the victim beforehand, giving them a
voice, not a veto. Even though the prosecutor ultimately will make the deci-
sion, the prosecutor should hear the victim's views, listen to the victim's
voice, convey empathy, and in the process treat the victim with dignity and
respect. Should the prosecutor decide not to follow the victim's views, he
should explain why, on balance, he has reached a different conclusion.
Therapeutic jurisprudence has frequently drawn on insights from the li-
terature on procedural justice. 16 This is an empirical literature that helps us
understand how people experience judicial and administrative hearings. 7
This literature shows that the satisfaction of litigants with the procedures
14. Id.
15. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
16. See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL
119-38 (2005); Bruce J. Winick & Ginger Lerner-Wren, Do Juveniles Facing Civil Commit-
ment Have a Right to Counsel?: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Brief, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 115
(2002).
17. E.g. E.A. LIND & T.R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1988); JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS, (1975); ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); E.A. Lind et al.,
Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in
Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952-59 (1990).
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they receive and their ability to accept the outcome are dependent upon sev-
eral factors. The first is "voice," the basic need that people have to tell their
stories and be listened to. The second is "validation," the feeling that the
judge has taken them seriously. The third is whether the judge has treated
them with dignity and respect and has acted fairly and in good faith. Let us
adapt these insights to the way the criminal justice process deals with the
victim. The prosecutor and the other judicial officials with whom they will
deal should give the victim this sense of voice. They should accord them
validation, pay attention to them, take them seriously, and take their argu-
ments into account, even if they ultimately reject them. They should listen to
them attentively, always treat them with dignity and respect, and provide
them with a process that they will feel is in good faith. Even if the prosecu-
tor makes a decision that the victim is unhappy with, the victim will then be
more likely to accept it. Treating the victim in this way will nonetheless
increase their satisfaction with the process and their ability to accept the out-
come. Moreover, treating the victim in this way can avoid much of the re-
victimization that the existing process imposes, and thereby assist the victim
to heal and move forward.
These are some of the factors that therapeutic jurisprudence suggests we
need to take into account in thinking about how to recast our criminal justice
system so that it pays more attention to the emotional needs of the victim.
These are preliminary perspectives on how therapeutic jurisprudence can
improve the plight of the victim in our criminal justice system. We need to
value the emotional well-being of the victim, and make greater use of psy-
chological insights and approaches in reshaping our criminal justice process
in order to better accomplish this. This symposium and the approach I have
outlined can do much to help us reimagine a more humane criminal process
that helps to bring about healing for the victim, rather than revictimization.
14
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I will examine jury trials in present day Russia. The main
focus of the paper will be on the new Russian Criminal Code of Procedure
which became effective in July of 2002.' The code is important because it
sets forth the standard for jury trials in Russia.
In order to examine jury trials in Russia today, it will be important to
look at Russian history. More specifically, it will be important to look at the
history of the right to a jury trial in Russia. It would be difficult to analyze
the present day Russian jury trial without also considering the historical as-
pect of the jury trial in Russia in the past.
After looking at the history of the Russian jury trial, I will then examine
the present day Russian jury trial. In order to look at the present day Russian
jury trial, one must examine the Russian Criminal Code of Procedure. The
code itself sets out not only the return of the jury trial, but also sets out the
specific standards for the jury trial.
The examination of the Russian jury trial will be informative. Beyond
being informative, this paper will address a salient question raised by the
I. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPKI [Criminal Procedural Code] (Russ.). This
article references an English translation of the Russian Criminal Code of Procedure which the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has available at http://www.legislation
line.org/documents/section/crimin al-codes.
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return of the jury trial to Russia. The salient question that this paper will
address is whether the jury trial today provides justice to the citizens of post-
Soviet Russia. The answer to that question will be addressed throughout the
paper and more directly during the paper's conclusion.
1]. RUSSIA AND ITS PEOPLE
Before there can be an analysis of the jury trial in Russia, it is first im-
portant to have an understanding of the historical context of Russia and its
people. It will provide a better view of the current state of the country of
Russia-including its judicial system.
Russia is a huge, complex, fascinating place. While it straddles Europe
and Asia, Russia is neither European nor Asian in its culture or perspective.2
While Russia, as the Soviet Union, attained super-power status with the
United States in "the twentieth century, it is very different from America."
3
Russia for centuries has struggled with its own identity among nations.4 The
struggle for their own sense of identity continues today.' Russia is no longer
an imperial power ruled by czars, as it was from the time of Peter the Great
in the late 1600s to 1917.6 Russia is no longer communist, as it was when
ruled by dictatorships from 1918 to 1991.7 Since 1991, Russia has been
striving to become a true democratic nation.8 It continues to struggle with its
own identity as a Russian democracy. 9
Geographically, Russia is the largest country in the world.' ° It occupies
approximately 6.6 million square miles, almost twice the size of the United
States." From east to west, Russia measures over 5,000 miles and has ele-
ven time zones. 12 The population of the Soviet Union was about 290 mil-
lion. 13 Today the Russian Federation has a population of approximately 147
million.' 4 Russia has the sixth largest population in the world following Chi-
2. CHARLES E. ZIEGLER, THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA, I (Greenwood Press. 1999).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at I.
8. See id. at 1,6-7.
9. See id. at 1.
10. Id.
I1. Id.
12. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at I.
13. Id. at2.
14. See id.
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na, India, the United States, Indonesia, and Brazil. 5 Over eighty percent of
the population is located in the western part of the country. 16 Only 25 mil-
lion people "live in the vast expanses of Siberia" and the eastern most part of
Russia.
7
As to be expected, most of the roads, railways, and airways are located
in the western portion of the country.'8 Interestingly, the eastern part of the
country is "rich in natural resources-oil, natural gas, gold, diamonds, furs,
and timber."' 9 Due to the remoteness and lack of a transportation system to
them, these natural resources remain inaccessible.20
Russia today "is ethnically more homogenous than" the Soviet Union.2'
"The Russian Federation is [approximately] 82 percent Russian. The next
largest group is the Tatars," who are Moslem Turkic people that comprise
about four percent of the population.22 Ukrainians make up 3 percent of the
population. 23 The remaining twelve percent is made up of Turkics, Germans,
Belorussians, Jews, and Siberian tribes.2 4
Most of Russia is further north than the United States.25 It is compara-
ble more to Canada in its geographical location than to the United States.26
Although Russia has good agricultural land, its northern location and climate
provide for shorter growing seasons. 27 Many crops do not do well. 28 As a
result of climate and Soviet policies, the farming sector to the present day
has done poorly.29 In 1998, almost half of all Russian imports were food.30
"Much of Russia is flat, and the absence of natural barriers is often cited
[as the basis for the continued] historical Russian preoccupation with secure
borders. ' 3' The Ural Mountains, which run north to south, separate Euro-
pean Russia from Siberia and the Far East.32 The Urals are not very high and
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. ld. at 3.
31. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 3.
32. Id.
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are comparable to the Appalachian Mountains in the United States.33 Due to
its vastness, the climate in Russia varies. 34 In some southernmost areas in the
summer, it "can be quite hot. '35 In north-central Russia the infamous Rus-
sian winters are brutally cold.36 It is not unusual for the temperatures to drop
to forty degrees below zero. 37 In the Siberian town of Verkhoyansk, temper-
atures have often fell to ninety degrees below zero.38
"Russia is an urban nation.., about 70 percent of the population liv[es]
in cities. Moscow, the capital, is ... the largest and [perhaps] most dynamic
city" in Russia.39 Its population is about nine million.n Close to seventy-
five percent of all "Western investment has been concentrated in [Mos-
cow]. 41 The investments have helped transform the capital to a modem
refurbished city.42 Most other Russian cities lag behind Moscow "where old
Soviet industries [lag behind] and the new market economy has" not as of yet
taken off.4
3
Life in the Russian countryside is "far removed" from the culture of the
larger cities.44 This has been true historically.45 Russian villages are much
poorer than the cities.46 Many rural homes do not have indoor plumbing.
47
Horse drawn carts are not an uncommon sight.48 Agricultural production
was mechanized by the Soviet Union. 49 However, many peasants were
forced into huge collective state farms, which are still operating today.5°
Productivity on these farms "is low and there are few opportunities for young
people in the" countryside areas. 51 As a result, many have left these areas for
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 3.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 3.
41. ld. at3,5.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id.
45. See ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 5.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 5.
51. Id.
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the cities.52 While Soviet restrictions prevented migration to the cities, the
new "Russian Constitution guarantees freedom of movement."53
Russians are a well-educated and highly literate people. 4 Before the
Russian revolution in 1917, the illiteracy rate stood at fifty-five percent.55
Currently, the literacy is approximately ninety-seven percent.56 "Russian
students routinely outperform" American students in math and science.57
Under Soviet rule, "all schools were operated by the state. '58 Today, the
Russian education system resembles those in the West including the United
States.59 Private schools and religious schools now exist along with state run
schools.6° It is not unusual for the Russian elite to now send their children to
Europe or the United States for their education.6'
It is readily apparent that the communist Soviet regime failed to eradi-
cate religion.62  Today religion flourishes in Russia.63  Numerous church
buildings have been restored or rebuilt.6' Services are often packed with
religious believers of the respective faith.65 About eighty percent are Russian
Orthodox which was the state church of the czars.6 6
Approximately nine percent are Moslems as represented by the Tatars,
the Chechens, Ingush, and others.67 About three percent of the population is
Jewish.68 There are also a large number of Catholics, Baptists, and Budd-
hists.69 A small number of fringe religions exist also, including the "Hare
Krishnas and members of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult. 70
"For centuries, Russia's government was a centralized" monarchy led
by the czars and "organized on [the] principles of rank and privilege."'7' In
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5; see also Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art.
27.
54. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 5.
55. Id. at 5-6.
56. Id. at6.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 6.
60. Id.
61. ld.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 6.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 6.
70. Id.
71. ld.
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the Soviet period, after 1917, a more stringent "dictatorship was organized
through the Communist Party. 7 2 Lenin, until his death in 1924,7 "estab-
lished the Soviet system and laid the foundation[] for a totalitarian dictator-
ship., 74 His successor, Joseph Stalin, took the system and developed it into
one of the most "repressive governments known to history. '75 After Stalin's
death in 1953, Khrushchev (1953-1964) and Brezhnev (1964-1982) tem-
pered some of the oppressive aspects of the Stalin era.76 However, they re-
tained and preserved the basics of the Soviet Party-state system. 77 Gorba-
chev-from 1985 to 1991-became "the first Soviet leader to undertake se-
rious reform., 78 He "set in motion a series of events," based in reform,
which "brought about the collapse of the USSR, leaving fifteen newly inde-
pendent states in its place. ' 79 From 1991 to 1999, Boris Yeltsin was presi-
dent.80 From 1999 through 2008, Vladimir Putin was the president of the
Russian Federation.81
"Many factors played a role in the collapse of the Soviet Union." 82 The
most important may "have been internal, although international pressures...
deserve[] some credit for the [demise]. 8 3 Domestic factors include the fol-
lowing: "poor economic performance of [a] centrally planned economy,
technological backwardness, a .. .repressive political system that discou-
raged [growth and] creativity, excessive military spending, . . . bureaucratic
inefficiency," polluting the environment, the impact of the Chernobyl nuclear
disaster on a wide range of issues, Russian nationalism, and the insensitivity
of the Soviet Union to its diverse population, including its minorities.84
One should consider not only domestic problems and international pres-
sures in the Soviet collapse, but also the generational shift in Soviet leader-
72. Id.; see also David Remnick, Leaders & Revolutionaries: V.L Lenin, TIME.COM, Apr.
13, 1998, http://www.time.com/time/time00/leaders/profile/lenin.htm.
73. Id.
74. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 6.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 7.
80. Id.
81. Andrew E. Kramer, Putin's Grasp of Energy Drives Russian Agenda, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/world/europe/29putin.html (last visited
Apr. 5, 2009); see Frances Romero, Russia President Dmitri Medvedev, TIME.COM, Apr. 2,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1888887,00.html.
82. ZEIGLER, supra note 2, at 170.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 167, 170.
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ship and the generational shift of all citizens.85 The new, younger "genera-
tion was better educated and more critical of [the] Soviet" record. 86 "[T]he
Soviet people [became] disillusioned and impatient with a corrupt, repressive
system that" failed to provide for the needs and desires of the modem Soviet
people.87 The collapse of the Soviet regime may have begun with party offi-
cials, but it was embraced by the public affirmation that democracy would be
accepted and dictatorship would be rejected and not restored.88
Today Russia is a blend of presidential-parliamentary form of govern-
ment, patterned upon the French system of government.89 "It is federal, with
political [power] divided between Moscow and eighty-nine regional [or dis-
trict] governments." 90 Russia has its own constitution, which defines the
power of the presidency, its legislature called the Federal Assembly, and its
judiciary.9' The constitution also contains a section, which sets out the rights
and freedoms for citizens, that is comparable to the American Bill of
Rights.92
The country has experienced difficulty in adjusting to their new econo-
my, shifting from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.93 The
transition has not been easy.94 In the last ten years, Russia "has experienced
hyperinflation, unemployment, . . . capital flight, and . . . income inequali-
ty."'95 There exists a complex and burdensome tax system. 96 Many business-
es keep two sets of books, which causes the government to run at a deficit.97
The Russian mafia has a significant presence in the country.98 There are
many armed mafia gangs, and a large percentage of businesses pay protec-
tion money to the mob.99 "Russia now has one of the highest murder rates in
the world."' ° Moreover, robbery, rape, and assault cases have risen substan-
tially in recent years.'0 '
85. Id. at 170-171.
86. Id. at 171.
87. ZEIGLER, supra note 2, at 171.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 6-7.
91. See id.
92. See ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 6-9.
93. id. at 8.
94. Id.
95. id.
96. id.
97. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 8.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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"Winston Churchill once remarked that the Soviet Union was a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."'' 0 2 Russia's present is inextricably
tied to its past.10 3 It is a past that has been troubled, violent, and fascinat-
ing. °4 It is still emerging from many decades of severe repression.'0 5 It is
still struggling to build "a viable and respected democracy."' The country
has tremendous potential as reflected in its people and its vast natural re-
sources.'07 Its people are highly educated and creative. 0 8 Whether the coun-
try is captive to its past and is doomed to authoritarian rule remains an open
question.' °9 With its new constitution as a foundation and responsible lea-
dership, Russia could become an affluent shining example of democracy.
This brief review of Russian history will provide a better understanding of
the present day jury trial and the jury trial in the past in Russia.
III. SEEDS OF REFORM IN RUSSIA
The seeds of judicial reform were sown by the Czar Alexsandr II.110 He
succeeded to the throne in 1855 as the Crimean War was still being waged.'
The war impacted "Russia's confidence in its military and diplomatic capa-
bilities, and underscored the need for social reform."'" 2 From 1853 to 1856,
war between Russia on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire, England,
France, and Sardinia on the other, was waged. 13 The war was initiated by
Czar Nicholas I14 The war revolved around a religious "dispute between
Orthodox Christians and Catholics over access to sites in the Holy Land.""'
Negotiations had failed."16 As a result war was waged. 17 Alexsandr II came
102. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 207.
103. See id. at 9.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 9.
108. Id. at 7.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 58-59.
Ill. Id.
112. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 58.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. ld.
116. Id.
117. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 58.
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to the throne in the midst of a losing war. 18 He immediately sought to end
the war and negotiated a peace accord." 9
Alexsandr ascended to the throne succeeding his father Nicholas who
ruled from 1825-1855.120 The thirty year reign of Nicholas has been "gener-
ally described as conservative, militaristic, and repressive."''1 1 In order to
preserve domestic order Nicholas had adopted draconian measures. 22 His
secret police, who were the predecessors of the Soviet KGB, were "notorious
for their harsh and intrusive methods."'1 3 The "police investigated every
possible revolutionary plot or subversive act" including the monitoring of
literature. 24 One such subversive was the writer Dostoyevsky who was ar-
rested and sentenced to death. 25 At the moment of execution, Dostoyevsky
and others had their sentences commuted and were instead exiled to Sibe-
ria126
Succeeding his father's reign, Alexsandr understood the need for reform
in Russia. 27 The loss of the Crimean War left no doubt that military reform
was needed. 28 The Russian "army was equipped with antiquated weapons
and [was] poorly supplied."' 29 The army was also composed of peasant re-
cruits who were ineffective fighters. 30 Alexsandr was no different from
many in the country who believed that Russia was technologically back-
wards.' 31 Unless change occurred, Russia would fall further behind. 32
At the forefront of positive change was the need for ending the delete-
rious impact caused by the institution of serfdom. 33 The first essential
reform by Alexsandr was emancipation of the serfs.' "The emancipation of
the serfs was . . . the most important of a series of official acts called the
Great Reforms."'' 35 The Emancipation Act of 1861 granted freedom to fifty-
118. Id. at 58-59.
119. See id. at 59.
120. Id. at 56, 58-59.
121. Id. at 56.
122. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 56.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 61-62.
128. Id. at61.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Seeid. at 61-62.
132. See ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 62-63.
133. Id. at 63.
134. Id.
135. ld.
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two million people from a total population at the time of seventy-three mil-
lion. 136 Interestingly, Abraham Lincoln would free American slaves two
years later. 137 The American slaves freed totaled four million. 138 Alexsandr
had stated that Russia needed to abolish serfdom from above before it ab-
olished itself from below.
139
IV. JUDICIAL REFORM IN RUSSIA
Another major reform enacted by Alexsandr 11 was judicial reform.14°
"Russia's judicial system in the early nineteenth century was inefficient and
corrupt, and based on class privilege.' 141 On November 20, 1864, he "signed
the main documents of Judicial Reform, known in history as [the] Judicial
Statutes.'42 A speedy, just, and merciful trial system equal for all was pre-
sented to Russia. 143  Reform "introduced a number of institutions shaped
after western European models, such as trial by jury, [and] representation by
counsel for [an] accused; torture and physical punishments such as flogging
were forbidden."' 44 Judicial power was strengthened by providing indepen-
dence to inspire respect for the law that was necessary for well-being.
145
By introducing trial by jury as part of the 1864 Judicial Reform, Alex-
sandr and other reformers in Russia intended to transform the practice of
their courts. 14 6 The initiation of juries, which had been developed in "the
adversarial tradition of Anglo-American countries, forced Russia to abandon
its pure[ly] inquisitorial" system. 14' The Reform replaced the inquisitorial
136. Id.
137. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 63.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 63-64.
141. Id. at 64.
142. Moscow Center for Prison Reform, Jury Trials in Russia (1998), http://www.prison.
org/english/rpsjur.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
143. ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 64.
144. World History at KMLA, Russian Empire, Russian Domestic Policy, 1855-1881,
http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/russia/rus185581dompol.htm (last visited April 5, 2009).
145. See generally Sergi M. Kazantsev, The Judicial Reform of 1864 and the Procuracy in
Russia, in REFORMING JUST. IN Russ., 1864-1996: POWER, CULTURE, AND THE LIMITS OF
LEGAL ORDER 44 (Peter H. Solomon, Jr. ed., 1997) [hereinafter Kazantsev, Judicial Reform];
ZIEGLER, supra note 2, at 65-83.
146. Girish N. Bhat, The Consensual Dimension of Late Imperial Russian Criminal Pro-
cedure: The Example of Trial by Jury, in REFORMING JUST. IN Russ., 1864-1996: POWER,
CULTURE, AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 61 (Peter H. Solomon, Jr. ed., 1997) [hereinafter
Bhat, Consensual Dimension].
147. Id.
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procedure with public trials. 148 The trials featured a contest between two
attorneys, presented before an audience composed of a judge, jury and spec-
tators. 1
49
Adversarialism was a "major procedural component of Russian jury tri-
al procedure."'150 It was intended to address the defects of pre-1864 Russian
justice.'5' Above all else, the reformers "of the new judicial order sought
fairness, [i.e.,] equity and even-handedness in resolving [legal] disputes."'' 52
The reformers also sought "a fundamental respect for the individual as a sub-
ject of the law.' 53 Adversarialism presupposes competition between com-
peting "parties, in a formal court setting, with the common [goal] of deter-
mining legal truth and obtaining judicial satisfaction."' 54 The state represents
society as a whole and the victim more particularly.'55 The state "is opposed,
on equal terms, by the legally [competent] defender [for] the accused. Ad-
versarial procedure is also [noted] by the presumption of innocence," the
importance of oral advocacy, and the adherence to an analytical standard of
proof in evaluating testimony and the admissibility of evidence. 56 The jury
trial, based on "its procedural format and [its] philosophical basis,
represent[ed] the best aspects of adversarial justice.' ' 57 The judge's role in
the adversarial trial in Russia was to be a neutral and "'impartial settler of
disputes' between [the] prosecution and the defense. '"58
Some historians consider the judicial reform as the most successful and
far-reaching of all the great reforms. 5 9 The legal reform gave Russia, in the
opinion of legal experts, one of the best legal systems anywhere in Europe. 160
The courts became independent of administrative interference.' 61 Judges
were sufficiently paid to resist corruption. 62 The accused was guaranteed
the right to representation by counsel.'63 Criminal trials were marked with a
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 65.
151. Bhat, Consensual Dimension, supra note 146, at 65.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Bhat, Consensual Dimension, supra note 146, at 65-66 (footnote omitted).
157. Id. at 66 (footnote omitted).
158. Id. (footnote omitted).
159. See DAVID SAUNDERS, RUSSIA IN THE AGE OF REACTION AND REFORM: 1801-1881,
258(1998).
160. See id. at 258-59.
161. Seeid.at261.
162. Id.
163. See id.
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presumption of innocence standard. 64 Lawyers were part of a professional
bar association, which raised competency levels to be advocates for an ac-
cused. 165 Importantly, people who were charged with crimes received trials
by jury that were in open court with oral testimony from witnesses on the
competing sides. 166 The new freedom from administrative interference and
the right to competent legal counsel with advocacy representation helped to
establish and maintain public confidence in the legal system. 67 In turn, with
faith in the justice system, public confidence was gained in the state system
itself. 168
Unfortunately, the Bolsheviks abolished jury trials along with other
democratic institutions in 1917.169 Thereafter, courts were transformed from
being fair, independent bodies that resolved disputes and protected rights into
a component of the repressive system of the new governmental authority.
70
V. RETURN OF JURY TRIALS TO RUSSIA
Since the end of 1993, and the beginning of 1994, jury trials have once
again begun to operate in Russia. 71 In September of 1992, President Yeltsin
issued an order requesting the State Legal Directorate and the Ministry of
Justice to develop a program of experiments introducing new provisions of
judicial legislation. 172 In 1993, the Russian Federation adopted the Laws on
Changes on Court Proceedings in the Russian Federation, the Criminal Pro-
cedural Code of the Russian Federation, the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, and the Code on Administrative Violations of Law. 173 The Rus-
sian Constitution specifically provides the right to a jury trial to Russian citi-
zens. 174 Interestingly, the new reforms are close to the ones established by
the Judicial Reform of 1864.175 The result is that after consulting with a law-
yer, a defendant may choose a court consisting either of a judge and two lay
164. SAUNDERS, supra note 159, at 259.
165. See id. at 261.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 61,62 (1995) [hereinafter Thaman, Resurrection].
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 78.
173. Moscow Center for Prison Reform, supra note 142.
174. Konstitutiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Knost RF] [Constitution] art. 47, 123.
175. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 169.
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assessors or a judge and twelve jurors who reach a verdict without the
judge's participation.'76
Today in Russia, the procedure of excluding unlawfully obtained evi-
dence is an important component of the jury trial. 77 The procedure in Rus-
sian jury trials today is, again, adversarial. 7 8 Jurors are invited to regional
courts, which deal with the most serious crimes. 79 Jurors are chosen by
heads of local administrations by lot among active people. 80 Jurors must be
twenty-five years or older and must never have been in prison.'18
After considering the evidence, jurors listen to the arguments of the
prosecution and the defense. 82 The defendant has an opportunity to make
his or her last words. 83 The judge sums up the case to the jury.' 84 Jurors
then deliberate and fill in a questionnaire. 85 The jurors are asked to deter-
mine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty and whether he deserves
leniency. 186 If the answer to the question of leniency is yes the judge gives a
milder sentence.'87 The answers to the questionnaire are considered the ver-
dict of the jury. 188
The number of jury trials has risen from the two that were first held in
1993. 189 As part of the experimental nature of the return of the jury trial,
only nine regions began conducting jury trials.' 90 The goal of the recent re-
forms in Russia was a bold one. The goal was to destroy the totalitarian
mentality of the country. The aim was to end stereotypes of the historical
Russian and Soviet justice system and to gain public confidence between
courts and the people.' 9'
176. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 30 (Russ.).
177. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 169.
178. Id. at 102.
179. Id.
180. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 169, at 95.
181. See id. at 83.
182. See id. at 102.
183. Id. at 113.
184. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 169, at 123.
185. See id. at 114.
186. Id. at 102.
187. See id. at 127.
188. See id.at 114; see also Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems: The Cases
of Spain and Russia, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 339 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000) [hereinafter Tha-
man, Europe's New Jury System].
189. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 169, at 62.
190. See id. at 81-82.
191. See Thaman, Europe's New Jury System, supra note 188, at 325.
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VI. THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
In July of 2002, Russia adopted a new legal code that governs the pros-
ecution of criminal cases and protects the rights of those accused.' 92 In a
country where the criminal justice system has remained ossified in its Soviet
past, the introduction of the code has been called the first step of a judicial
revolution. 93 The following discussion focuses on the new Russian Criminal
Code;1 94 this discussion is narrowly focused on one portion of the code,
which provides clear direction on conducting a jury trial. This portion of the
code is Chapter 42 which contains Articles 324 through 353. This chapter
and included articles contained therein, set forth the framework from which a
jury trial is conducted in Russia. The chapter provides direction to an au-
dience which includes judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforce-
ment, witnesses, the Russian public, and to the world community.
VII. ORDER OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN A COURT WITH THE PARTICIPATION
OF JURORS
Article 324 is a short introductory statement. It simply states that trials
"with the participation of jurors," i.e., jury trials, will be governed by the
requirements set out in the articles or provisions contained within, Chapter
42 of the code. 95 Basically, a judge need only look at the code, and more
specifically at this chapter, to guide oneself through the procedures of con-
ducting ajury trial.
VII. SPECIFICS IN CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY HEARING
Article 325 of the criminal code recognizes that after the accused de-
mands trial by jury at the close of a preliminary investigation, the judge sets
a preliminary hearing.196 At the preliminary hearing, the judge must confirm
the defendant's choice of a trial by jury.' 97 If there are multiple defendants in
a case, a jury trial will take place if any one defendant requests a jury.1 98
192. See generally Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code]
(Russ.).
193. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 169, at 138.
194. See generally Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code]
(Russ.).
195. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 324
(Russ.).
196. See id. art. 325(l).
197. See id. art. 325(2)-(3).
198. Id. art. 325(2).
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Article 325 also prescribes the number of initials jurors to be brought
into court as the initial venire.' 99 The number is not to be less than twenty
prospective jurors.2° Interestingly, the court makes a determination at the
preliminary hearing whether jury selection will be "open, closed or partially
closed., 20 1 No guidance is given as to when this stage of the proceedings
should be closed or not. This provides the judge wide latitude in making the
determination whether or not to close jury selection to the public. 2°2
Once the judge confirms that a case will proceed with a jury, the deci-
sion is final.20 3 It appears that there is no appeal on this issue.2°4 Once the
judge makes the determination that the case will proceed with a jury, a de-
fendant may neither refuse nor change one's mind.20 5 It is a critical time,
since the decision to proceed with or without a jury is confirmed and fina-
lized at the preliminary hearing. 2"
IX. COMPILING A PRELIMINARY LIST OF JURORS
Article 326 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the initial
compilation of a prospective jury. 27 This section provides that a secretary of
the court or a judge, who is not the presiding judge at trial, select candidates
for jurors, or a venire, from annual lists through a random fashion.20 8
The secretary of the court or the deputy judge then can make a determi-
nation whether there exists any circumstances that would prevent the pros-
pective juror in sitting as a fair and impartial juror at trial. 209 This initial de-
cision is made without the prospective juror being in a formal court ses-
sion.2' 0 This section anticipates an informal inquiry either through the do-
cumentation or contact with the candidate for jury service.21' It gives the
199. Id. art. 325(4).
200. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 325(4)
(Russ.).
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. Id. art. 325(5).
204. See id.
205. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPKI [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 325(5)
(Russ.).
206. See id. art. 325(1), (5).
207. See generally id. art. 326.
208. Id. art. 326(1).
209. Id. art. 326(2).
210. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPKI [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 326(6)
(Russ.).
211. See id. art. 326(2).
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power to exclude candidates who may not be fair and impartial to someone
other than the presiding trial judge.212
Article 326 limits the time in which a person may serve as a juror.213
214Specifically, a person may not serve in more than one trial in any one year.
Participation in any trial, irrespective of length, would preclude service in
that same year.215 Arguably, if a case lasted from the end of one year to
another, a juror would not be required to serve again in the same year the
case was concluded.1 6
After selecting a preliminary list of jurors, the secretary or deputy judge
shall sign off on the list affirming their selection of a venire. 17 The list is
required to include the prospective juror's name as well as his or her father's
last name and home address.1 8
Notifications are required to be given to those chosen to make up a ve-
nire.2' 9 This section requires that citizens be given the place of the court, the
date, and time for their appearance.220 Also, notice must be given a mini-
mum of seven days prior to the case proceeding to trial.22
X. PREPARATORY PART OF A COURT SESSION
Article 327 addresses the procedure in selecting jurors immediately
prior to the questioning of prospective jurors.222 Prior to trial, the presiding
judge determines if there is a minimum of twenty jurors in the prospective
panel.223 If there is not, the judge will order that a minimum of twenty be
summoned.224
The list of the prospective panel is handed to the parties.22- The list is
not allowed to contain the home addresses of the venire members.226 Prior to
212. See id.
213. See id. art. 326(3).
214. Id.
215. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 326(3)(Russ.).
216. See id.
217. Id. art. 326(4).
218. Id.
219. id. art. 326(6).
220. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 326(6)
(Russ.).
221. Id.
222. Id. art. 327.
223. See id. art. 327(3).
224. Id.
225. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 327(4)
(Russ.).
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beginning the questioning of individuals in the venire, the trial judge is re-
quired to tell the parties they are entitled to exercise "a motivated objection
to a juror." '227 A motivated objection is a legal challenge for cause. Further-
more, the presiding judge must explain to the parties that they may exercise
their right to a motivated objection only two times.228 No additional number
of challenges is delineated based upon the type of case involved.229
XI. FORMATION OF A COLLEGE OF JURORS
Article 328 is one of the lengthiest sections in Chapter 42.230 The chap-
ter deals with procedures involving the selection of a jury.23' It should be
noted that a college of jurors means a jury panel.
The first direction under this article is directed towards the presiding
judge. 2 Interestingly, while many judges in Russia are women, throughout
the code the pronoun that references judges is masculine.233 The judge, prior
to jury selection, is required to address the prospective panel. 234 The judge
must give an introductory speech to the candidates of a prospective jury.235
By law, the judge must introduce himself 236 The judge is also mandated to
introduce the parties to the venire.237 The nature of the criminal case that will
be heard by the jury must be explained by the trial judge to the venire.238 The
jury must be told the length of the trial. 239 Also, the venire must be told of
their duties as jurors as well as their role in the criminal proceedings.24
Jurors, prior to selection, have the right to point out any reasons why
they should not be selected.24 If they are unable to perform their duties, they
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
art. 328
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
(Russ.).
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
(Russ.).
241.
Id.
Id. art. 327(5)1.
Id. art. 327(5)2.
See id.
See generally Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code]
(Russ.).
See generally id.
Id. art. 328(2).
See, e.g., id. art. 328(2)1.
id. art. 328(2).
Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] ar. 328(2)
id. art. 328(2)1.
Id. art 328(2)2.
See id. art. 328(2)3.
Id. art. 328(2)4.
Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 328(2)5
Id. art. 328(4).
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may present this to the trial judge.242 The concept of a juror disclosing that
he or she is unable to serve is referred to as self-rejection.243 The position of
a prospective juror's inability to serve will be reviewed by the judge.244 The
judge is required to hear from the parties if a jury candidate claims that it
would be impossible for him or her to serve.245 If the judge rules in favor of
self-rejection, the code requires the judge to remove the prospective juror
from the courtroom. 246
After the review of claims for self-rejection, the trial judge then informs
the parties of their right to make motivated objections towards members of
the venire. 24 ' These are challenges for cause. The parties are then required
to be allowed to question the venire.248 The questions must have a bearing on
their ability to participate in the particular criminal case as a juror.2 49 This
language appears to narrow the focus of questions that may be presented to
possible jurors.
After the questioning by the parties, the judge asks whether there are
any objections to the prospective panel.250 Any objection to the panel is then
addressed by discussing each panel member in order of their sequence on the
jury list.251 Any motivated objection must be reduced to writing.2  Such an
objection may not be announced in open court.253 The code requires the
judge to rule from the bench on these challenges. 4 The trial judge must rule
on the motivated petitions without departure from the court room to a retiring
room for consideration.255
The judge is then required to announce the decision on motivated objec-
tions to the parties. 6 There is no requirement to inform the particular juror
242. Id. art. 328(3).
243. See id. art. 328(4)-(7).
244. Id. art. 328(5).
245. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 328(5)
(Russ.).
246. Id. art. 328(6).
247. Id. art. 328(7).
248. Id. art. 328(8).
249. Id.
250. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPKI [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 328(9)
(Russ.).
251. Id.
252. Id. art. 328(10).
253. Id.
254. See id.
255. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 328(10)
(Russ.).
256. Id. art. 328(11).
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of the decision.2 57 The judge may bring the decision on motivated challenges
to the juror candidate. 258 After consideration of self-rejections and motivated
challenges, the trial judge is required to inform the parties of proceeding with
unmotivated objections. 59 These are preemptory challenges.26
The prosecution must go forward first in exercising unmotivated objec-
tions or challenges. 26' The number of unmotivated objections is dependant
up on the number of jurors remaining.262 The trial judge can grant an equal
number of unmotivated objections to the parties if there are sufficient pros-
pective jurors remaining from self-rejection and motivated objections. 263 In
order to proceed, there must be fourteen remaining members of the venire.2 4
From these individuals, twelve jurors will proceed along with two alter-
nates.2 65 These alternates are referred to as reserve jurors.266 While the code
requires a minimum of two reserve jurors, more can be ordered.2 67 The trial
judge has the discretion, depending on "the character and complexity of the
criminal case," to select additional alternate jurors.268
Once the jury is selected, including reserve jurors, the presiding judge is
required to announce those who have been selected.2 69 The judge is prec-
luded from explaining why any juror was excluded.70 Interestingly, the code
requires the trial judge to thank the juror candidates who have been ex-
cused. 7'
The trial judge then assigns the panel their seating arrangement in order
of their placement on the jury list.2 72 The panel is required to be in a jury box
that is separated from everyone else in the courtroom.273 The jury box, as
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id. art. 328(12).
260. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
328(13) (Russ.).
261. Id. art. 328(14).
262. See id. art. 328(12).
263. Id. art. 328(16)-(17).
264. Id. art. 328(18).
265. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
328(21) (Russ.).
266. See id. art. 328(18).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. art. 328(19).
270. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 328(19)
(Russ.).
271. Id.
272. See id. art. 328(22).
273. Id.
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prescribed in the code, shall be directly opposite the witness stand. 4 The
finalization of jury selection shall take place in camera, outside the presence
of the venire. 75 While questioning and objections take place in the cour-
troom, the college of jurors is formed in camera. 76
If the criminal case will contain evidence of state secrets or any secrets
protected by federal law, the jurors are required to sign a written acknowled-
gement and agree not to divulge such evidence. 7 If a juror declines to sign
an agreement not to disclose privileged secrets, the trial judge shall reject,
i.e., remove, the juror.~'7 There is no discretion available to the trial judge. 79
A juror must be removed and replaced with an alternate upon refusal to pro-
tect privileged secrets from public disclosure.28°
XII. REPLACEMENT OF A JUROR WITH A RESERVE ONE
Article 329 addresses the replacement of a juror from the original col-
lege of jurors, i.e., panel of jurors.281 Once the jury has been selected, this
section contemplates that one of the jurors may not be able to proceed. 282 If
one of the jurors is not able to proceed, the judge may replace the original
panel member with a reserve juror.283
A reserve juror is the Russian counterpart to the American alternate ju-
ror. The alternate juror is selected in the sequence of selection as an alter-
nate.284 The first alternate must be chosen first to replace a juror who is una-
ble to proceed.285 If there is more than one alternate, the sequence mandates
the selection of a replacement.286
The code does not address the specific reason for replacement of the
original juror. No mention is set forth as to health reasons or bias. The re-
placement is based on a broad concept: "[O]ne of the jurors cannot go on
274. See id.
275. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
328(23) (Russ.).
276. Id.
277. Id. art. 328(24).
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 328(24)
(Russ.).
281. See id. art. 329.
282. Id. art. 329(1).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 329(1)
(Russ.).
286. Id.
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participating in the court session. 287 Arguably, this allows the trial judge
broad discretion in deciding to replace a juror with an alternate.288
If there are not enough reserve jurors to hear the case after multiple ju-
rors need replacement, the trial judge is required to find the proceedings to
be invalid. 289 The presiding judge must then begin jury selection again.2"
Jurors who had been previously discharged, as well as the reserve jurors,
may be part of the pool to form a new college of jurors.29'
This section also addresses the inability of a juror to proceed once deli-
beration begins. 292 The judge is again allowed broad discretion to consider
the issue. 29 3 The general language is that during the deliberation there may
be an "impossibility for [some] of the jurors to participate. 294 Once the pre-
siding judge learns and determines that such an impossibility exists, the pan-
el must enter the courtroom. 295 The judge then has the ability to replace a
juror during deliberation and require the new panel to continue deliberations
with a reserve juror.296
XIII. DISMISSAL OF THE JURY BECAUSE OF THE BIASED NATURE OF ITS
COMPOSITION
Article 330 allows the parties one last opportunity to object to the col-
lege of jurors.297 The objection by any of the parties is not based upon an
objection to an individual juror. 98 The objection is directed to the "college
of jurors as a whole., 299
The basis of the objection must be based on the specific facts of the
criminal case to be tried.300 Even though the individual jurors have been
287. Id.
288. See id.
289. Id. art. 329(3).
290. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 329(3)
(Russ.).
291. Id.
292. See id. art. 329(1).
293. See id.
294. id. art. 329(4).
295. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 329(4)
(Russ.).
296. See id.
297. See id. art. 330(l).
298. See id.
299. Id.
300. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 330(1)
(Russ.).
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approved, this section recognizes that the panel, as a whole, may be incapa-
ble of fairly deliberating a verdict.
30 1
Issues of bias and impartiality should have been addressed with the se-
lection of the college of jurors. However, in theory, the facts of the case may
raise questions about the jury as a whole even after the individual question-
ing of potential jurors. °2 Something, such as misconduct, may have oc-
cuffed between the time of individual questioning and the formation of the
college of jurors.
The presiding judge is required to entertain the party's objection, and
must rule after proceeding to chambers, which is called a retiring room in
Russia.30 3 If the presiding judge agrees with the objection, the college of
jurors must be disbanded.3° Jury selection must then begin anew.30 5
XIV. SENIOR JUROR
In the United States, a foreman or foreperson is selected immediately
prior to deliberation.30 6 It is the first order of business for the jury before
deliberations will begin.307 The purpose of a foreman is to help direct delibe-
rations to ensure that the law is followed and respect for fellow jurors is
maintained.3 °8
In Russia, Article 331 addresses the selection and function of a fore-
man- the Russian term used in lieu of foreman is senior juror.3°9 Interesting-
ly, the jury does not wait for deliberations to select the senior juror. Nor is
the selection limited to those jurors who will be deliberating.
The Code provides that the jury, by a majority vote, decides the selec-
tion of the senior juror.310 The selection must then be presented to the atten-
tion of the presiding judge.31 1 The vote does not take place immediately
prior to deliberation.3 12 It takes place immediately after jury selection and
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. Id. art. 330(2).
304. Id. art. 330(3).
305. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 330(3)
(Russ.).
306. See, e.g., Florida STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES § 7.2 (2007).
307. See, e.g., id.
308. See id.
309. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 331
(Russ.).
310. Id. art. 331(1).
311. Id. art. 331(1).
312. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 332(l)
(Russ.).
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before the case proceeds.313 The alternate or reserve juror participates in the
voting for a senior juror.3t 4
The function of the senior juror is not limited to deliberations. 31 5 The
senior juror, during the course of the trial, takes the role of providing direc-
tion to the jury and providing communication to the trial judge.3 16 Any ques-
tions or requests from the jury must be communicated only through the se-
nior juror.1 7 The senior juror is also responsible for answering any questions
placed before the jury by the judge about the case.318 The answers must be in
writing.319 The senior juror must also summarize the result of the voting of
the jury, as well as formalize and announce the verdict in open court. 32 °
XV. TAKING AN OATH BY THE JURORS
Article 332 provides a detailed oath that must be administered to a se-
lected college of jurors. 32' The presiding judge is required to read the oath to
the selected panel verbatim after the senior juror is chosen.322 Unlike an
American oath that is general in nature and requires jurors to swear to per-
form their lawful duty, the Russian oath provides greater detail:
As I begin the discharge of the juror's responsible duties, I hereby
solemnly swear to discharge them honestly and without a bias, to
take into account all the proof considered in court, both those ex-
posing the defendant and acquitting him, and to resolve the crimi-
nal case in accordance with my inner conviction and conscience,
not acquitting a guilty person and not condemning an [sic] guilty
323one, as befits a free citizen and a just man.
After reading the oath to the panel as a whole, the trial judge addresses
each member of the college of jurors, including the reserve jurors, indivi-
313. See id.
314. See id. art. 331(1).
315. See id. art. 331(2).
316. Id.
317. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 331(2)
(Russ.).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. art. 332(1).
322. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 332(1)
(Russ.).
323. Id.
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dually.324 Each individual must respond to the oath with two required words
set out in the code: "I swear. ' ' 32 The judge is required to make a written
note that the oath has been administered and taken.326 Interestingly, the code
requires that everyone in the courtroom, including the jurors, stand while the
oath is being administered and accepted by the panel.327
After the oath is sworn to, the judge is next required to explain to the ju-
rors their rights and duties as set out in the following article.328
XVI. RIGHTS OF THE JURORS
The rights of each juror are enumerated in detail in Article 333.329 This
portion of the code is divided into two conceptual parts. 3 0 First, the article
addresses the rights that jurors have and then the article addresses the rights
that jurors do not have.3
Generally, a Russian juror has the right to be an active participant in a
trial.332 The code recognizes the right of a juror to study all of the circums-
tances of a criminal case.333 Towards that end, a juror has the right to pose
questions to all witnesses through the presiding judge.3 Questions may not
be posed directly to witnesses. 335 They must first be presented to the trial
judge.336
The examination of the case is not limited to questioning witnesses. A
juror has the right to pose questions during the trial about any evidence, in-
cluding documents, demonstrative proof, and the investigative action that
was taken on the case.337 It is a proactive position; more involved than most
American jurors are allowed.
324. Id. art. 332(2)-(3).
325. Id. art. 332(2).
326. Id. art. 332(4).
327. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 332(5)
(Russ.).
328. Id. art. 332(6).
329. Id. art. 333.
330. See id. art. 333(1)-(2).
331. Id.
332. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
333(1)1 (Russ.).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See id. art. 333(2)3.
336. See id. art. 333(1)1.
337. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 331(1)1
(Russ.).
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The Russian juror also has the right to pose questions to the judge dur-
ing the trial.338 A juror has the right to ask the judge about the law of the
case at any time. 39 If there are documents admitted into evidence, a juror is
entitled to inquire about the contents of the documents at any time. 40 As a
general proposition, a juror has the right to ask the trial judge any question
during a trial if one finds any concept or issue to be vague.341 This catchall
phrase allows the juror to ask the judge any question during the trial if the
juror is in the slightest way unclear on any matter.342
The jurors, by law, are entitled to take written notes; there is no prohibi-
tion as to time of taking the notes. 3 This allows a juror to take notes at any-
time during the course of all the proceedings.' The jury is also not limited
to the use of the written notes." The notes taken during the course of a trial
may be taken back to the retiring room or room for deliberation for consider-
ation by the jurors.346
Article 333 informs everyone that jurors do not have certain rights.347
The first right or prohibition to jurors pertains to their attendance in court.348
A juror does not have the right to leave the courtroom while the proceedings
are taking place. 349 This portion of the code is a recognition of the need for
the jury to hear and see all the evidence and testimony in the case as well as
hear the law from the judge.350
Jurors are not allowed to express their opinions about the criminal case
until they begin their deliberations. 35' This ensures that jurors maintain their
impartiality until such time as they have heard all the evidence and the law
and are prepared to discuss the case with their fellow jurors. This is compa-
rable to the expectations placed upon jurors in the United States.
338. Id. art. 333(1)2.
339. See id.
340. Id. art. 333(1)1-2.
341. Id. art. 333(1)2.
342. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
333(1)2 (Russ.).
343. Id. art. 333(1)3.
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 333(2)
(Russ.).
348. Id. art. 333(2)1.
349. Id.
350. See id.
351. Id. art. 333(2)2.
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Jurors are not allowed to communicate with anyone outside the cour-
troom about the circumstances of the pending case.352 While there is no pro-
hibition to questioning witnesses in the courtroom, this portion of the code
precludes jurors from conducting an investigation of the case outside of the
courtroom.353 While inside the courtroom, a Russian juror may actively scru-
tinize the case.354 Independent investigation of the case and even discussion
of the case with anyone outside of the courtroom is prohibited.355 This sec-
tion is comparable with American jury expectations.
The jurors have no right to discuss their deliberations and verdict after
they are excused.356 This section is very broad. The prohibition prevents a
Russian juror from discussing their deliberations and verdict with anyone.357
While one would contemplate this as an assurance to keep the media from
gaining information about the jury's thought process, the prohibition pre-
vents a juror from divulging their work with anyone. While this maintains
the secrecy of the jury deliberation, it also impinges upon a Russian citizen's
ability to speak freely after serving as a juror. This portion of the code is not
comparable to the American jury requirements. Such a portion would be
considered an impingement on a juror's First Amendment rights upon being
excused from jury service.
A juror has no right to fail to come to court without "a serious rea-
son."35 8 The serious reason is not elaborated upon. This provides a trial
judge broad discretion to consider whether a serious reason has been pro-
vided for missing court. If a juror fails to appear in court and fails to provide
an appropriate reason, the presiding judge may impose a monetary fine.359
The contempt power of the Russian trial judge is limited in this circums-
tance.360 American trial judges have contempt power that allows for the im-
position of incarceration and/or a monetary fine. Russian judges are limited
to monetary fines.361
The last portion of this article requires the presiding judge to inform the
jurors of their rights and warn them of the consequence of violating any of
352. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodcks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 333(2)3
(Russ.).
353. Id. art. 333(2)4.
354. See id. art. 333(1)1.
355. Id. art. 333(2)3.
356. Id. art. 333(2)5.
357. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
333(2)5 (Russ.).
358. Id. art. 333(3).
359. Id.
360. See id. art. 333(4).
361. Id. art. 333(3).
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the demands placed on them.36 If they violate any of the demands placed on
13them, the judge may discharge a particular juror. The removal of the juror
is not mandatory." The trial judge is given the discretion to consider the
violation and consider the appropriate action including removal.365 Once
removed, the trial judge may replace the juror with a reserved one.366
XVII. POWERS OF THE JUDGE AND OF THE JURORS
Article 334 generally delineates the function of the judge and the jury.367
The function of a Russian jury is to address three issues or questions that are
presented for its consideration. 368 These issues or questions are: (1) whether
the crime that has been charged was committed or has taken place; (2)
whether the crime that was charged was proven to be committed by the de-
fendant; (3) whether the defendant is guilty of the crime; and when there is a
conviction, an additional question: (4) whether a defendant found guilty of a
crime deserves leniency.369
The first two issues addressed by a Russian jury are similar to the re-
sponsibilities of an American jury. In the United States, the prosecution
must prove both that a crime has been committed and that the defendant on
trial was the person who committed the crime. The third issue is a variance
of the American standard. In the United States, if it has been proven that the
crime had been committed and the defendant committed the crime, then the
jury is bound to convict the defendant.
The third issue or question presented to juries in Russia allows for a
jury to vote for an acquittal even when the case has been legally proven. 370 It
is tantamount to a jury pardon or jury nullification. A number of bases may
be presented to a jury to pardon a particular defendant. One's use of alcohol,
a mental condition, or even economic strata could be considered to find that
a defendant was not guilty.
371
362. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 333(4)
(Russ.).
363. Id.
364. See id. art. 333(4).
365. See id.
366. Id.
367. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 334
(Russ.).
368. id. art. 334(1).
369. Id. art. 339(1)1-3, (4).
370. See id. art. 339(1)2-3.
371. See id. art. 335(8).
[Vol. 33
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss3/1
JURY TRIALS IN POST-SO VIET RUSSIA
Once a defendant is found guilty, the jury has the power to find that the
defendant is entitled to leniency.372 This finding then allows the presiding
judge to attenuate the sentence based on the jury finding that leniency is de-
served.373 This is a power that is in most states in the United States not af-
forded to jurors. In most states and in most cases, the judge alone imposes a
sentence without input from the jury. In capital cases, the jury does have that
input. Interestingly, the Russian code allows the jury to make a finding of
leniency, but no finding that a defendant deserves a severe or tougher sen-
tence.374 Theoretically, based on the language of the code, the presiding
judge is the only person who may find that a convicted defendant deserves a
severe or tougher sentence based on the facts and circumstances of the case
and the particular defendant.375
This article notes that four questions are decided exclusively by the
jury.376 The article then in a straightforward manner, declares that all other
questions are to be decided by the presiding judge.377 Specifically, the jury is
responsible for only those issues and no others.37 8 The trial judge is on his or
her own in deciding a multitude of issues that may arise during the course of
a trial.379
XVI. SPECIFICS OF THE JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION IN A COURT WITH THE
PARTICIPATION OF JURORS
Article 335 provides direction to the judge, parties, and jurors as to their
role in the court proceeding.380 The Russian code refers to the jury trial pro-
ceedings as a judicial investigation. 38' The investigation involves more than
just the judge and parties.382
372. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 339(4)
(Russ.).
373. See generally id.
374. See id. art. 334.
375. See id. art. 334(2).
376. Id. art. 339(1)1-3, 4.
377. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 334(2)
(Russ.).
378. See id. art. 334(l).
379. See id. art. 334(2).
380. Id. art. 335.
381. Id. art. 335(I).
382. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 335
(Russ.).
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The jury trial begins with introductory statements made by the prosecu-
tor and counsel for the defense.383 This is analogous to the opening statement
in American courts. 8
The prosecutor is required in the introductory statement to elaborate on
the nature of the charges that have been brought.385 The prosecutor is also
required to set out the evidence necessary to prove the case and describe the
steps that will be taken to present proof of guilt.386 The duty of the Russian
prosecutor is similar to the requirements of an American prosecutor.387 The
Russian code provides greater detail as to how the prosecutor should pro-
ceed.388 It is generally understood in American courts that the prosecutor in
an opening statement will set out the facts which will support the charges.389
However, the opening statement in many courts does not allow for legal ar-
gument.390 The opening statement is meant to provide the prosecutor an op-
portunity to let the jury know what the facts of the case will be.39' Closing
arguments are generally reserved for presenting legal argument to the jury.3 92
The defense is also required to present their position to the jury in the
introductory statement.393 The language in the code is mandatory for defense
counsel to express their opinion about the charge to the jury.394 The defense,
similar to the prosecution, must also present their position as to the evidence
and proof anticipated during the trial. 395 This requirement is different from
American proceedings. 396 There is no mandatory requirement for the defense
to present an opening statement in American courts.397 Any requirement
would impinge on the presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent,
and the right against self-incrimination.
383. Id. art. 335(1).
384. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 429 (2008).
385. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 335(2)
(Russ.).
386. Id.
387. Compare id., with 75 AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 429.
388. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 335(2)
(Russ.).
389. 75 AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 429.
390. See 88 C.J.S. Trial § 263 (2007).
391. 75 AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 429.
392. 75A AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 444 (2007).
393. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 335(3).
(Russ.).
394. See id.
395. Id.
396. See 75 AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 431 (2007).
397. See id.
[Vol. 33
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss3/1
JURY TRIALS IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
Article 335 allows jurors to pose questions to the defendant, the victim,
witnesses, and experts after they have been questioned by the parties, and the
questions must be reduced to writing and "submitted to the presiding [judge]
through the senior juror., 398 The jury's questions shall be posed by the pre-
siding judge who may rephrase the questions. 399 The judge may also refuse
to pose a proposed jury question if the judge makes the determination that
the question bears no relevancy to the case.4
This portion of the code authorizes the judge to exclude evidence that is
inadmissible in the case."0 The judge has the power to exclude inadmissible
evidence on his own initiative or upon the petition or objection of the par-
ties.402 A judge is required to hear any objections or arguments on the admis-
sibility of evidence outside the presence of the jury.4°3 The code allows for
the parties to state their opinions on the issue of admissibility.404 After con-
sidering the parties' opinions, the judge alone is required to decide issues of
admissibility of evidence. 405
This section notes that the judicial investigation or trial proceedings is a
factual consideration for the jury.4 Only the factual circumstances of the
case are to be presented to the jury for their consideration.4 7 The facts must
relate to the questions the jury is able to address pursuant to Article 334.408
Those questions as previously noted are: 1) whether the crime that has been
charged was committed or had taken place; 2) whether the crime that was
charged was proven to be committed by the defendant; 3) whether the defen-
dant is guilty of the crime; and 4) whether a defendant found guilty of a
crime deserves leniency.409
This section specifically prohibits any inquiry during the jury trial of the
facts of a defendant's prior criminal record or questions relating to whether
the defendant is an alcoholic or a drug addict.410 Moreover, this section has a
398. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 335(4)
(Russ.).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. art. 335(5).
402. Id.
403. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks (UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 335(6)
(Russ.).
404. See id.
405. Id.
406. Id. art. 335(7).
407. Id.
408. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 335(7)
(Russ.).
409. Id. art. 334, 339.
410. Id. art. 335(8).
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general edict that no questions may be posed that will give rise to any bias
against the defendant to the jurors.4"' In the United States, a defendant's
prior record generally may not be used as substantive evidence of guilt.4"2
The number of convictions of a defendant may be considered as impeach-
ment to attack the credibility of a defendant who testifies.4 1 3 Similar to the
Russian code, reputation evidence of a defendant being addicted to alcohol
or drugs would be considered inadmissible.4"4 Similar to American courts,
the Russian code would allow reputation evidence to be admissible if it was
not used to show bad character, but to establish the modus operandi or cor-
pus delicti.4 15 The general reference to bias gives a judge broad discretion
compatible with American courts to determine whether any evidence is un-
duly prejudicial to a defendant.4 16
XIX. PARTIES' PRESENTATIONS
Article 336 generally addresses the parties' rights to closing arguments
in a criminal jury trial.417 The closing arguments are called presentations. 8
As this section notes, the presentations are to be carried out in conformity
with Article 292 of the Russian code.419 Article 292, in turn, more particular-
ly describes the requirements of the presentations of the parties.42°
Article 292 calls the arguments the speeches of the parties.42' The pros-
ecution and defense are entitled to give presentations to the jury.422 The
prosecution always goes first.423 The defense always goes last.424 The victim
or victim's representative may also give a presentation to the jury.4 2 The
ability of the victim to be heard at this juncture is within the presiding
411. Id.
412. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
413. See FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
414. Compare Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
335(8), with FED. R. EvID. 404(a), 608(b).
415. Id.
416. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
335(8).
417. See id. art. 336.
418. Id.
419. Id. art. 336(l).
420. See id. art. 292.
421. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 292(l).
422. Id.
423. Id. art. 292(3).
424. Id.
425. Id. art. 292(2).
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judge's discretion.41 6 After the opening presentation of the prosecution and
the defense, each side is entitled to a response, which is referred to as a re-
tort. 7 This is analogous to the American rebuttal.
The length of the presentations is unlimited.428 Article 292 specifically
forbids a trial judge to limit the time of the presentation. 42 9 The article also
prohibits the court from stopping argument that is relevant and based upon
the fair discussion of admissible evidence.43°
After the initial reference to Article 292, Article 336 generally notes
that the presentations shall not touch upon matters considered after the ver-
dict.431 Arguably, this can refer to sentencing, as well as issues as to the con-
duct of a defendant post trial.432 It is a limitation to the parties to discuss
matters that pertain to the charge and the jury's duty to focus on the issues of
guilt or innocence.433 If one of the parties attempts to discuss matters that are
relevant after a jury verdict, the trial court can stop the presentation and ex-
plain or instruct the jury that it must not take these circumstances into con-
sideration during deliberations.
Finally, Article 336 generally provides that the parties may not refer to
inadmissible evidence during their presentations.435 If the parties do so, the
court is required to stop the party and explain to the jury that it may not con-
sider the circumstances during jury deliberation.436
The ability of a Russian judge to stop inappropriate comments during
presentations is similar to the ability of American judges to prevent inappro-
priate comments during closing arguments. While oftentimes the attorneys
will make an objection, nothing prevents the American trial judge from ad-
dressing serious violations that may be fundamental error if left alone. While
Article 336 does not prevent an attorney from objecting first during presenta-
tions, the code places an affirmative duty on judges to ensure the jury hears
only relevant arguments that are based upon the admissible evidence at tri-
al. 437
426. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
292(2).
427. Id. art. 292(6).
428. Id. art. 292(5).
429. Id.
430. See id.
431. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 336(2).
432. See id.
433. See id.
434. Id.
435. Id. art. 336(3).
436. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 336(3).
437. Id.
2009]
47
: Nova Law Review 33, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
XX. RETORTS OF THE PARTIES AND THE LAST PLEA OF THE DEFENDANT
Article 337 is a short provision that recognizes that all parties have the
right to one rebuttal or retort to the presentation that was originally presented
by the opposing party.438 The last retort belongs to defense counsel and the
defendant.439
This article also recognizes the right of a defendant to make a final plea
in conformity with Article 293 of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code.'4
Article 293 makes the final plea mandatory if the defendant so chooses to
speak.44' While phrased as a last plea, in effect it is the last opportunity the
defendant has to present one's position alone." 2 It is one's individual pres-
entation to the jury after all the other presentations, including any retorts or
rebuttals, have been made." 3
The last plea is the last opportunity for a defendant to speak to the jury
about one's case.44 The opportunity is made without any examination of the
defendant." 5 Article 293 expressly forbids any questions from anyone being
placed before the defendant when the defendant is exercising a final plea to
the jury." 6 Additionally, the defendant may speak as long as one wants.44 A
court has no right to limit the time that the defendant wishes to use during a
last plea.448 The only time the court is allowed to interrupt a defendant's last
plea is if the defendant starts speaking upon matters that are totally unrelated
to the case before the jury." 9
XXI. RAISING QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED BY THE JURORS
Article 338 sets out the Russian equivalent of the American jury charge
conference.450 This section notes that the judge is responsible for the ques-
438. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 337(I)
(Russ.).
439. Id.
440. Id. art. 337(2).
441. Id. art. 293(l).
442. Id.
443. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPKI [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 293(1)
(Russ.).
444. See id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. art. 293(2).
448. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 293(2)
(Russ.).
449. Id.
450. See id. art. 338.
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tions to be placed before the jury in determining the outcome of the criminal
trial.45 ' Similar to special interrogatories in American cases, the judge sub-
mits written questions to the jury to be answered during deliberations.
The judge is required to formulate, or compose, the questions.45 2 Along
with the questions, the judge submits an overview of the judicial investiga-
tion, or trial proceedings, with a summary of the parties' presentations, or
closing arguments.45 3 All these writings must be submitted to the parties for
their review and input.454
The parties have a right to provide input to all questions formulated by
the judge.455 The parties also have the right to provide input as to the overall
summary by the judge concerning the judicial investigation, as well as the
parties' presentations. 4 6 Besides comments, the parties may present to the
judge for consideration their own questions and summaries of the proceed-
ings.
457
This section of the code requires the trial judge to have the jury consider
any defenses that have been raised in the case.458 Any defense which ex-
cludes the defendant's responsibility must be presented to the jury.459 More-
over, any questions that may establish a lesser included offense from the
main charge must be placed before the jury. 4
This section also requires that any discussion of the proposed jury ques-
tions and formulation of such questions must take place outside the hearing
of the jury.461 Specifically, the jurors are required to depart from the cour-
troom whenever such discussions take place.462
The judge is required to finalize the jury questions after considering the
input of the parties.463 When appropriate, the judge should allow the parties'
comments and input to be part of the questions and summaries. 464 The judge
451.
452.
453.
(Russ.).
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
(Russ.).
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
(Russ.).
464.
Id. art. 338(1).
Id. art. 338(4).
Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 338(1)
Id. art. 338(2).
Id. art. 338(4).
Id. art. 338(1).
Id. art. 338(2).
See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 338(2)
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 338(3).
Id.
Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 338(4)
Id. art. 338(2).
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is required to sign the list of questions, verifying that the final questions are
those to be placed before the jury for their consideration.465
Once formalized, the questions shall be read out to the jurors by the
judge in open court.466 The written questions must be handed to the senior
juror.467 If the jurors have any confusion from the list of questions, they are
entitled to ask the trial judge to resolve any ambiguities before their delibera-
tion begins. 68 The presiding judge is cautioned that when explaining any
confusion or ambiguity, not to provide answers to the jury questions.469 The
judge may clear up the form of the question without providing the answers to
them.47 ° It is the role of the jury to answer the questions after being provided
clarity from the judge.47'
XXH. CONTENT OF QUESTIONS PUT TO THE JURORS
Article 339 specifically defines the three basic questions that a jury
must consider in every criminal case.472 The questions are: "1) whether it is
proven that the act has taken place; 2) whether it is proven that the act was
committed by the defendant; [and] 3) whether the defendant is guilty of the
perpetration of this act., 473 A judge is required to pose these questions at a
minimum to a jury. 474 Whether a defendant is guilty is also considered a
basic question.475 This straightforward question must also be presented to the
jury in every case.476 The question of guilt in form is a general question
without any additional issues allowed within the question.477
After the basic questions are posed, private or special questions may be
placed before the jury.478 Those questions may require the jury to consider
465. Id. art. 338(4).
466. Id. art. 338(5).
467. Id.
468. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 338(5)
(Russ.).
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. See id.
472. Id. art. 339(l).
473. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 339(1)1-3
(Russ.).
474. See id. art. 339(1).
475. Id. art. 339(1)3.
476. See id.
477. See id. art. 339(1)2.
478. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 339(3)
(Russ.).
[Vol. 33
50
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss3/1
JURY TRIALS IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
mitigating or aggravating circumstances of the defendant's guilt.479 Also
questions may be presented addressing the defenses claimed by the defen-
dant, including the level of responsibility. 480 Another question the jury may
consider is whether criminal intent has been established and to what ex-
tent.48
Also the jury may consider the use of force utilized by the defendant in
the particular case in question.482 In addition, questions may address the
complicity of each of the co-defendants charged in the perpetration of the
crimes.483
Questions must be presented allowing the defendant to maintain that a
less serious crime was committed.48 Such questions may not be posed if the
result to any answers would involve a more serious crime for which the de-
fendant would be convicted.485
If a defendant is found guilty, the jury must be presented a question on
leniency.486 The jury may respond in any case that the defendant deserves
leniency. 487 The court has no discretion in denying a question of leniency
once a defendant is convicted.488 The trial judge must present a question of
leniency to the jury.489
No question may be presented to the jury that inquires about the defen-
dant's prior criminal record nor criminal history.490 No question either di-
rectly or in combination with another question may address whether the de-
fendant should be categorized as a dangerous recidivist. 49'
Importantly, no question may be presented to the jury that causes a re-
sponse that finds the defendant guilty of an offense that has not been charged
by the prosecutor.492 The questions must address the charge that has been
479. See id.
480. See id. art. 339(3)-(4).
481. Id.
482. See id.
483. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 339(3)
(Russ.).
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id. art. 339(4).
487. See id.
488. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 339(4)
(Russ.).
489. See id.
490. Id. art. 339(5).
491. See id.
492. Id. art. 339(6).
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brought by the prosecutor and that is supported by the evidence. 93 Theoreti-
cally, if a sexual offense is the only charge, no question may be presented
that would convict a defendant of a theft charge that has not been brought by
the prosecutor.494
This article requires that every defendant be entitled to separate ques-
tions for their individual case.495 Questions cannot be combined for co-
defendants.4 96 The questions must be separated for each defendant. 97 More-
over, any questions that are formulated and put before the jury must be com-
prehensible.498 This is an effort to reduce complex legalistic questions to an
understandable fashion to jurors who may be unfamiliar with the law.
XXIII. CHARGING WORD OF THE PRESIDING JUSTICE
Article 340 directs the presiding judge, or justice, to charge the jury be-
fore they deliberate. 99 What the judge must do is contained in this lengthy
article. °° The code requires thdt before the jury deliberates the trial judge
must "address the jurors with the charging word. 50° In essence the charging
word means charging the jury. In an American court, this is charging, or
giving jury instructions to the jury.
The first admonition given to the trial judge is not to express one's opi-
nion on any of the questions that will be posed to the jury.502 A Russian
judge, during the charge of the jury, is expressly prohibited in any manner or
form to convey his own opinion. °3 Arguably, this could be expressed in
word or through body language. American jury instructions often contain a
charge to jurors to disregard anything the judge may have said or done dur-
ing the course of the trial to give the impression that the trial judge had one
position or another as to the outcome of the case.
493. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 339(6)
(Russ.).
494. See id.
495. Id. art. 339(7).
496. See id.
497. Id.
498. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 339(8)
(Russ.).
499. Id. art. 340(l).
500. See generally id. art. 340.
501. Id. art. 340(1).
502. Id. art. 340(2).
503. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 340(2)
(Russ.).
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The charge to the jury is required to contain certain things.504 The first
requirement is to inform the jury of the charge or charges against the defen-
dant that they must decide.5 °5 Next, the judge is required to explain the crim-
inal law with respect to the case and the charge. 50 6 This entails the elements
of the charge necessary to be proven for a conviction.50 7
The judge is also responsible for summarizing the evidence objective-
ly.50 8 This summary must fairly present the evidence that is both inculpatory
and exculpatory. 50 9 The court is not allowed to draw any conclusions from
the evidence nor convey any conclusions to the jury.1 °
The trial judge must also present the position of both the prosecutor and
the defense.51 ' The judge is required to explain to the jury the concept of
weighing the evidence.51 2 This is compatible with American instructions that
touch upon weighing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.
Similar to American instructions, the Russian code contains the re-
quirement that the trial judge must inform the jury of the presumption of
innocence.5"3 While this is a hallmark of American justice, this is a departure
from Soviet law that placed a defendant in the position of proving one's in-
nocence. 514 Now the Russian code aligns its judicial system with the United
States by presuming that a defendant is innocent until such time as the gov-
ernment proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.515 Reasonable doubt or
eliminating doubt must be contained in the charge to the jury.516
Russian jurors are to be advised that they may only consider the evi-
dence that has been introduced during the course of the trial.5 7 They are not
permitted to speculate on matters that were not part of the evidence. 518 Nor
504. Id. art. 340(3)1-7.
505. Id. art. 340(3)1.
506. Id. art. 340(3)2.
507. Id.
508. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 340(3)3
(Russ.).
509. See id.
510. Id.
511. Id. art. 340(3)4.
512. Id. art. 340(3)5.
513. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 340(3)5
(Russ.).
514. John Quigley, The Soviet Conception of the Presumption of Innocence, 29 SANTA
CLARA L. REV., 301,301 (1989).
515. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 340(3)5
(Russ.).
516. Id. art. 340(3)5.
517. Id. art. 340(3)5-6.
518. See id.
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may the jury rely on or speculate or consider evidence that the court ruled
was inadmissible.
The court must instruct the jury that the defendant has the right to re-
main silent and that the refusal to give evidence may not be considered by
them as having any legal importance. 5'9 This is similar to American instruc-
tions, which inform the jury that a defendant has the absolute right to remain
silent and the exercise of that right may not be considered in the jury's deli-
berations. The Russian jury is further informed that a defendant's silence
cannot be considered as evidence of guilt.5 20 This aspect of the Russian code
is similar to American instructions dealing with the right to remain silent and
the jury's requirement to disregard such an exercise and not consider it as
evidence of a defendant's guilt.
The judge must explain to the jurors their responsibility in answering
the written questions or interrogatories presented to them. 52' The presiding
judge must inform them of their voting procedure on questions and for their
procedure to arrive at a verdict.522
The final charge or instruction to the jury is a reminder of their oath that
they had originally taken as jurors to reinforce the importance of considering
the admissible evidence and following the law.523 Then, the judge must also
remind the jury that even if they convict a defendant, they may still find that
"the defendant deserves leniency" in terms of sentencing. 524
After hearing the complete charge or instructions from the judge, the
jury may have questions about the instructions. 525 If so, they are entitled to
further explanations of the charge from the presiding judge prior to their de-
liberations. 5 26 This is different from juror questions on American instruc-
tions. Oftentimes, an American jury begins deliberation and then poses
questions about the instructions. Under the Russian code, jurors' questions
may be posed to the judge for clarification before the deliberations begin.527
Finally, this section allows the parties to make an objection to the final
instructions or charging word of the trial judge. 528 The objection may be
519. Id. art. 340(3)6.
520. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 340(3)6
(Russ.).
521. Id. art. 340(3)7.
522. Id.
523. Id. art. 340(4).
524. Id.
525. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 340(5)
(Russ.).
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id. art. 340(6).
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based upon the concept of the judge "violating the principle of objectivity
and impartiality" in the charging word.529 This limitation is problematic. If
the judge presents instructions in such a way that there is a question of main-
taining objectivity and impartiality, an objection may be preserved. This
raises the question whether an objection may be made for an improper or
incorrect instruction on the law when made in good faith by the judge. Per-
haps this may precipitate an objection or fall under the purview of breaching
objectivity and impartiality.
XXIV. SECRET OF THE JURORS' CONFERENCE
Article 341 generally provides for the conduct of deliberations by the
jurors.130 After the charging word or final instructions, the jurors are re-
quired to proceed to a retiring room or jury room for their deliberations and
consideration of a verdict.5 3' The Russian code refers to the deliberation as a
conference.532 This is the same procedure followed by American jurors.
Perhaps we take for granted that a jury deliberates within their own room.
The Russian code clearly lays out the place where the jury will deliberate.533
This provision precludes anyone other than a jury member from being
in the retiring room or jury room. 534 While not set out in American criminal
codes, the presence of anyone besides the sworn jury would cause a mistrial
in an American court.
This section also allows the jury to stop or choose not to start their con-
ference or deliberations.535 This depends upon the time of day.536 If, accord-
ing to the code, night time comes and it is after working hours, the jurors
have a "right to interrupt their conference for a rest., 537 The right to interrupt
the conference by the jurors must be with the permission of the trial judge.538
Theoretically, if it is getting late the jury may be tired or have family or
business matters to attend to. They may choose to come back in the morning
or next day to complete their deliberations. They may even choose to begin
529. Id.
530. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 341
(Russ.).
531. Id. art. 341(1).
532. Id. art. 341.
533. Id. art. 341(1).
534. Id. art. 341(2).
535. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 341(3)
(Russ.).
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id.
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deliberation the next day if the hour is late. While the jury has the right to do
so, the code only allows the right to be exercised upon approval of the trial
judge.539
Allowing the jury to rest and continue their deliberations is similar to
American courts. In some cases the judge or jury can decide that it is best
for the jury to either begin or complete their deliberations the next day. Of-
ten times this is a discretionary decision. When the jury has been seques-
tered, and also specifically in capital cases, it will not be allowed to go home
and return the next day for deliberations. The Russian code, however, does
not provide for the concept of sequestration.
The jury is also admonished not to divulge their discussions during the
conference or deliberations. 540  This is more stringent than the American
counterpart. American jurors are not allowed to speak with anyone about the
case other than their fellow jurors during deliberations. Once deliberations
are ended and their duties have been completed, they are not required to
speak with the public, but may do so if they so desire.
Finally, this section specifically allows jurors to take their notes made
during the judicial investigation or trial back to the retiring room. 54' The
notes may be used during their conference or deliberation.542 The notes may
be used to assist the jury in the answering of any of the questions that they
must answer as part of the special interrogatories placed before them.543
XXV. PROCEDURE FOR HOLDING THE CONFERENCE AND THE VOTING IN
THE RETIRING ROOM
Article 342 sets out additional procedures that must be followed by the
jury during their conference or deliberations.5" The section is a direction to,
and recognition of, the power of the senior juror, or foreperson.545
The senior juror is given slightly more power and responsibility than the
American counterpart. 546 The senior juror is required to direct the discussion
to the questions posed by the court in the order, or sequence, presented.5 47 It
539. Id.
540. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 341(4)
(Russ.).
541. Id. art. 341(5).
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. See id.
545. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 342
(Russ.).
546. See id. art. 331(2).
547. Id. art. 342(l).
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is also up to the senior juror to hold the voting on any questions and the ver-
dict as a whole and to count the votes. as
The code even provides the manner in which jurors are to cast their
votes. 549 Votes are required to be cast by the show of hands.550 American
deliberations are not as controlled by the senior juror as the Russian code
provides. 55' Nor is the manner of the vote of the individual jurors specifical-
ly defined. The American jury may cast written votes in secret if they so
choose. They may decide as a whole the manner in which to deliberate and
cast their votes on questions and the verdict.
No Russian juror member may abstain from a vote.552 Each juror is re-
quired to vote.55 3 Theoretically, if an individual juror refuses to vote in viola-
tion of the code, the senior juror could bring this to the attention of the trial
judge. In turn, the trial judge could admonish the recalcitrant juror or replace
the juror with a reserved one or alternate.554
While the senior juror is given more power and responsibility than the
other jurors, the code requires that the senior juror be the last person to cast
their vote. 5  Arguably this tempers the power of the senior juror to initially
influence the other members. By allowing others to vote first there may be a
freer uninfluenced vote being made initially.
XXVI. PASSING VERDICT
Article 343 defines the manner and process for reaching a verdict.
55 6
The section begins by providing that a jury should try to reach a unanimous
verdict. 7 This is contrary to every American verdict. A unanimous verdict
is required in every criminal case in the United States. It is not a question of
attempting to reach a unanimous verdict. One must be attained or there is a
hung jury and mistrial.
548. Id.
549. Id. art. 342(2).
550. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 342(2)
(Russ.).
551. See id. art. 331.
552. Id. art. 342(3).
553. Id.
554. See id. art. 329.
555. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 342(4)
(Russ.).
556. See id. art. 343.
557. Id. art. 343(1).
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Interestingly, under the Russian code, a jury has three hours in which to
reach a unanimous verdict.558 This time imposition is also contrary to the
law in American courts. No specific time limitation is imposed on a jury. It
is not unusual for some complex cases, such as capital cases, to have jury
deliberations extend beyond three hours. Some cases take a day or more to
decide.
If the jurors have not reached a unanimous decision in three hours, a
verdict is reached by voting. 559 Simply put, a guilty verdict is reached
through a majority vote.51 If a majority of the jurors answer in the affirma-
tive to the three paramount questions set forth in Article 339, then a guilty
verdict is reached. 56' Those three questions are: "1) whether it is proven that
the act has taken place; 2) whether it is proven that the act is committed by
the defendant; [and] 3) whether the defendant is guilty of the perpetration of
this act. ' 5
62
If there is no majority vote on the aforementioned questions, a not
guilty verdict is reached.563 It should be noted, as specifically set out in the
code, if the jury is split or tied with a vote of six to six, a not guilty verdict is
rendered. 564 A majority for guilt has not been reached and therefore a tie
goes to the defendant in the form of a not guilty verdict.565
On questions other than the three paramount questions set out in Article
339, an answer is arrived similarly by a majority if a unanimous answer may
not be reached. 566 In addition, if there is a tie on non-paramount questions,
the answer that is the most favorable to the defendant is accepted.567 An ex-
ample would be on the question of leniency. If a unanimous decision is not
reached on that question, the majority vote shall prevail.568 On the other
hand, if the jury is equally divided on the question of leniency, the answer to
the question on leniency would be in the affirmative since that answer would
be more favorable to the defendant under the code.569
558. Id.
559. ld.
560. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPKI [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 343(1)-(2)
(Russ.).
561. Id. art. 343(2).
562. Id. art. 339(1)1-3.
563. Id. art. 343(3).
564. See id.
565. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 343(3), (5)
(Russ.).
566. Id. art. 343(4).
567. Id. art. 343(5).
568. Id. art. 343(4).
569. See id. art. 343(5).
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Even when a verdict is attained, the jury may consider varying the ver-
dict to reflect a charge that is more favorable to the defendant. 570 In theory,
the jury, within its discretion under the code, could find the defendant guilty
of a lesser included offense, even if the main charge has been proven.571
That is a matter that is within their discretion when passing a verdict.
572
The code specifies the manner in which the answers to the three ques-
tions under Article 339 must be presented.573 The answers must be in writ-
ing.574 Furthermore, the answers are limited to a confirmation, i.e., affirma-
tion or negation, i.e., in the negative.575 The response must also be followed
by an explanatory phrase addressing guilt or innocence.576 An example of
the form of the answer to those questions would be: "Yes, guilty," or "No,
not guilty. '5
77
The senior juror is required to enter the responses to all the questions
based upon the vote of the jury.578 If a unanimous verdict is not reached, the
senior juror is also responsible for noting the vote count as part of the re-
sponse to the written interrogatories.579 Finally, the senior juror is required to
sign the verdict form and list of interrogatories.i
XXVII. ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRESIDING JUSTICE
AND RESUMPTION OF THE JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION
Article 344 sets out the procedure for the jury to raise questions about
their deliberations and also to reopen the case to consider additional evidence
if they feel the need and the judge concurs with the request.581
The section begins with the acknowledgement that the jury may have
questions about the questions posed to them by way of the interrogatories as
part of the verdict.582 The code allows the jury to pose questions if they are
570. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 343(6)
(Russ.).
571. Id. art. 338(2).
572. Id. art. 343(6).
573. See id. art. 343(7)-(10).
574. See id. art. 343(8).
575. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPKJ [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 343(7)
(Russ.).
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Id. art. 343(8).
579. Id. art. 343(9).
580. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 343(10)
(Russ.).
581. Id. art. 344(1)-(6).
582. Id. art. 344(l).
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confused or need clarification on the questions presented to them by the trial
judge.83 The specific procedure for posing questions is set forth in this ar-
ticle. The jury must come back into the courtroom and present their ques-
tions to the presiding judge through the senior juror.584 This procedure is
slightly different from the one exercised in American courts. An American
jury will reduce any question they may have to writing.5 85 There is no re-
quirement that the American foreperson be the writer of the question nor
specifically be required to convey the question to the judge.586
Once presented with the questions, the judge may solicit the opinions of
the parties to determine how to respond.587 The ultimate burden is on the
trial judge to appropriately respond to the questions posed to him or her by
the jury.588 The code notes that the court may explain the questions or
present additional questions based on the juror's need for clarification. 89
If there is an amendment to the original questions presented by the
judge to the jury, an additional charging word, or instructions, must be pro-
vided to the jury.590 The code refers to the additional charging word as being
a brief one at that time.59' Once the explanations are made, or additional
questions are posed to the jury, and after the additional brief charging word,
the jury is required to return to the retiring room to continue with their deli-
berations.592
Interestingly, the jury may make a request to resume the judicial inves-
tigation even after they have begun their conference or deliberation.593 The
code provides that if the jury has doubts about the factual circumstances of
the case which is essential to their answering the questions before them in the
verdict, they may request the judge to resume the judicial investigation.594 In
essence the code provides for the reopening of the case to introduce facts on
issues the jury has doubts on.5 95 In theory, the jury could hear additional
583. Id.
584. Id.
585. See American Bar Association, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials 22 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf.
586. See id.
587. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] 344(6)
(Russ.).
588. See id. art. 344(2).
589. Id.
590. Id. art. 344(3).
591. Id.
592. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 344(4)
(Russ.).
593. Id. art. 344(5).
594. Id.
595. See id.
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testimony or evidence, or have testimony repeated or clarified. The request
for the resumption of the judicial investigation is made to the trial judge
through the senior juror in open court.596
This procedure is different from the recognized procedures in American
courts. Once an American jury begins deliberating, there is no authority to
allow for the reopening of the criminal case for additional testimony or evi-
dence.597 Under some circumstances, a jury may request to review evidence
that has already been admitted.598 Also, an American jury may ask for the
testimony of one of the parties to be re-read to them.599 This may be within
the discretion of the court subject to the parties' objections.
Once the request to resume the judicial investigation is made, the pre-
siding judge must consider the parties' opinion." The judge must make the
ultimate decision whether or not to grant the request for the resumption of
the judicial investigation.60'
If the court allows for the resumption of the judicial investigation, the
parties and the court follow the procedure that takes place at the end of the
original judicial investigation. °2 This means that the court must formulate
additional or modified questions with the input of the parties.60 3 The parties
are again allowed to make a presentation or argument to the jury along with
retorts or rebuttal, and the defendant is allowed again to speak to the jury if
he or she chooses, which is described as one's final plea.6°4 Once again, the
judge must provide a charging word to the jury with appropriate summaries
of everyone's position on the case.605 The jury then, once again, must pro-
ceed to their conference or deliberation in order to reach a verdict.
6 °6
596. See id. art. 344.
597. Cf Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 332-33 (1971).
598. See Sherry M. Purdy, Casenote, Videotaped Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases:
United States v. Binder, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV., 193, 196-98 (1987).
599. See id. at 196-97.
600. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 344(6)
(Russ.).
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. See id.
604. Id.
605. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 344(6)
(Russ.).
606. Id.
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XXVIH. PROCLAMATION OF THE VERDICT
Article 345 addresses the protocol to be followed by the jury after
reaching a verdict.6°7 The senior juror is required to sign the list of answered
questions that were posed to the jury by the presiding judge.60 8 The jury is
required to return to the courtroom after completing their conference or deli-
beration in the retiring room or jury room.'
The senior juror in open court is responsible for announcing the ver-
dict. 610 This is done by reading aloud each question put to the jury by the
judge followed by announcing the corresponding answers by the jury.6 1'
Interestingly, the code requires that when the verdict is announced, eve-
ryone in the courtroom must stand.61 2 This is in contrast with American
courts where the parties and counsel will stand when receiving the verdict.
The audience, however, in American courts is not required to stand when the
verdict is read.
The Russian code provides that the proclaimed verdict must be physi-
cally presented to the presiding justice.61 3 The justice is then required to
make the verdict together with all the questions and answers part of the crim-
inal case or file.614 This ensures, similar to an American trial, that there is a
record for appellate purposes.
XXIX. ACTIONS OF THE PRESIDING JUSTICE AFTER THE PROCLAMATION
OF THE VERDICT
Article 346 sets out the protocol to be followed by the presiding justice,
or trial judge, after the proclamation, or receiving, of the verdict.65 If the
jury finds the defendant not guilty, the presiding justice shall declare the de-
fendant to be acquitted.6 6 If the defendant is in custody, he or she must be
immediately released after an acquittal.6 7 The code specifies that the release
607. See generally id. art. 345.
608. Id. art. 343(10).
609. Id. art. 345(1).
610. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 345(3)
(Russ.).
611. Id.
612. Id. art. 345(4).
613. Id. art. 345(5).
614. Id.
615. See generally Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code]
art. 346 (Russ.).
616. Id. art. 346(1).
617. Id.
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is immediate and directly from the courtroom from which the not guilty ver-
dict was rendered. 1 8
These first two provisions are comparable with American trials. Upon
receiving a not guilty verdict, an American judge must accept the verdict of
the jury without any ability to vary the acquittal. On the other hand, while
American courts require the release of an acquitted defendant from custody,
not all jurisdictions require the release to be directly from the courtroom as
the Russian code specifies. An American detainee may be released in some
jurisdictions after being processed through the jail the same day within a
short period of time.
The Russian code requires the presiding justice to thank the jury for
their service. 61 9 Also after the proclamation of the verdict, the trial judge
must inform the jury that their service in the case has ended.620 American
judges thank jurors for their service, but it is not a requirement set out in
every code. Similar to the Russian courts, American judges also discharge
the jury after the verdict has been received. Often they are discharged or
excused with the thanks and appreciation of the judge and the parties.
After the verdict is rendered, there may be consequences to the ver-
dict.62 ' An example of a consequence would be the sentencing after a guilty
verdict.622 The code recognizes that after any verdict the consequences shall
be discussed among the parties and the judge without the participation of the
jury.623 Once the jury has given "the proclamation of the verdict," their du-
ties cease.624
The jurors still have the right to stay in the courtroom after they have
reached a verdict and have been relieved of their duties.625 The Russian code
requires, however, that if a juror decides to remain for the discussion of the
consequences of the verdict, it must be seated with the rest of the public in
the audience.626 In essence after the verdict is reached they no longer are
jurors and return to public seating if they decide to observe the remaining
proceedings.627
618. Id.
619. Id. art. 346(2).
620. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 346(2)
(Russ.).
621. Id. art. 347.
622. Id. art. 347(3).
623. Id. art. 346(3).
624. Id. art. 346(2).
625. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 346(3)
(Russ.).
626. Id.
627. See id. art. 346(2)-(3).
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XXX. DISCUSSION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE VERDICT
Article 347 defines the roles of everyone and also the matters to be dis-
cussed after the proclamation of the verdict.6"8 After the verdict is received,
the judicial proceedings continue with the participation of the parties and the
judge. 9
This section first addresses the procedure when a not guilty verdict is
rendered.63° If a not guilty verdict is rendered, the parties must address the
issue of the civil claims contained within the criminal case.63' Under the
Russian code, issues of restitution or damages are handled within and not
separate from the criminal case.632 An example would be if there was a bur-
glary or aggravated battery case where damages arose from the defendant's
conduct.
The issue of damages is addressed through questions placed before the
jury in the criminal case.633 Even when there is a not guilty verdict, damages
may be assessed civilly against a defendant if the jury so finds. 634 While this
may appear inconsistent with a not guilty finding, the Russian code distin-
guishes innocence from a finding of civil responsibility.
If there is a conviction, the parties are also allowed to be heard on sen-
tencing issues.635 This is done prior to the actual sentencing.636 The defense
counsel and the defendant have the right to be heard last.637 Besides discus-
sion of the civil claim, the issue of classification of the criminal conduct and
the issue of punishment may also be discussed.638 The parties have the right
to be heard prior to the judge pronouncing sentence.639 The argument of the
parties must address matters that need resolution, such as the appropriate
classification and the appropriate sentence to be imposed.64° The parties are
prohibited from arguing that the verdict reached by the jury was inappro-
628. See id. art. 347.
629. Id. art. 347(1).
630. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 347(2)
(Russ.).
631. Id.
632. See id. art. 347(3).
633. See id. art. 347(2).
634. See id.
635. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 347(3)
(Russ.).
636. See id.
637. Id. art. 347(5).
638. See id. art. 347(4).
639. See id. art. 347(5).
640. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 347(4)
(Russ.).
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priate.64' They are precluded from casting doubt on the correctness of the
jury's discretionary decision. 62
After the parties present their last arguments before the court, prior to
sentencing, the defendant has the right to be heard.64' 3 The defendant has
another last plea.644 Before sentencing, the last plea of the defendant is be-
fore the presiding justice.645 After hearing the last arguments from everyone,
the judge is required to retire and consider his or her decision on the sentence
to be imposed in the criminal case. 6
XXXI. OBLIGATORY CHARACTER OF THE VERDICT
Article 348 deals with the impact of the verdict and how the presiding
justice or trial judge is required to address it.647 First, the code mandates that
a not guilty verdict is a mandatory verdict that the judge must accept.648 He
or she cannot reject it, ask for further deliberations, nor override it with a
finding of guilt.649 The judge upon receiving a not guilty verdict must pass or
find the defendant not guilty. 60 A sentence of acquittal shall be entered by
the presiding justice.651
Second, the code notes that a verdict of guilty is also obligatory.652 The
trial judge must accept it.653 However, the code also notes that the judge has
the ability to override a guilty verdict under some circumstances set out in a
later portion of Article 348.654 This paper will address this exception shortly.
The judge must make certain determinations or findings when the jury
renders a guilty verdict.655 The judge is required to determine the classifica-
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Id. art. 347(5).
644. Id.
645. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 347(5)
(Russ.).
646. Id.
647. See generally id. art. 348.
648. Id. art. 348(l).
649. See id.
650. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 348(1)
(Russ.).
651. Id.
652. Id. art. 348(2).
653. Id.
654. Id. art. 348(2), (4), (5).
655. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 348(3)
(Russ.).
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tion or degree of the convicted crime.656 The judge must also consider the
circumstances of the facts of the case without assistance from the jury before
imposing a sentence.657
A trial judge has the discretion to pass a sentence of acquittal or over-
ride a guilty verdict.6 8 This may occur if the presiding justice finds that the
acts committed by the defendant do not give rise to a crime. 659 This is com-
parable to an American judge granting a judgment of acquittal. If a legally
sufficient case is not proven, i.e., a prima facie case, an American judge has
the power to grant a dismissal of the case. It is not, however, considered a
passing or sentence of acquittal as the Russian code proscribes.66
The judge also has the discretion to determine whether the defendant is
an innocent person irrespective of a guilty verdict.66' The basis of this de-
termination is that the defendant's guilt has not been established, or that the
defendant's participation in a crime has not been proved.662 If a court deter-
mines that a convicted defendant is an innocent person, the court can proceed
further.663 In American trials, once a jury or a judge makes a determination
of legal insufficiency, that trial judge can go no further based on double jeo-
pardy protections. 6
6
The Russian courts face no double jeopardy restriction.665 The code al-
lows the trial judge to take further steps in the case even when the judge
makes a finding that the defendant is innocent.666 The court may dismiss the
college of jurors but must address a resolution on sending the criminal case
for a new consideration. 67 This is tantamount to the case being reset and
retried before another judge and jury.668 Procedurally, the case may be in-
itially referred to the beginning stage of a preliminary hearing should a judge
grant a resolution sending the criminal case for a new consideration. 669 This
656. Id.
657. See id.
658. Id. art. 348(4)-(5).
659. Id. art. 348(4).
660. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 348(4)
(Russ.).
661. Id. art. 348(5).
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978).
665. See Ugolovno-Protsessuai'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 348(5)
(Russ.).
666. Id.
667. Id.
668. See id.
669. Id.
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is a significant decision by a Russian trial judge.670 The decision is not sub-
ject to appeal. 67' This gives the judge tremendous power to continue pro-
ceedings against a defendant whom the government has unsuccessfully pros-
ecuted the first time.
This is a troubling portion of the Russian code. It allows the govern-
ment to continue prosecution even after being unsuccessful the first time.
Without the American protection against double jeopardy, a Russian citizen
may go through multiple trials after a trial judge grants an acquittal to a con-
victed defendant. Arguably, a judge could find sufficient facts to warrant
additional investigation and continued prosecution after a first or even
second trial or more.
XXXII. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF RECOGNIZING THE DEFENDANTS AS
DESERVING LENIENCY
Article 349 addresses the concept of leniency in sentencing, directing
the presiding judge on how to proceed. 672 The section begins by mandating
that the trial judge must accept the finding of the jury that leniency is merited
in the case before it.673 The code describes the finding as an obligatory one
for the judge.674 The court has no discretion to disregard or override the de-
termination by the jury that a defendant deserves leniency.675
A jury decides when a defendant deserves leniency and so notes it as
part of the verdict.676 Once the jury makes this determination, the judge must
account for leniency in the sentence.677 The code then directs the trial judge
to follow Article 64 and Article 65 of the Russian Criminal Code.678
Article 64 allows the judge, upon a jury's finding of leniency, to impose
the most lenient sentence under the sentencing requirements of the Russian
code.67 9 The court may also disregard any additional mandatory sentencing
670. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 348(5)
(Russ.).
671. Id.
672. See id. art. 349.
673. Id. art. 349(1).
674. Id.
675. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 349(1)
(Russ.).
676. See id.
677. Id.
678. Id. art. 349(2). Note that this code is substantive as compared with the procedural
law of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure.
679. Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 64(1) (Russ.).
2009]
67
: Nova Law Review 33, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
requirements.680 This would be analogous to a court being able to disregard a
minimum mandatory sentence in the United States.
Article 65 further provides that irrespective of the lenient sentence im-
posed, it may not exceed two-thirds of the maximum term for the particular
crime charged. 681' An example would be for a robbery case that has a maxi-
mum sentence of thirty years. A Russian judge obligated by a jury finding of
leniency would under no circumstance be able to exceed a sentence of twen-
ty years. Additionally, if the defendant is convicted of a capital offense or a
life felony, Article 65 precludes a judge from imposing either a capital sen-
tence or a respective life sentence if the jury finds the defendant deserves
leniency.682
The presiding judge also has the discretion to impose a more lenient
sentence, even when the jury makes no finding for leniency, when reaching a
guilty verdict.68 3 Article 349 gives the trial judge this authority. 684 The trial
judge may take into consideration the circumstances of the case and the de-
fendant, along with any mitigating and aggravating circumstances relating to
the case.685 The court is directed to consider sentencing under the Russian
Criminal Code, giving consideration again to Article 64.686
Article 64 contains the necessary predicate for the trial judge to consid-
er when solely deciding to impose a lenient sentence.687 Generally, the stan-
dard is one of exceptional circumstances set out in the aforementioned ar-
ticle.688 The exceptional circumstances must relate to the motive or purpose
689 i nbehind the crime. Was it one of malice or was the defendant committing a
crime with the motive to assist his family?
Under Article 64, the court must consider the role played by the defen-
dant in the crime. 69° Also, the court is required to consider the behavior of a
defendant during or after the commission of the crime. 69' The court must
consider the societal impact of the crime in terms of danger.692 A drug of-
680. Id. art. 65(1).
681. Id. art. 65(1).
682. Id.
683. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 349(2)
(Russ.).
684. id. art 349(2).
685. Id.
686. Id.
687. Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 64(1) (Russ.).
688. Id.
689. Id.
690. Id.
691. Id.
692. Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 64(1) (Russ.).
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fense may be considered less dangerous than a crime of violence such as
robbery or sexual battery.
The court may consider particular mitigating circumstances or the to-
tality of mitigating circumstances when considering whether the circums-
tances rise to the standard of being exceptional to merit a more lenient sen-
tence.693 The actual sentence imposed when the judge makes the finding of
leniency without the jury is the same substantively as when the jury deter-
mines a defendant deserves leniency.694
XXXIII. KINDS OF DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE PRESIDING JUSTICE
The criminal jury trial ends through the conduct of the trial judge.695
The procedure is set out in Article 350 which the judge must follow to com-
plete the case.696 At the conclusion of the case, a presiding judge has four
options or decisions to make.697 In order to reach this decision, a judge must
not only review Article 350, but also multiple other sections of the code that
are referenced in order to properly conclude the case. 698 This paper will go
through the myriad of sections which the judge must consider and follow in
order to complete the case.
The first option or decision that the judge must consider is "the termina-
tion of the criminal case. ' 6 99 Article 254 governs the law when considering a
termination of the criminal case.7°° A court must terminate a criminal case
under certain circumstances pursuant to Article 24 before the case proceeds
before the jury.70' These circumstances include the expiration of the period
of limitation for the criminal case.702 This is the Russian version of the
American statute of limitations or speedy trial rules.703 Another circumstance
would be the death of the suspect or accused.704 This would result in termi-
693. Id. art. 64(2).
694. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 349(2)
(Russ.).
695. See id. art. 350.
696. See id.
697. Id.
698. See id.
699. Id. art. 350(l).
700. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 254
(Russ.).
701. Id. art. 254(1).
702. Id. art. 24(1)3.
703. See id.
704. Id. art. 24(1)4.
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nation of the criminal case.70 5 Additionally, if there is an "absence of the
victim's application" to pursue the case, a judge must terminate the case.7"
The judge must also terminate the criminal case if the proper charging au-
thority has not been followed.7 7 Under Article 448, different governmental
positions, such as judges or prosecutors who face criminal charges, must be
prosecuted by those named specifically. 7°8 If the procedure is not followed,
the trial judge would be required to terminate the case. °9
The judge is also required to stop or terminate a prosecution pursuant to
Article 27.710 The circumstances set out in this provision include the non-
involvement of the suspect. 1 If the accused is shown at any point not to be
involved with the crime, a judge is required to stop or terminate the case.712
Also, when there is a resolution to terminate the case made by the body of
inquiry, investigator, or prosecutor, the judge must terminate the case. 713
Additionally, when the Russian Parliament refuses to institute a case against
a member of that legislative body, the judge must terminate the case.711 If
the Russian Parliament refuses to bring a Human Rights action, the judge
must terminate the case. 715 And if the Russian Parliament refuses to remove
the grant of immunity to the President of the Russian Federation during a
prosecution, the judge must terminate the case.7 16
The prosecutor during a criminal prosecution has a duty to the court
pursuant to Article 246.717 Anytime during the case, a prosecutor may de-
termine that there is a legally insufficient case to move forward with.718
When that occurs, the code requires the prosecutor to renounce or dismiss the
705. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 24(1)
(Russ.).
706. Id. art. 24(1)5.
707. Id. art. 24(1)6.
708. Id. art. 448(1).
709. Id. art. 24(1)6.
710. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 254(1)
(Russ.).
711. Id. art. 27(l)].
712. See id.
713. See id. art. 27(1)5.
714. See id. art. 448(1)(1).
715. See id. art. 448(1)(7).
716. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 27(1)6
(Russ.).
717. Id. art. 246.
718. Id. art. 246(7).
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case and to explain the situation to the court. 7 19 The court must in turn record
and terminate the case.72 °
The prosecution of a criminal case requires the victim to appear and
participate.2 Should a victim refuse to appear or participate in the criminal
proceeding, this will result in the termination of the case when the appear-
ance is obligatory by law.722 Article 249 addresses this area of termination of
cases. 723 It would be the responsibility of the prosecutor to renounce the case
and bring the matter to the court's attention.724
The court, in concluding or terminating a case, must also consider three
other sections. 725 Article 25 deals with the parties' reconciliation.7 6 An ap-
plication may be filed by a victim of a crime to terminate the case.727 The
victim could be a friend or family member of the defendant, although no
relationship is required under the code.728 The crime must be a first offense
and be a minor one or one of ordinary gravity.729 The prosecutor must ap-
prove the termination along with the parties, the court, and the investiga-
tor.73° If there is reconciliation and compensation to the victim for any dam-
ages suffered, termination takes place with the approval of all the interested
participants. 3
A case may be terminated based on a change of the situation, pursuant
to Article 27.732 This section provides that if the person has changed or the
facts of the case have changed to the point where the defendant is no longer
socially dangerous, the case may be terminated.733 Perhaps the defendant has
been rehabilitated from a drug or alcohol abuse problem.3 The prosecutor
must approve the termination along with the parties, the court, and the inves-
719. Id.
720. Id.
721. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 249(l)
(Russ.).
722. Id. art. 249(2).
723. See id. art. 249.
724. See id. art. 254(2).
725. See id. art. 25, 27, 28.
726. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 25 (Russ.).
727. Id.
728. See id.
729. See id.
730. Id.
731. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 25 (Russ.).
732. See id. art. 27.
733. Id.
734. See id. art. 134.
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tigator.735 The crime must be a first offense and be a minor one or one of
736ordinary gravity.
A case may also be terminated if there has been inadmissible evidence,
such as a confession obtained without the presence of counsel or one that has
not been confirmed by the defendant and is only established through hear-
say. 37 The prosecutor must approve the termination along with the parties,
the court, and the investigator.738 The crime must be a first offense and be "a
minor one or [one] of an ordinary gravity., 739  The second option or deci-
sion under Article 350 that the judge must consider to complete a case is the
sentence of acquittal.7 40 Articles 305 and 306 govern this consideration. 4
The former section requires that three basic questions be placed before every
Russian jury.742 Those questions are: "1) whether it is proven that the act
has taken place; 2) whether it is proven that the act [is] committed by the
defendant; [and] 3) whether the defendant is guilty of the perpetration of this
act. 74 3 If any one of those questions is answered by the jury in the negative,
the judge must enter a sentence of acquittal. 744
The third option or decision under Article 350 that the judge must con-
sider to complete a case is the sentence of conviction.745 The judgment of
conviction may be entered only after considering and reflecting on the legal
sufficiency of the case based on all the admissible evidence.746 The judgment
of conviction is governed by Article 302. In passing a sentence of convic-
tion, the judge must specify the punishment. 748 It could be a time certain or a
suspended sentence. 749 A judge is also authorized to impose no punish-
ment.
750
735. Id. art. 25.
736. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPKI [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 25
(Russ.).
737. Id. art. 28; see also id. art. 75(2).
738. Id. art. 25.
739. Id.
740. Id. art. 350(2).
741. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 305, 306
(Russ.).
742. Id. art. 339(1)1-3.
743. Id.
744. Id. art. 350(2).
745. Id. art. 350(3).
746. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 302(4)
(Russ.).
747. Id. art. 302(4)-(5), (7).
748. Id. art. 302(5)1, (7).
749. Id. art. 302(5)1-2.
750. Id. art. 302(5)3.
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The judge is required to compile or reduce the sentence to its proper
form pursuant to Article 303.5' It also must address all the questions re-
solved by the jury.752 The sentence must also be reduced to either a writing
by hand or by the use of a technical device, whether that is a transcript or by
computer.753
Under Article 307, the judgment of conviction must contain a descrip-
tive-motivation part. A This means there must be a description of the crimi-
nal act supplied by the judge.755 Also, the judge must set out the place, time,
and method of the crime's perpetration.5 The court is responsible for pro-
viding the evidence and conclusions that were reached that served as the
basis for the defendant's conviction.757 The form must also contain a consid-
eration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances that impact the sen-
tence.758 The court must explain how it handled the resolution of questions
during the trial.759 In general, the judge is required in the sentencing form for
conviction, to summarize and describe all the factual and legal issues at tri-
a.760
The judgment of conviction form must also contain a resolutive part set-
ting forth the details of the sentence under Article 308.761 This part requires
the defendant's full name to be set forth.762 The judge must record and rec-
ognize the defendant to be guilty. 763 The criminal code violation must be
specified.7 4 The punishment administered must be noted.765 The name of
the correctional institution must be identified in the resolutive part of the
judgment of conviction.766 Any probationary period and any other type of
Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 303
See id. art. 303(l).
Id. art. 303(2).
Id. art. 307.
Id. art. 307(l).
Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 307(1)
See id. art. 307(2).
See id. art. 307(3).
Id. art. 307(4).
See id. art. 307(1).
Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 308
Id. art. 308(1)1.
Id. art. 308(1)2.
Id. art. 308(1)3.
Id. art. 308(1)4.
Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 308(1)6.
751.
(Russ.).
752.
753.
754.
755.
756.
(Russ.).
757.
758.
759.
760.
761.
(Russ.).
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
(Russ.).
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punishment must be detailed in the form.767 The judge must also account for
any time the defendant served while being detained before trial either while
in jail, house arrest, or in a mental hospital.768 This time is offset, which
means a defendant is entitled to the time that he or she was detained prior to
trial including the conviction and sentence. This form also requires the judge
to describe the restraint necessary for the defendant prior to the sentence
being imposed and served.769 The court must detail those charges that the
defendant was convicted on and on those where there was an acquittal.77°
Finally, the court must record that a sentence is suspended or that no pu-
nishment at all is being meted out.77'
The fourth and last option or decision under Article 350 that the judge
must consider to complete a case is the resolution on the dismissal of the
college of jurors and the sending of "the criminal case for a new considera-
tion by another composition of the court., 7 72 The judge has the discretion,
pursuant to Article 348, to determine that a defendant is an innocent person
irrespective of a guilty verdict.773 The basis of this determination is that the
defendant's guilt has not been established or that the defendant's participa-
tion in a crime has not been proved.7 If a court determines that a convicted
defendant is an innocent person, the court can proceed further. The court
may dismiss the college of jurors, but must address a resolution on sending
the criminal case for a new consideration. 775 This is tantamount to the case
being reset and retried before another judge and jury. Procedurally, the case
may be initially referred to the beginning stage of a preliminary hearing,
should a judge grant a resolution sending the criminal case for a new consid-
eration.
XXXIV. PASSING THE SENTENCE
Article 351 addresses the procedure the judge must follow before im-
posing a sentence.776 Passing a sentence basically means determining, for-
767. Id. art. 308(1)7.
768. Id. art. 308(1)9.
769. Id. art. 308(1)10.
770. Id. art. 308(2).
771. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 308(3)
(Russ.).
772. Id. art. 350(4).
773. Id. art. 348(5).
774. Id.
775. Id. art. 350(4).
776. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 351
(Russ.).
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mulating, imposing, and recording the sentence. The first requirement for a
judge is to proceed with sentencing based on the mandate of Chapter 39 of
the code.777 Chapter 39 contains articles 296 through 313.778 This paper has
already addressed several of the provisions contained in those articles.779
This paper will generally provide an overview of Chapter 39 to give some
sense of the judge's responsibility in passing the sentence.
Chapter 39 requires the judge to address many issues before a sentence
may be passed.780 The judge must first be convinced of the legality, substan-
tiation, and justness of the sentence.78  The judge must reflect on these
things.782 The judge must go to a retiring room or chambers to maintain the
secrecy of the judge's conference or deliberation on the passing of a sen-
tence.783
The judge must resolve questions that the code presents.7 M These ques-
tions are similar to the ones answered by the jury. They are questions that
deal with the legality of the conviction and the appropriateness of any sen-
tence to be imposed.785 The judge is required to consider the defendant's
sanity before imposing sentence.786 The judge is required to consider the
different types of sentences that can be imposed.787 The judge is also re-
quired to compile or reduce the sentence to written form with details of the
case and the court's findings.788 These details of the case and sentence pro-
vide a record from which the public and the appellate court may review.
Importantly, the judge is required in any sentence to set out the proce-
dure and time frame in which to file an appeal. 789 The judge is required to
return to the courtroom to pronounce or impose the sentence.790 Everyone
present in the courtroom is required to stand as the judge pronounces the
777. Id.
778. Id. art. 296-313.
779. See supra notes 746-72 and accompanying text.
780. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 296-313
(Russ.).
781. Id. art. 297(l).
782. See id.
783. See generally id. art. 298.
784. See id. art. 299.
785. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art.
299(1)1-17 (Russ.).
786. Id. art. 300(l).
787. Id. art. 302.
788. Id. art. 303(I)-(2).
789. Id. art. 309(3).
790. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 310(1)
(Russ.).
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sentence."' The judge must also be mindful when a defendant is in custo-
dy.792 If there is a sentence of acquittal, the defendant must be released from
the courtroom after the judge pronounces the sentence.793
The judge must also adhere to the mandate to provide copies of the
written sentencing document to the defendant, to defense counsel, and to the
prosecutor. 94 Copies must be provided to the respective individuals within
five days of the pronouncement of the sentence.795
While Article 351 is instructive to the trial judge to follow Chapter 39
in passing sentence, Article 351 also is instructive to the trial judge on what
not to do.796 The judge is prohibited from naming the jurors in the written
sentence form.797
This section also requires the judge to reference the charge and verdict
of the jury when a sentence of an acquittal is rendered.798 When there is a
sentence of conviction, the judge must describe the criminal act of which the
defendant was found guilty.799 The court must also provide an explanation
for the punishment that the judge imposes.8° If there is a civil claim im-
posed as part of the sentence, the judge must also provide a substantiation
and explanation for the claim. 80 ' Finally, this section underscores that the
judge must explain within the sentencing form the cassation procedure or
appellate procedure for filing an appeal from the sentence.
802
XXXV. TERMINATING AN EXAMINATION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE
BECAUSE OF THE ESTABLISHED DEFENDANT'S INSANITY
Article 352 gives guidance to the judge and all parties on the procedure
to follow when there is evidence of the defendant's insanity. 80 3 This section
791. Id.
792. See id. art. 311.
793. Id. art. 311(1).
794. Id. art. 312.
795. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 312
(Russ.).
796. See id. art. 35 1.
797. Id. art. 351(1).
798. Id. art. 351(2).
799. Id. art. 351(3).
800. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 351(3)(Russ.).
801. Id.
802. Id. art. 351(4).
803. See generally id. art. 352.
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is applicable during any stage of a jury trial. 804 The court must act if there is
evidence of insanity.80 5
The insanity of the defendant is at issue whether the insanity was
present at the time of committing the act charged or anytime thereafter.8 °
The issue of insanity could arise during the trial or at sentencing. 8°7 There
must be a showing that the defendant has or is suffering a mental disorder.80 8
There must be some circumstances shown to prove this mental disorder. °9
This section of the code also requires that an expert, one who has forensic-
psychiatric expertise, confirm or support the circumstances or claim of a
mental disorder.810
Once the mental disorder is established with some evidence and con-
firmed by an expert, the judge is mandated to "pass a resolution on the ter-
mination" of the examination of the criminal case.81 ' This procedure does
not terminate or dismiss the case entirely.812 It simply ends the existing jury
trial.813 In the United States, the issue of competency and insanity is ad-
dressed prior to trial. If an American defendant is not competent to stand
trial, the case may not proceed until such time as competency is restored. If
a defendant in the United States is competent to stand trial, but was insane at
the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant may assert this de-
fense at trial. A jury would then be able to find the defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity.
If a Russian judge passes "a resolution on the termination" of the ex-
amination of the criminal case based upon the insanity of the defendant, the
court is required to move the case to another court for consideration of the
issue of insanity as set out in Chapter 51.8I4 Chapter 51 requires the new
court to consider only the issue of insanity based upon compliance with ar-
ticles 433 through 446.815
804. See id.
805. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 352(1)
(Russ.).
806. Id.
807. See id.
808. Id.
809. Id.
810. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 352(1)
(Russ.).
811. Id.
812. See id.
813. See id.
814. Id.
815. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 433-
36 (Russ.).
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The referral of the case to another court is considered a separate pro-
ceeding. 8"6 The focus of the referral is the establishment of the insanity of
the defendant conclusively. 81 7 The issue of the defendant's conclusive men-
tal disorder is heard and decided by the new judge alone, without the assis-
tance of a jury.8 8 During this proceeding the defendant is entitled to repre-
sentation.8
19
If the judge hearing the referred case determines the defendant suffers
no mental infirmity, then the case may be referred back to the prosecutor to
proceed to a jury trial.82° If the judge hearing the referred case determines
the defendant is insane, the judge must order the defendant to a stationary
state mental hospital.82' It should be noted that the terms "insanity," "mental
disorder," "mentally deranged," and "mentally ill" are used interchangea-
bly. 822 The term stationary precludes outpatient treatment and requires the
defendant to be confined for treatment.823 The decision of the judge on the
issue of finding a mental disorder may be appealed by way of cassation, the
Russian counterpart to an appellate court.824
Article 352 finally specifies that the decision of the trial judge to termi-
nate the examination of the criminal case with a referral to a judge under
Chapter 51 is not subject to appeal.82 5
XXXVI. SPECIFICS IN KEEPING THE PROTOCOL OF A COURT SESSION
Article 353 requires there to be a record of the criminal proceedings
during the course of a jury trial.826 The record of the proceedings is referred
to as the protocol.827 The protocol or record "may be written by hand, or
typed, or made with the use of a computer. '828 The process of reducing the
case to a written record is compatible with the recording process of an Amer-
816. Id. art. 436.
817. Id. art. 154,436.
818. See id art. 440.
819. Id. art. 437-38.
820. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 443(5)
(Russ.).
821. Id. art. 435(l).
822. See id. art. 433, 435, 446.
823. See id. art. 203(1)-(2).
824. Id. art. 445(8).
825. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPKI [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 352
(Russ.).
826. See generally id. art. 259, 353.
827. See id. art. 259.
828. Id. art. 259(2).
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ican criminal jury trial. American courts require a written record detailing all
the proceedings.
All of the proceedings must be memorialized in order to provide a
record that may be reviewed by an appellate court for its correctness.129 The
judge is required to compile or verify and confirm the protocol and sign the
entire record within three days of the end of the concluding court session.83°
Article 353 details what must be contained within the protocol or
record. 3' The record must reflect the composition or members of the jury.832
The protocol is required to show the process as to how the college of jurors
or panel has been selected.833
This section also requires that the charging word or jury instructions
from the presiding justice shall be part of the protocol in writing.834
Article 353 ends with the mandate that all of the proceedings should be
reflected in the protocol.835 The reason for having a protocol or record is the
same reason as American courts have in maintaining a record. The Russian
code states that it is important to have a protocol of "the entire course of the
judicial proceedings, so that one can [get] convinced of the correctness of its
conducting. ' 836 Simply stated, a record will convince many audiences of the
correctness of the conduct of the judge, the prosecutor and all the proceed-
ings during the course of the trial.837 The audience is not limited to an appel-
late court.838 It includes the public as well.839
XXXVII. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to separate the history of Russia from its people and its
judicial system. For centuries the country was ruled by the Czars. A large
percentage of Russians lived as serfs tantamount to slavery. The justice sys-
tem was by grace of the monarchy and not from the will of the people.
829. See id. art. 353(4).
830. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 259(6)
(Russ.).
831. See generally id. art. 353.
832. See id. art. 353(2).
833. Id.
834. Id. art. 353(3).
835. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 353(4)
(Russ.).
836. Id.
837. See id.
838. See id. art. 354(4).
839. See id.
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With the Reforms of 1864, the Russian people were granted freedoms
including the right to a jury trial. 84 However, this historical period of reform
lasted a little over fifty years. 8 ' With the Russian revolution of 1917, a tota-
litarian rule under communism began.842 Jury trials stopped. 3 The judicial
system was the arm of the totalitarian government with few rights granted to
those charged with offenses.844 No due process rights were provided nor
substantive laws to provide for a fair and just resolution of a case.845 Acquit-
tals were unheard of under totalitarian rule.' The Soviet judicial system
was perceived as another tool of the government to maintain power and con-
trol over the people. 7
From the darkness of communism to the sunshine of freedom, Russia
has moved towards democracy. 8 In 1993, the first Russian jury trial was
held since the October Revolution of 1917. 849 Since 2003, all provinces pro-
vide for a jury trial to those defendants who are charged with serious
crimes.850 The Russian Constitution now grants rights that we are familiar
with in the United States: the presumption of innocence; the right to remain
silent; the right to have illegally seized evidence excluded; the right to coun-
sel; and the right to ajury as provided by law.85'
The new Russian Code of Criminal Procedure provides the framework
for implementation of those rights to a defendant during the course of a jury
trial.85 2 The stages of the Russian jury trial are similar to the American jury
trial.853 The demand for the jury trial is made by the defendant.854 Jury selec-
tion takes place with the right to inquire of prospective jurors and challenge
840. See SAUNDERS, supra note 159, at 260-61.
841. See Sharon LaFraniere, Russian Courts Give Power to the People; Revival of Jury
Trials Marks Shift from Soviet-Style Justice System, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2002, at A24.
842. See id.
843. See id.
844. See id.
845. See LaFraniere, supra note 841.
846. See id.
847. See Ian Traynor, Shake-Up for Russia's Legal Code, THE GUARDIAN, July 2, 2002, at
II.
848. See id.
849. See James W. Diehm. The Introduction of Jury Trials and Adversarial Elements into
the Former Soviet Union and Other Inquisitional Countries, 1 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1,
4(2001).
850. See LaFraniere, supra note 841; see also Diehm, supra note 849 at 37 n.220.
851. Diehm, supra note 849 at 29-33.
852. See Steven Lee Myers, Russia Glances to the West for Its New Legal Code, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 1, 2002, at AI.
853. See generally Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code]
art. 325 (Russ.).
854. See id. art. 325(3).
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the jurors to ensure their impartiality. 855 Opening statements are permitted as
well as the examination of witnesses.856 The attorneys are allowed to make
closing arguments.8 7 The judge may dismiss the case if it is legally insuffi-
cient. 8  If the case is legally sufficient, the case goes to the jury with in-
structions from the judge.859 The jurors deliberate in private.86 The judge
reflects on the sentence and imposes it in open court after a conviction.861
As a whole, the new constitution and new code provides citizens with a
fair process.862 No longer is the judge aligned with the prosecutor.863 The
Russian judge is now a neutral arbiter deciding legal issues before the jury
can determine the disposition of the case.864 The process is fair because the
defendant has an opportunity to be heard before a jury of one's peers.865 The
case does not rest solely with the government. 866 The people, as a jury, de-
cide the fate of a Russian citizen.867
While the present Russian jury trial, based on the Russian Constitution
and code, provides for greater justice to the people, there are areas of concern
that should be addressed. One area of concern is double jeopardy. This con-
cept is not recognized under Russian law. In fact, the code provides for the
termination of the case by a judge with a referral to another court for further
investigation.8 68 This could result in a Kafkaesque situation. A defendant
could have a trial where the evidence is insufficient, but face further prosecu-
tion. The case should end the first time under a double jeopardy theory to
ensure proper original investigation. Respecting double jeopardy protections
would also free the people from the belief that the case is never ending
whenever the government so chooses.
Another area of concern is the limitation on deliberation and the process
thereafter. Russian juries are not permitted to deliberate longer than three
855. Id. art. 328(3), (8).
856. Id. art. 335(1), (4).
857. Seeid. art. 336(1).
858. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 348(5)
(Russ.).
859. Id. art. 338(5).
860. Id. art. 341(1).
861. Id. art. 347(3).
862. See Myers, supra note 852.
863. Id.
864. Id.
865. Id.
866. Id.
867. Myers, supra note 852.
868. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 350(4)
(Russ.).
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hours in order to arrive at a unanimous verdict.86 9 The judge has no discre-
tion on this issue.870 There are some complex criminal cases, such as a death
penalty case, which require more than a three hour time frame to consider.
This time period is arbitrary and would raise significant constitutional due
process questions if an American Legislature imposed a deliberation restric-
tion on criminal juries.
Along with the time limitation is the process after the three hour period
is met. Under the code, the jury must decide the case after three hours with a
less than unanimous verdict.87' In theory, seven people could decide the fate
of an individual in a death penalty case even though five other jurors support
an acquittal.871 This would again raise constitutional questions in an Ameri-
can court. Such a provision would have a difficult time withstanding consti-
871tutional scrutiny.
The type of crimes where a Russian citizen is entitled to a jury trial
should be expanded. Presently, only the most serious crimes in Russia en-
title a defendant to have a case considered by a jury. 74 In the United States,
a jury trial in many jurisdictions is guaranteed when the crime carries with it
any term of incarceration.875 This marks the high value we place on freedom.
The Russian Parliament should consider expanding the right to a jury trial in
any case in which the defendant may be sentenced to incarceration.
Finally, standard jury instructions need to be developed in Russia. In
American courts, judges are provided with standard jury instructions to prop-
876 therly charge a jury. At the present time, no standard jury instructions exist
in Russia. This may result in judges applying different law throughout the
country and also places a burden on the trial judge to create jury instructions
in every case. It would be easier for the judge administratively, and it would
be more consistent for all parties in Russia, if jury instructions were standar-
dized and adopted.
It is an exciting time for Russia. The move from totalitarian rule to de-
mocracy provides challenges along with the many new freedoms we now
see. The judicial system is a fairer and a more just system than before. It
869. Id. art. 343(l).
870. See id.
871. Id.
872. See id. art. 343(2).
873. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 721 (1992).
874. See Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 20, 30(Russ.).
875. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50 (1968).
876. See Molly Armour, Comment, Dazed and Confused: The Need for a Legislative
Solution to the Constitutional Problem of Juror Incomprehension, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs.
L. REV. 641, 643-44 (2008).
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will provide confidence and a belief by the people that the government does
not determine their freedom; it respects it and acknowledges it. The new
constitution and code provide a great promise to the Russian people. It is a
promise that must be acted upon. The words of the constitution and the code
must be given meaning by the people in the justice system by implementing
and protecting the rights given to Russian citizens. Only then will those
words grant freedom to a people who have long lived under the tyrannical
rule of the Czars and communist dictators. Only time will tell whether the
Russian people will successfully break from its past and embrace its new
found democracy. That success will be assisted by the historic return of the
jury trial to Russia, a return not only of the jury trial to Russia, but a return of
justice to the Russian people.
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I. KNOW YOUR CASE
Cases involving sexual abuse of students are extremely sensitive and
demanding in several aspects. As the victim's attorney, these cases require
thorough preparation and dedication. It is essential to spend sufficient time
interviewing the minor client and appropriate family members in order to
obtain all essential details of the abuse so as to be able to properly investigate
the case and initiate legal proceedings. You will want to meet and obtain
statements from other victims or potential victims and witnesses, as well as
obtain all available school documents and meet with parents of other children
in order to gather up all necessary data for your case. As the victim's lawyer,
you need to get involved with the State or District Attorney and/or the local
investigating agency with jurisdiction over the criminal matter and obtain as
much police investigation as is available. Next you want to make sure that
your client(s) is/are obtaining appropriate psychological care for his/her/their
injuries. You will need to know the appropriate law in your jurisdiction ap-
plicable to the facts of your case in order to determine which legal remedies
are available for you to proceed on. Because of the potentially high profile
nature of these cases, you will need to be available to respond to media atten-
tion while, at the same time, protecting your client and his/her family from
the media to protect their privacy.
A. Identify Your Client(s)
It is important to identify who your clients are in each particular case.
The most identifiable client is the student who has been abused. However, it
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is also important to identify other family members who may have viable
claims, e.g., for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, or
for cost of medical or psychological treatment of the minor plaintiff. Be-
cause of the extremely sensitive and often embarrassing topic of sexual
abuse, some family members will not directly disclose the damages that they
have sustained as a result of the injuries caused to their children. It is, how-
ever, important to engage in open discussions with the parents and potential-
ly other family members in order to ferret out these claims.
B. Develop Your Minor Client's Trust in You, Such That There Will Be
Open and Complete Disclosure of All Facts
Early on in the process, it is very important that your minor client feels
comfortable in disclosing all the facts with as much detail as possible to as-
sist you in building your case. Because of the very sensitive and potentially
embarrassing nature of these claims, it will be very important for the client to
feel comfortable enough with you to open up and discuss things that he or
she may not even wish for his or her parents to know. You need to caution
the parent to allow this process, and you should consider bringing in a psy-
chotherapist or guardian ad litem to assist you with this process early on.
I. BUILD YOUR CASE WITH AS MANY FACTUAL DETAILS AS
POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO PROVE
FORESEEABILITY
A. Obtain Names of All Teachers and/or Other School Administrators
and Employees Who May Have Witnessed Any Unusual Behavior
Many jurisdictions agree that the mere fact that sexual "abuse occurred
on school district property does not make the school district automatically
liable for abuse by its employee."' Hence, in many jurisdictions it is neces-
sary to establish that the sexual abuse was or should have been foreseeable in
order to hold the school district liable for negligence under different theories,
for example negligent supervision.2
1. See, e.g., Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701, 707 (Iowa 1999).
2. See, e.g., P.L. v. Aubert, 545 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. 1996). "A school district
cannot be held liable for actions that are not foreseeable when reasonable measures of super-
vision are employed to insure adequate educational duties are being performed by the teach-
ers, and there is adequate consideration being given for the safety and welfare of all students
in the school." Id.; see Godar, 588 N.W.2d at 707.
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Because cases involving sexual abuse by a public school teacher typi-
cally contain many hurdles, one such hurdle being foreseeability, it is very
important to gather extremely detailed information, including names of all
teachers who may have witnessed any circumstances alleged early on while
the details are fresh in the victim's memory.3
II. EARLY ON DECIDE IF YOU WILL NEED AN EXPERT IN THE
APPROPRIATE FIELD TO HELP EDUCATE AND INFORM THE
COURT ON THE ISSUE OF FORESEEABILITY AS IT APPLIES
TO THE FACTS OF YOUR CASE
In the preparation of your case, decide early on if you may need an ex-
pert to assist you in developing liability. In Minnesota, the state supreme
court, in P.L. v. Aubert,4 determined that the plaintiff student did not prevail
because he failed to retain an expert to prove implied foreseeability. 5
The Supreme Court of Minnesota compared the school board case in-
volving a teacher who had an ongoing sexual relationship with a student to
an earlier decision involving a psychologist who made "improper sexual
advances to patients during and immediately after therapy sessions."'6 In the
P.L. school board case, the court held that despite the fact "that teachers have
power and authority over students," there was "no expert testimony or affi-
davits" that a relationship between a teacher and a student is a well known
hazard, and "thus, there can be no implied foreseeability." 7
3. See, e.g., P.L, 545 N.W.2d at 668.
4. 545 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 1996).
5. See id. at 668.
6. id. at 667-68; Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329
N.W.2d 306, 307 (Minn. 1982).
7. P.L., 545 N.W.2d at 668. Conversely, earlier Minnesota case law held that liability
lies with the employer when the source of the attack is related to the 'duties of the employee
and occur[] within work related limits of time and place."' Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 310-11
(quoting Lange v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. 1973)). The Marston case
involved an employee, who was a psychologist, who made unwelcomed and improper sexual
advances to patients during and immediately after therapy sessions in his office. See id. at
308. The court held that there was a fact issue as to whether the acts were "within the scope
of [the doctor's] employment." Id. at 311. "[l]t should be a question of fact whether the acts
of [the defendant] were foreseeable, related to and connected with acts otherwise within the
scope of employment." Id. (citing Todd v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 219 N.W.2d 639, 640
(Minn. 1974)). The issue of foreseeability was raised because of expert testimony at the trial
court that sexual relations between doctors and patients were "a well-known hazard and thus.
. foreseeable." Id. It was the foresecability of the risk that determined the outcome of that
case. See Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 311.
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IV. KNOW THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW IN YOUR
JURISDICTION AND IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS INVOLVING
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES BY PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
Plaintiff victims of sexual abuse by school officials who proceed with
civil state law claims allege the following theories of liability in their com-
plaints: negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent supervision, negli-
gence and negligence per se, and respondeat superior.8 School administra-
tors have been held liable when their officials knew or should have known
that school employees or applicants had a history of sexual abuse, the school
retained or hired the person despite the person's record, as well as situations
where their personnel knew or should have known that an employee sexually
abused a student, and the school retained the employee notwithstanding this
knowledge. 9
A. Immunity of School Officials
"[M]any states have governmental immunities that block negligent hir-
ing and retention claims against public schools."' The reason provided by
the courts for granting immunity "is that the hiring and supervision of school
8. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Liability, Under State Law Claims, of Public
and Private Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning for Teacher's, Other Employee's, or
Student's Sexual Relationship with, or Sexual Harassment or Abuse of Student, 86 A.L.R. 5th
1, 22, 36-37 (2001) (providing a comprehensive outline and discussion of various state and
federal cases discussing the state tort or statutory liability of entities involved in the operation
of public or private schools or institutions of higher learning, when not precluded by sovereign
or charitable immunity, for an injury sustained by a student during a sexual relationship with,
or sexual harassment or abuse by, a teacher or other school employee, or another student at the
school).
9. See id. at 22-23.
10. William W. Watkinson, Jr., Note, Shades of DeShaney: Official Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for Sexual Abuse in the Public Schools, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1237, 1272
(1995) ("Governmental immunity is a doctrine that absolves government[al] agencies and
officials from tort liability when they are acting in their official capacities."). See Bruce
Beezer, Commentary, School District Liability for Negligent Hiring and Retention of Unfit
Employees, 56 EDUC. L. REP. 1117, 1119 (1990) (stating that courts in New Mexico, Michi-
gan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin have upheld governmental immunity for school
officials in negligent hiring and retention actions); see also Scott J. Borth, Comment, Munici-
pal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A National Survey, 58 WASH.
L. REV. 537, 540-46 nn.23-48 (1983) (demonstrating that in thirteen states, municipal gov-
ernments and officials have absolute immunity from tort liability, twenty-four states retain tort
immunity but provide for exceptions in certain circumstances, and fifteen states have ab-
olished governmental tort immunity).
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personnel is a discretionary governmental function that is necessary to carry
out public education.""
Conversely, other jurisdictions have rejected the immunity argument
and have held that school officials may be held liable for negligence in hiring
or retaining unfit school personnel.' 2 In Doe v. Durtschi,13 an Idaho case
where there was admitted sexual abuse of four female students and allega-
tions of negligent hiring and retention, the Supreme Court of Idaho rejected
the school district's argument of immunity and held that the district may be
liable for its own negligence in retaining a teacher where it was informed of
the teacher's dangerous behavior. 4 The court further held that the exemption
under the immunity statute for employee acts that arise out of assault and
battery did not apply in this situation. '5 Likewise, in the Florida case of
School Board of Orange County v. Coffey, 16 which involved allegations of a
teacher's sexual abuse of a student, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held
that "[t]he retention and supervision of a teacher by a school board are not
acts covered [within] sovereign immunity." '7
In Ohio, sovereign immunity was argued in Massey v. Akron City Board
of Education.8 Based upon arguments made by the defense, as to the appli-
cable sovereign immunity statute, the court concluded "that the plaintiff[s]
could succeed only if they [could] show [that the school] board acted with
malice, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner."' 9 The court found
that on the facts presented, there was "sufficient evidence to raise a genuine
issue of material fact" where the school board so acted, and therefore, denied
the school board's motion for summary judgment.20
B. Respondeat Superior Claims in Sexual Abuse by Public School
Teacher Cases
In California, the state "[s]upreme [c]ourt has held that the conduct of
teachers who sexually molest students under their supervision will not be
11. Beezer, supra note 10, at 1119.
12. See, e.g., Doe v. Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Idaho 1986).
13. Id. at 1238. "Governmental immunity is a doctrine that absolves government[al]
agencies and officials from tort liability when they are acting in their official capacities."
Watkinson, supra note 10, at 1272.
14. Durtschi, 716 P.2d at 1240-41, 1245.
15. Id. at 1243-44.
16. 524 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
17. id. at 1053.
18. 82 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747-48 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
19. Id. at 748.
20. Id.
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imputed to school districts to permit recovery by injured students from the
employing districts under the doctrine of respondeat superior."9
21
Conversely, the doctrine of respondeat superior was held to apply so as
to render a school district liable for a teacher's sexual molestation of a stu-
dent when applying Nevada law.22
C. Negligent Hiring Cases
In California, although the courts do not recognize a theory for respon-
deat superior in cases involving sexual molestation of students, the courts do
recognize causes of action for negligent hiring.23
D. Negligent Supervision Cases
In Illinois, the appellate court held that "[a] cause of action for negligent
supervision exists against the School District if it is alleged and established
that the School District had a duty to supervise its employees, that the School
21. See Virginia G. v. ABC Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 675 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (citing John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948,953 (Cal. 1989)).
22. Doe v. Estes, 926 F. Supp. 979, 989-90 (D. Nev. 1996) (denying the district's motion
for summary judgment on the student's battery claim). The district was held liable, in that
case, to the student under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 989. The court referred
to a Nebraska case in which a casino was held vicariously liable for injuries suffered by a
patron punched by a blackjack dealer. Id. The court held that it "fail[ed] to discern any prin-
cipled legal distinction between a battery claim against a casino whose blackjack dealer
slug[ged] a patron and the same claim against a school district whose teacher fondle[d] a
student." Id. In both cases, the court reasoned, "the plaintiff was on the defendant's premises
for the purpose of enjoying the defendant's services" and in neither case did "the employee's
duties included acts of common-law battery." Id.
23. Virginia G., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675. In Virginia G., the court held that while the
teacher-perpetrator's conduct in molesting the student
will not be imputed to the District, if individual District employees responsible for hiring
and/or supervising teachers knew or should have known of [the teacher's] prior sexual mis-
conduct toward students, and thus, that he posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to stu-
dents under his supervision, including [the student at issue], the employees owed a duty to pro-
tect the students from such harm.
Id. Thus, the court held that the plaintiff
may be able to amend her pleading[s] to allege a cause of action against the District based on
the negligence of its employees who were responsible for the hiring and/or supervision of [the
teacher] if such employees knew or should have known of [the teacher's] history of sexual
misconduct with students under his supervision.
Id. at 676. The court further concluded that the "[d]etermination of the question whether the
District is immune from liability to" the student based on the immunity provisions must await
the plaintiff's "further pleading and the requisite factual determinations, if any." Id.
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District negligently supervised [the teacher-perpetrator], and that such negli-
gence proximately caused [the] plaintiff's injuries."' 4
E. Negligent Retention Cases
In Indiana, the district court denied summary judgment and held that a
negligent retention claim was supportable against a university for retaining a
professor who sexually harassed a student, where the professor had previous-
ly engaged in similar misconduct, and the university had ignored the con-
duct.25
V. MAKE A RECORD: BRING OUT THE FACTS WHICH SHOW
FORESEEABILITY-DO NOT BASE YOUR CASE ON SIMPLY
THE FACT THAT THE BAD ACTS WERE COMMIT-TED ON
SCHOOL PREMISES WITHOUT SHOWING HOW THE SCHOOL
DISTRICT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE
PERPETRATOR'S ACTIONS
The way to prevail in state civil court on these cases is by using the
facts of your case to show how the school district knew or should have
known of the perpetrator's actions or propensities.26 If you simply rely on
the egregiousness of the occurrence(s), regardless of whether they occurred
on school property, without demonstrating that the actions were foreseeable
by school district officials, you may not succeed in getting your case to the
* 27jury.
For example, in a Washington case, a minor and his parents sued a
school district and its principal "for negligence in hiring, retaining and su-
pervising a teacher" and librarian.28 On two different occasions, in secluded
areas of the auditorium and library, the teacher/librarian engaged in oral sex
with the student.29 The trial court's granting of summary judgment for the
district and the principal was affirmed by the higher court.3°
The Washington court focused on the following question: "Did the dis-
trict know, or in the exercise of reasonable care should it have known, that
24. Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 664 (I1. App. Ct. 1997).
25. Chontos v. Rhea, 29 F. Supp. 2d 931, 937-39 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
26. See, e.g., Peck v. Siau, 827 P.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
27. See id.
28. Id. at 1109.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 109,1113.
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[the teacher/librarian] was a risk to its students? '31 Without evidence "in the
record to so indicate," the appellate court answered this question in the nega-
tive.
32
The court explained that:
When a pupil attends a public school, he or she is subject to
the rules and discipline of the school, and the protective custody of
the teachers is substituted for that of the parent. As a result, a duty
is imposed by law on the school district to take certain precautions
to protect the pupils in its custody from dangers reasonably to be
anticipated. This duty is one of reasonable care, which is to say
that the district, as it supervises the pupils within its custody, is re-
quired to exercise such care as a reasonably prudent person would
exercise under the same or similar circumstances. The basic idea
is that a school district has the power to control the conduct of its
students while they are in school or engaged in school activities,
and with that power [comes] the responsibility of reasonable su-
pervision.33
"A school district's duty requires that it exercise reasonable care to pro-
tect students from physical hazards in the school building or on school
grounds. . . . [I]t also requires that the district exercise reasonable care to
protect students from the harmful actions of fellow students." 34 Quoting
several cases and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Washington court
concluded that:
[T]he district is not liable merely because such activities occur.
([The] school district [is] not an insurer of the safety of its pupils).
Rather, the district will be liable only if the wrongful activities are
foreseeable, and the activities will be foreseeable only if the dis-
trict knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known
of the risk that resulted in their occurrence.
35
31. Peck, 827 P.2d at ll3.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1112 (citations omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1112-13 (citations omitted).
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VI. FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION
After you have reviewed the pertinent facts of your case and the case
law which governs your jurisdiction, you should decide if it is advantageous
to proceed with a state or federal cause of action.
A. Reasons to Proceed with Federal Causes of Action
In some jurisdictions, the courts are reluctant to find liability for negli-
gent hiring and retention in school board cases.36 In addition, state tort law
generally cannot hold school officials liable for their deliberate indifference
toward sexual abuse.37 Another reason to turn to federal law for relief is due
to sovereign immunities, which may bar state causes of action in certain ju-
risdictions. 38 Holding school systems liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is ne-
cessary because "'[c]omplicated state law immunities may protect munici-
palities and school districts from many state tort claims but will not insulate
them from a constitutional tort suit."'' 3
9
B. Criteria to Proceed with a Federal 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Cause of
Action
Some plaintiffs have proceeded with claims under Federal Statutes. A
Nevada federal court has held that a defendant school district could be liable
36. Watkinson, supra note 10, at 1272.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. id. at 1273 (quoting Steven F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public
Schools after DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1961 (1990)). According to the author of
the Note, Shades of DeShaney, there is controversy in federal court cases as to whether the
schools can be liable for the sexual abuse of their students based on predicating special rela-
tionships on custody. See id. at 1283. Doe v. Taylor Independent School District interpreted
custody broadly and held the school liable. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443,
451 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994). However, D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School,
subscribed to a narrow definition of custody. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1369-72 (3d Cir. 1992). Thus, the court in Middle Bucks found
that the school district did not have an affirmative duty to protect its students. Id. at 1384.
The Shades of DeShaney article discusses later federal cases which offer an alternative liabili-
ty theory, removing the custody controversy where a school employee is the perpetrator of the
sexual abuse. Watkinson, supra note 10, at 1250-57. The later cases hold that school systems
and its officials are not liable under section 1983 without a finding of a special relationship
between the school and the student. See discussion infra Part V.
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if some policy or custom it followed can be said to
have legally been the cause of the complained constitutional violation.
40
The school district may be liable under section 1983 for constitutional
torts committed by its employees when their choice, from among various
alternatives, to follow a particular course of action reflects a "deliberate in-
difference" to the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs.41
For officials to be liable under section 1983, they must be deliberately
indifferent to the plight of a student.42 Mere negligence upon the part of an
official will not trigger liability. 43 If schools are found to have an affirmative
duty of protection, school officials will be liable only in cases like Doe v.
Taylor Independent School District" and D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voca-
tional Technical School,45 where the officials know that the abuse is occur-
ring but do nothing to stop it.46
VII. CONCLUSION
Your emphasis should remain in preparing your case and discovering all
pertinent facts to establish foreseeability and liability of the school district.
Once the facts are revealed, you can apply them to the laws which govern
your jurisdiction. Without obtaining the relevant facts, and ensuring that the
laws in your jurisdiction provide you with an adequate remedy, you will be
unable to establish what you need to prove to the court: that the egregious
violation of your victim/client's rights and their resulting lifetime damages
40. See Doe ex rel. Knackert v. Estes, 926 F. Supp. 979, 986-87 (D. Nev. 1996). In Doe
ex rel. Knackert v. Estes, the court granted judgment as a matter of law as to the school board.
See id. at 989-90. The court found that the defendants failed to demonstrate that "the absence
of any genuine issue[] of material fact [existed] with respect to the question [as to] whether
the defendant school district's pre-1990 failure to prevent the sexual molestation of its stu-
dents was a policy for which the district could be liable under [s]ection 1983." Id. at 988.
The court concluded that:
[The] [p]laintiffs [presented] evidence that the defendant school district had until the arrest of
[the perpetrator] in 1990 no policy [in effect] regarding the reporting of suspected incidents of
sexual abuse of students, had never instructed its employees in the techniques of recognizing
the warning signs of suspected sexual abuse of students, [and] had never provided its staff with
guidelines for dealing with such suspicions.
Id.
41. Id.
42. City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 270 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
43. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (explaining the
deliberate indifference standard for section 1983 liability by inaction).
44. 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994).
45. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
46. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 445; D.R., 972 F.2d at 1366.
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are issues which should get to the jury to decide the liability of the school
district for the acts of its employee, or the liability of the school district for
failing to properly supervise or carefully hire its employees.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 2004, insurgents attacked a United States military convoy
in Fallujah, Iraq, killing four of its members.' The bodies were mutilated,
burned, and hung from a bridge.2 This incident quickly became infamous
due to its shocking brutality.
3
The Fallujah incident was also newsworthy for a second reason. Those
killed in the attack were not members of the United States military, but rather
employees of Blackwater Worldwide,4 a private security company (PSC).5
Blackwater was under contract with the U. S. government to provide extra
security forces and to perform other duties typically performed by U.S. sol-
diers.6 The Fallujah fallout was the first time many Americans became
aware of the existence of such agreements, and for those who were aware of
the existence of PSCs, the extent to which the government relies on them.
The existence and use of PSCs is controversial, and much academic dis-
course is available on the subject.7 Much of this is centered on their use in
Iraq and other military zones.8 It is claimed that these entities are mercena-
ries who operate lawlessly and with no accountability. 9 The proposed solu-
tions focus on international law, statutes aimed at military activities, and
* The author is a law clerk to the Honorable Lawrence P. Zatkoff, United States Dis-
trict Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan. The author would like to thank Professor
Susan Bitenksy of the Michigan State University College of Law for her guidance throughout
the writing process.
I. See, e.g., U.S. Expects More Attacks in Iraq, CNN.coM, May 6, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/ 2004IWORLD/meastl03/311 iraq.main/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009); see
also infra Part 11.C.2.
2. U.S. Expects More Attacks in Iraq, CNN.coM, May 6, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/
2004/world/meast/03/31/iraq.main/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009)
3. See id.
4. This company was formerly known as "Blackwater USA", and has recently again
changed names, operating now as "Xe".
5. See Jonathan Finer, Recent Development, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accoun-
tability Measures for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 259, 259 (2008).
6. See id. at 260.
7. See id. at 259.
8. See id.at 259-60.
9. See id.
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contract law.' ° The United States Constitution has been essentially ignored
as an avenue of recourse." This may be reasonable when discussing acts
concerning the military or Iraqi citizens. However, PSCs can also affect U.S.
citizens, who are entitled to the protections of the Constitution.
This article narrows this focus to the relationship between PSCs and
American citizens. Specifically, this article raises the previously unanswered
question of whether PSCs, when contracting with federal or state govern-
ments, are state actors. If they are determined to be state actors, then they
would be liable for violations of the Constitution, especially the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 2
The practical application of this determination would be whether a U.S. citi-
zen would have recourse if a PSC, acting under contract with a state or fed-
eral government, violated that citizen's federal constitutional rights.
This article argues that PSCs should be considered state actors when
carrying out obligations under contract with a state or federal government.
Thus, a citizen aggrieved by a PSC in this manner would have the same me-
thods of recourse as he or she would if an actual government actor had
caused the claimed injury, including a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. How-
ever, this is not necessarily a green light to sue, as the aggrieved must also
have a pleadable cause of action and the prospective defendant must be sub-
ject to suit. 3
Part I describes the use of PSCs in the Hurricane Katrina aftermath. It
then discusses the controversial events regarding PSCs in Iraq. Part R serves
as a refresher on the state action doctrine, discusses its various exceptions,
and analyzes the case law dealing with privately contracted security guards.
Part III examines the law regarding section 1983 claims and analyzes the
case law applying section 1983 to privately run prisons. Part V offers the
analysis of PSCs under the state action doctrine and argues that a PSC is a
state actor when performing work under government contract if it violates
the federal constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen. Part V provides a brief
description on how suits might proceed-or not proceed-under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 after a violation has occurred.
10. See Finer, supra note 5, at 260-63.
II. See id. at 261-65.
12. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929-30 (1982).
13. Id. at 930 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)). See
infra Part V for a discussion of how these requirements affect a suit against a state actor.
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II. THE USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES
This part will focus on Blackwater's presence in New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina. While this article's thesis remains hypothetical at this
point, the fact that PSCs have operated within the United States, makes this
thesis more of a prediction of future events than pure conjecture. It will then
describe Blackwater's controversial actions in Iraq to help advance the claim
that these entities and their employees do participate in actions that would be,
at best, questionable if subjected to federal constitutional scrutiny. Finally, it
will summarize the current lawsuits pending against Blackwater to show the
lack of remedies when a PSC acts abroad. This article attempts to provide a
remedy for U.S. citizens when PSCs act domestically under either state or
federal contract, as was the case with Blackwater in New Orleans.
A. The Rise of Private Security Companies14
PSCs are nothing new, and the U.S. military has utilized private con-
tractors since the American Revolution.' 5 One author notes the use of pri-
vately contracted ships outnumbered the U.S. Navy in the War of 1812.16
The use of PSCs exploded during Vietnam and has risen steadily ever
since. 7 One explanation is that the demilitarization after the end of the Cold
War helped increase the number of PSCs. 18 The current numbers are stag-
gering. It is estimated that more than 30,000 employees of PSCs are current-
ly in Iraq.' 9
14. This section is intended to give a very brief description of how the use of PSCs came
about. For a much more in-depth discussion and description of how these entities operate, see
generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY (2003).
15. Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with
Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 234 (2000).
16. Finer, supra note 5, at 259.
17. See id. at 259-60; See Davidson, supra note 15, at 235.
18. E.L. Gaston, Note, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security In-
dustry and Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 221, 224 (2008).
19. JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND,
LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 3 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order
Code RL32419, Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf.
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B. Involvement in New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina
While Blackwater is most infamously known for its actions in Iraq, it
also contracts to perform operations within the United States. 20 Blackwater
initially deployed approximately 150 personnel to help with security after
Hurricane Katrina in September 2005.2' This number would later swell by at
least another hundred.22 Blackwater issued a press release stating that it was
donating aerial support and that airlift, security, humanitarian support, and
logistics and transportation services would be available.23 However, its pres-
ence also included ground personnel, which charged the government $950 a
day per employee.24 It is claimed that Blackwater was paid a total of $73
million in less than a year in New Orleans.25
However, at least for the purpose of this article, the financial aspects re-
garding PSCs are not as troubling as their actions. Blackwater employees
were heavily armed with automatic weapons in New Orleans.26 They pa-
trolled the streets in khaki uniforms with an armband as their only identifica-
tion as Blackwater employees.27 They patrolled in SUVs or other vehicles,
sometimes marked with the Blackwater logo, sometimes not.28 They operat-
ed under contract with the Department of Homeland Security and at least
some were deputized by the State of Louisiana.29
While there were no incidents in New Orleans that gained the press that
the incidents in Iraq did, questionable conduct still went on, this time involv-
ing-assumedly-U.S. citizens.30 Scahill reports of an interview with a PSC
employee who was transporting wealthy business owners in New Orleans.3'
20. See Griff Witte, Private Security Contractors Head to Gulf, WASH. POST, Sept. 8,
2005, at A 14.
21. See id.
22. JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL
MERCENARY ARMY 325 (2007). "On September 18, Blackwater estimated that it had 250
troops deployed in the region; a number Mathews said would continue to grow." Id.
23. Press Release, Blackwater Tactical Weekly, Blackwater Joins Hurricane Katrina
Relief Effort! (Sept. 5, 2005), available at http://www.libertyparkusafd.org/lp/Hale/Special
%20Reports%5CBlackwaterUSA%5CBlackwater%20Tactical%2OWeekly.htm.
24. See SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 326.
25. Id. at 327. So much for Blackwater's claims that "'[w]e don't believe we will make a
profit here' and "'[i]f we break even on the security services, our company will have done a
great job."' Id. at 325.
26. Id. at 321-24. "[W]hat poured in fastest were guns. Lots of guns." Id. at 323.
27. See SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 321.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 324.
30. See id. at 327-28.
31. See id. at 328-29.
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He claims that the "convoy came under fire," and the employees "unleashed
a barrage of bullets in the general direction of the alleged shooters. 32 While
this was likely self-defense, what is more troubling was the lack of investiga-
tion by either the Army or state troopers.33 "'[T]hey didn't even care. They
just left .... [W]e all coordinate with each other-one family."'" This sug-
gests that PSCs were seen as equals of state and federal actors in their law
enforcement status.
35
Despite this, and the continued uproar over Blackwater's presence in
Iraq36, its presence in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina has been essen-
tially ignored.37 However, as Hurricane Katrina was certainly financially
successful for Blackwater, there is no reason to think that domestic activity
will not continue in the future. 38 This presents troubling state action prob-
lems that are discussed infra.39
C. Private Security Companies in Iraq and Controversies
This article is applicable to all PSCs, but Blackwater Worldwide will
operate as the primary example, due to its infamy in the U.S. media and its
involvement in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The latter establishes
the fact that state governments have used-and presumably will continue to
use-PSCs.40 It is apparent in the Hurricane Katrina aftermath that PSCs are
not utilized solely by the U.S. military.4' Likewise, one author notes that
PSCs realize that there is potential in expanding operations within the United
States: "'The private security firm Blackwater is seeking to diversify its
business by reaching out to U.S. state and local governments that may lack
infrastructure or capacity to respond to natural disasters and terrorist at-
tacks., 42 This is important for this article, as it avoids the rather complex
32. SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 328-29.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. In January, 2009, the U.S. State Department announced that Blackwater's contract to
operate in Iraq would not be renewed. It is unclear, however, when Blackwater will fully
withdraw its employees. See U.S. Will Not Renew Blackwater Contract in Iraq, REUTERS.
COM, Jan 30, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-GCA-iraq/idUSTRE50p352009
0131.
37. See id. at 330.
38. See Brent D. Hessel, United Nations Update, 15 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 53, 54 (2007).
39. See infra Part V.
40. See Hessel, supra note 38, at 54.
41. See id.
42. Id. Hessel points out that Blackwater's effectiveness was not questioned, but its cost
was. Id.
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issues of military immunity that would arise if Blackwater was solely con-
tracted to provide soldiers on foreign soil as a military supplement.4 3
1. Controversial Incidents Involving Blackwater in Iraq
Blackwater's initial foray into Iraq was when it Was awarded a no-bid
$27.7 million contract to provide security detail for L. Paul Bremer III, the
Coalition Provisional Authority for the invasion.44 Even after Bremer's de-
parture, Blackwater stayed in Iraq on various security details. 45 In March
2007, Time Magazine reported that Blackwater had been paid $320 million
for its services in Iraq.46 Among Blackwater's current responsibilities is pro-
viding security for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.47
Several controversial incidents have marked Blackwater's tenure in
Iraq. The first was the killing of four Blackwater employees in an attack by
Iraqi opposition forces on March 31, 2004.48 Their bodies were burned and
hung from a bridge overlooking the Euphrates River.49 The images were
broadcast on television. 50 This has been described as "a turning point in pub-
lic opinion about the war.,
51
The Committee on Oversight and Reform (Committee) launched an in-
vestigation into the Fallujah incident as to whether Blackwater properly
trained and supplied its employees.5 2 The Committee concluded it had not.
53
43. Although the Justice Department's recent indictment of five Blackwater employees
on manslaughter charges for their involvement in the Nissor Square massacre suggests that
this area of the law is in flux. Despite this "'unprecedented use of the law"', it is much too
early in the proceedings to determine the likelihood of conviction. Ginger Thompson and
James Risen, Plea by Blackwater Guard Helps Indict Others, NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 8, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/washington/09blackwater.html?ref=us
44. See SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 68-69. Scahill notes that the contract was awarded
after the Secret Service had assessed the situation as too dangerous for its men. Id. at 69.
45. See id. at 164-65.
46. See Brian Bennett, Victims of an Outsourced War, TIME.COM, Mar. 15, 2007,
http://www.time.comltime/magazine/article/0,9171.1 599682,00.html.
47. U.S. Embassy Resumes Use of Blackwater Security, USATODAY.COM, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-09-21 -iraq-blackwaterN.htm.
48. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, I IOTH CONG.,
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKWATER'S ACTIONS IN
FALLUJAH 4 (Comm. Print 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20070927104643.pdf [hereinafter PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS].
49. Report: Blackwater 'Impeded' Probe into Contractors Deaths, CNN.cOM, Sept. 27,
2007, http://www.cnn.com2007/POLITICS/09/27/iraq.blackwater/index.html.
50. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 48, at 4.
51. Id.
52. See Id. at 2.
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Due to this finding, the Committee also concluded that "[t]hese actions raise
serious questions about the consequences of engaging private, for-profit enti-
ties to engage in essentially military operations in a war zone."'54 The Fallu-
jah incident sparked questions about whether Blackwater is liable for injuries
suffered by its own employees.55
A much more controversial incident led to questions about Blackwater's
liability to third parties harmed by its conduct.56 On September 16, 2007, a
group of Blackwater troops were involved in a gunfire attack on Iraqi citi-
zens in Nisour Square in Baghdad, killing seventeen while wounding twenty-
four others.57 The fallout from this incident was fierce. The Iraqi govern-
ment immediately revoked Blackwater's license to operate in Iraq.58  The
State Department official in charge of PSCs in Iraq resigned.59 Blackwater
CEO Erik Prince took a trip to Capitol Hill to face a Congressional commit-
tee.6' In addition, an American watchdog group filed a lawsuit on behalf of
the Iraqi victims' estates.6' This incident has fueled the debate regarding
Blackwater's legality and accountability. 62
2. Pending Lawsuits
Blackwater currently has two lawsuits pending, both resulting from in-
cidents that occurred in Iraq.63 The first was filed by the estates of the four
53. Id. at 17. Among Blackwater's shortcomings were undertaking a mission before its
contract began and one that it had been previously warned about as too dangerous, not provid-
ing properly armed vehicles and weapons, and sending out a team two members short. Id.
54. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 48, at 17.
55. See infra Part I1.C.2 for a description of the lawsuit stemming from the Fallujah
incident brought by the victims' estates.
56. See Paul von Zielbauer & James Glanz, Under Siege, Blackwater Takes on Air of
Bunker, NYTIMES.COM, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com12007/10/25/world/middle
east/25blackwater.html?hp=&pagewanted=all.
57. Id.
58. Iraq Battle Was Self-Defense, Security Firm Says, CNN.coM, Sept. 18, 2007,
http://www.cnn.conV2007IWORLD/meast/09/17/iraq.main/index.html [hereinafter Iraq Battle
Was Self-Defense].
59. Zielbauer & Glanz, supra note 56.
60. See John M. Broder, Chief of Blackwater Defends His Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
3, 2007, at A8.
61. See generally Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Abtan v. Blackwater Worldwide,
No. 1:07-cv-01831 (D.D.C Nov. 26, 2007); see infra Part 11.C.2 for a discussion of this law-
suit.
62. See generally Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, supra note 61.
63. See Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, L.L.C., 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 803 (E.D.
N.C. 2005); Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, supra note 61, at 3.
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Blackwater employees killed in the Fallujah attack in March 2004.64 The
lawsuit states claims for wrongful death and fraud. 65 It was originally filed
in state court and later removed to federal court.66 The federal district court
remanded it to state court.67 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held the
remand unreviewable and refused to issue a writ of mandamus. 68 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 69
The second lawsuit was filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights on
behalf of victims of the September 2007 attack on Iraqi civilians.70 The
amended complaint claims, inter alia, violations of the Alien Tort Claims
Act, wrongful death, and negligent hiring and supervision.7' Blackwater is
again in a jurisdictional battle, but this time over the proper federal forum. 72
Blackwater's motion to dismiss or transfer has yet to be ruled on.73
The existence of these lawsuits shows that Blackwater is certainly not
immune to suit. However, they address statutory and common law viola-
tions. The remaining question is whether Blackwater is answerable for fed-
eral constitutional violations. This may seem conjectural at this point, but its
actions in Louisiana certainly foreshadow such a situation, especially given
its track record in Iraq. Thus, this article will analyze Blackwater-and any
other PSC in a similar situation-under the traditional state action doctrine.
It will argue that Blackwater is a state actor when it contracts with the federal
or state governments and is therefore answerable for any federal constitu-
tional violations that it may inflict on U.S. citizens.74
64. Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 814.
68. In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, L.L.C., 460 F.3d 576, 595 (4th Cir. 2006).
69. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, L.L.C. v. Nordan, 549 U.S. 1260, 1260 (2007).
70. See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, supra note 61, at 18.
71. Id. at 14-15, 17.
72. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for Lack of Venue and
to Dismiss Non-Legal Entities at I, Abtan v. Blackwater Worldwide, No. 1:07-cv-01831
(D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2008). The case is currently filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Id. Blackwater suggests the court should dismiss the entire suit for
filing in an improper venue, or alternatively, transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia. Id.
73. See Court Docket, Abtan v. Blackwater Worldwide, No. 1:07-cv-0 1831 (D.D.C. Oct.
11,2007).
74. This is not to insinuate that PSCs automatically will act in such a way. Therefore,
this analysis does remain hypothetical to a certain extent. What is more certain is that gov-
ernments will continue to utilize PSCs for certain matters and that it is possible that such a
claim could arise in the near future. This is especially true if PSCs continue to act outside of
military operations, such as Blackwater did during the Hurricane Katrina aftermath.
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I1I. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
This part provides a description of the state action doctrine and its his-
torical path. It then introduces the major strands of the doctrine and summa-
rizes the seminal cases from which they sprung. It then focuses on two ex-
ceptions most pertinent to this article's discussion that PSCs will later be
analyzed under:75 The exclusive and traditional state function exception and
the nexus exception. Finally, this part describes how courts have historically
treated private security guards under the state action doctrine.
A. The Origins of the State Action Doctrine
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was passed in 1868.76
Among other things, it promulgated that a state may not "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 7 7 One of the first
cases the Supreme Court applied this clause to was the Civil Rights Cases
7 8
in 1883.79 In these consolidated cases, the underlying issue was whether a
private entity could still enforce its racially discriminatory policies. 80 The
Court held that the Amendment did not apply to private actors.8 ' As opposed
to this private discrimination, "[i]t is State action of a particular character
75. See infra Part Ill B.
76. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 596 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
79. Id. at 9. The Amendment had come up before, but under different circumstances.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876). In Cruikshank, the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights and that the Bill of Rights was
only applicable to the federal government. id. at 551-52. This holding, of course, has been
chipped away over the years through the doctrine of selective incorporation. See Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment freedom from double
jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment
right to trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the
Fourth Amendment freedom from unlawful search and seizure); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the First Amendment's provision preventing the establishment of
a religion); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (incorporating the
Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937) (incorporating the freedoms of the First Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925).
80. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9-Il.
81. Id. at 11.
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that is prohibited. 82 The Court also clarified the power given to Congress in
the final section of the Amendment. 83 Congress has only the power "[t]o
adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited
state laws and state acts." 4 That is, Congress can invalidate state action that
violates the Amendment, but it cannot invalidate similar private action. 5
The debate soon centered on the definition of state action. Some state
action is easily discernable, for example, an actual discriminatory state law
86
or action taken by a state employee.87 A somewhat more difficult case is the
doctrine's application to government agencies. For example, in Lebron v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp.,88 the National Railroad Passenger Cor-
poration-more popularly known as Amtrak-was held to be a government
agent, thus subject to federal constitutional requirements.89 The Court held
that when "the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the fur-
therance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authori-
ty to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is
part of the Government." 90 This has not been interpreted as an automatic
finding that all government agencies are state actors; rather, it is a factual
finding based on each specific agency's makeup.91 For example, the Ninth
Circuit held the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation-Freddie Mac-
not to be a state actor for due process purposes.92 This decision was based on
82. Id.
83. Id. The text of that section is: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
84. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
85. See id. That is, it cannot invalidate discriminatory private action using the power
granted to it by section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. However, it can-and
has-regulated discriminatory private action with other powers, notably its Commerce Clause
power. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (affirming
Congress' power to regulate private hotel from discriminating against blacks under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (affirming Congress'
power to regulate private restaurants under the Interstate Commerce Clause).
86. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971).
87. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
88. 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
89. Id. at 400. Amtrak was created under the Railroad Passenger Service Act of 1970.
Id. at 383-84; see also 45 U.S.C. § 501 (2000), repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379, 1386. Lebron dealt with a First Amendment issue regarding
political advertising directed against the Coors family-of Coors Brewing fame. Lebron, 513
U.S. at 376-77.
90. Id. at 400.
91. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d
1401, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996).
92. Id.
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the level of control the government had on the make-up of the board of direc-
tors, holding it was much less than in Lebron.93
However, there are exceptions to the state action doctrine in certain cir-
cumstances where the private entity's actions could legitimately be attributed
to the state. 94 The literature on the subject varies. One academic counts six
distinct categories in which state action could be found.95 Another names
two main categories, with the second consisting of three subcategories.96
Regardless of the nomenclature of the various exceptions, the overreaching
idea is the same: Under certain circumstances, a private entity will be consi-
dered a state actor.
B. The State Action Doctrine as Applied to Private Entities
The next section will focus on two commonly litigated exceptions that
would most likely be discussed in a case involving a PSC: the exclusive and
traditional public function exception and the nexus exception.
I. Traditional and Exclusive Governmental Functions
One area that will subject a private actor to the state action doctrine is
when that actor is performing a traditional state function.97 This exception
has been narrowed to include only those functions which are "traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the State." 98 This exception has its beginning in
the White Primary Cases, a collection of Supreme Court rulings dealing with
93. id. at 1407-09. In an interesting dichotomy, while Freddie Mac is not a government
actor for state action purposes, a federal district court has held that it is a government actor for
immunity purposes. See Paslowski v. Standard Mortgage Corp. of Ga., 129 F. Supp. 2d 793,
800-01 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
94. See generally G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doc-
trine: The Searchfor Governmental Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REV. 333 (1997).
95. Id. at 344. Professor Buchanan claims the following six situations came about, albeit
some of them indirectly, from the Civil Rights Cases decision: Public Function, State Nexus,
Beyond-State-Authority, Projection-of-State-Authority, State Authorization, and State Inac-
tion. Id. at 344-53.
96. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv. 302 (1995).
Professor Krotoszynski claims the two main categories are whether the actor is a state agency
and whether the actor has sufficient contacts with the state. Id. at 306, 314. The "contacts"
category is further broken down into: exclusive government functions, symbiotic relation-
ships, and the nexus test. Id.
97. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
98. Id. at 353.
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the denial of black citizens' right to vote in state primary elections. 99 To
synthesize, the Court held that although the Democratic Party of Texas, a
private entity, was responsible for the questioned elections, the elections
were ultimately regulated by state law.'0° Thus, the Democratic Party was
answerable for its violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
when it excluded black citizens on the basis of race.'0 ' This was later ex-
tended to a private organization known as the Jaybird Democratic Associa-
tion, which claimed it was a completely private and voluntary organization,
not a state-regulated political party. 0 2 The Court so held that "[t]he Jaybird
primary has become an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the
elective process that determines who shall rule and govern in the county. 10 3
The Court added another situation to the public function prong in Marsh
v. Alabana.' 4 In Marsh, the plaintiff was a Jehovah's Witness claiming a
violation of her First Amendment freedoms of press and religion. 10 5 The
defendant was a corporately owned town which claimed it had no federal
constitutional liability. 0 6  The Court held the city liable, noting that
"[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion."'0 7 It further rea-
soned that the city's actions, by opening up its property for public use and
then regulating it, resulted in it being a traditional public function. 08
The public function exception was further discussed in Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks.' °9 In Flagg Bros., the Court held that a firm executing a lien sale
pursuant to statute was not an exclusive traditional state function, although it
is usually thought to be a sheriff's duty."0 The Court noted that "[c]reditors
and debtors have had available to them historically a far wider number of
choices than has one who would be an elected public official, or a member of
Jehovah's Witnesses who wished to distribute literature in Chickasaw, Ala.,
99. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
100. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 663-64; Condon, 286 U.S. at 89.
101. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 666; Condon, 286 U.S. at 89.
102. Terry, 345 U.S. at 462-63.
103. Id. at 469.
104. 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
105. Id. at 504.
106. Id. at 502.
107. Id. at 506.
108. Id. The Court likened this to private companies that build and operate bridges, fer-
ries, and roadways. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506. "Since these facilities are built and operated
primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is
subject to state regulation." Id.
109. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
110. Id. at 161-62.
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at the time Marsh was decided."''. Due to the variety of options, creditors
and debtors had to solve their dispute; the Court held that the lien sale was
not a function exclusive to the state."12 It also noted that there were several
areas that would be better suited to the extension of the exception before
creditor rights: "Among these are such functions as education, fire and po-
lice protection, and tax collection."' 13 The Court only mentioned these as
possibilities and of course, declined to rule on any of them.' 14
2. Nexus/Entanglement
This section will attempt to synthesize the line of cases that address pri-
vate action that is not a traditional government function, but yet involves
such close activity with the state that the entity's behavior can be attributed
to the state. Nomenclature of this prong varies, with terms such as "joint
activity," "nexus," "entanglement," and "symbiotic relationship" being used
in cases. However, the underlying premise is that the state and private actor
have such a close relationship that the line between them becomes blurred.
a. Private Action That Is State Action
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority," 5 the Court held that the
symbiotic relationship between a restaurant and a parking structure operated
by the State was sufficiently close to require the restaurant to meet the man-
dates of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 Burton involved a privately-owned
restaurant that refused to serve the plaintiff, who was black. 1 7 The restau-
rant was located on the ground floor of a publicly owned parking lot, and it
leased its business space from the operating state agency." 8 The State used
the proceeds from the lease to help with the financing of and payment for the
structure. '9 The lease provided that the State would include certain utilities
and be responsible for most repairs. 20 In addition, the restaurant enjoyed a
11. Id. at162.
112. Id. at 163. "[E]ven if we were inclined to extend the sovereign-function doctrine
outside of its present carefully confined bounds, the field of private commercial transactions
would be a particularly inappropriate area into which to expand it." Id.
113. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163.
114. Id. at 163-64.
115. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
116. See id. at 716, 726.
117. Id. at 716.
118. Id.
119. Seeid. at719.
120. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 720.
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public tax exemption for any improvements to the property that would be
considered fixtures.' 2' Signs hung from the structure stating its public nature
and the state and national flags flew above it.
122
The Court considered the fact that this set-up was mutually beneficial to
both parties; the restaurant's patrons had a convenient place to park, and the
State profited from their use of the structure. 123 The Court attempted to nar-
row its holding by recognizing that "a multitude of relationships might ap-
pear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace" and by insisting that
this is to be a factual inquiry. 24 In this case, the Court emphasized that the
State went further than mere acquiescence to the discrimination; it instead
"elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted dis-
crimination."'' 25 Based on the above factors, the Court found that by the mu-
tual benefits conferred between the State and the restaurant, "[t]he State
[had] so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle
that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.' ' 26
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 127 the Court addressed an amendment to the Cali-
fornia Constitution banning the State from regulating discrimination in prop-
erty transactions except in those transactions where the State was the proper-
ty owner. 28 Among its effects, the amendment nullified two state civil sta-
tutes penalizing discrimination in housing transactions. 29 California argued
that it was simply taking a neutral position to private housing discrimina-
tion. 3° The Court disagreed, stating that the amendment "changed the situa-
tion from one in which discrimination was restricted 'to one wherein it is
encouraged, within the meaning of the cited decisions."",13' Thus, the State
was now "'at least a partner in the instant act of discrimination '"1 32 The
Court explained that by enacting the amendment, the State went beyond re-
peal of the civil provisions. 3 3 Instead of relying on mere "personal choice"
121. Id. at 719.
122. Id. at 720.
123. Id. at 724.
124. Id. at 726.
125. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. The Court also recognized the irony "that in one part of a
single building, erected and maintained with public funds by an agency of the State to serve a
public purpose, all persons have equal rights, while in another portion, also serving the public,
a Negro is a second-class citizen, offensive because of his race." Id. at 724.
126. Id. at 725.
127. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
128. See id. at 370-71.
129. See id. at 372.
1130. See id. at 376.
13i. Id. at375.
132. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375.
133. See id. at 377.
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to discriminate, one "could now invoke express constitutional authority" to
do so. 34 This led the Court to conclude that the State had "significantly in-
volved itself with invidious discriminations" and that this state action vi-
olated the Fourteenth Amendment. 135
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass'n, 136 the Court held that a high school athletic association was a state
actor when enforcing its rules against member schools. 137 Although the As-
sociation was comprised of both public and private high schools, the Court
held that the "pervasive entwinement" between the Association and public
high school officials required a finding of state action.'38 Examples of this
entwinement included: the fact that each member-school was represented by
a faculty or administration member acting within his or her scope of duty,
that meetings were often held during school hours, and that the schools pro-
vided a small part of the Association's funding. 39 There was a financial
relationship between the public schools and the Association as well. 140 In
exchange for the services the Association provided in scheduling and regu-
lating athletic events within the state, it received dues from the member-
schools and a portion of the sales generated by the events.' 4' Not only were
the public officials involved in the Association, they overwhelmingly per-
formed "all but the purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists
and functions in practical terms."'' 4
2
The Court referred to this presence of public school officials as "bottom
up" entwinement. 43 It also found what it termed "top down" entwinement.' 44
The Court noted that State Board of Education members were assigned to
134. Id.
135. Id. at 376, 380-81.
136. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
137. See id. at 290-91.
138. Id. at 291. The Court noted that 84% of the member-schools are public, and that the
16% which are private prevent "this entwinement of the Association and the public school
system from being total and their identities totally indistinguishable." Id. at 299-300. The
dissent was unimpressed with "entwinement" as the basis of the majority's holding. Id. at 305
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We have never found state action based upon mere 'entwine-
ment."').
139. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 299. "Although the findings and prior opinions in this
case include no express conclusion of law that public school officials act within the scope of
their duties when they represent their institutions, no other view would be rational . I..." ld
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 300.
143. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300.
144. Id.
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serve on the board of control and legislative council. 141 It also considered the
fact that the Association's ministerial employees were considered state em-
ployees for purposes of the state retirement system.' 46 The Court found the
sum result of these two forms of entwinement "unmistakable" and "over-
whelming," and that the evidence presented required the Association to be
considered a state actor.
147
b. Private Action That Is Not State Action
The Court has drawn boundaries to ensure that a state and a private enti-
ty may interact without the private entity automatically becoming a state
actor. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 148 the Court held that a private social
club did not become a state actor by virtue of its liquor license obtained from
the state liquor board. 149 Likewise, the State was not liable for the club's
racial discriminatory policies in so licensing them. 150 The Court held that
this case presented "nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship between
lessor and lessee that was present in Burton," noting that "while Eagle was a
public restaurant in a public building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in
a private building."' 1  In analyzing the relationship between the licensing
board and the club, the Court noted that the board "plays absolutely no part
in establishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club.' 52
The board's regulatory scheme was to keep track of the number of licenses in
a given jurisdiction and to regulate their use, and "cannot be said to in any
way foster or encourage racial discrimination.' 53 Thus, the State could not
be held in joint activity with the private club and the club's discriminatory
policies did not constitute state action.
54
However, the Court did enjoin the enforcement of one provision of the
board's regulations that required "'[e]very club licensee shall adhere to all of
the provisions of its Constitution and By-Laws.""1 55 It reasoned that this
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 302.
148. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
149. See id. at 177, 179.
150. Id. at 175-77.
151. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. Irvis, 407 U.S. at 176-77.
154. See id. at 177.
155. Id.
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would be state enforcement of the Lodge's discriminatory policy if it were to
discipline the Lodge for violating its own policy of racial discrimination.'56
These standards were again tested in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
(NCAA) v. Tarkanian,57 with the Court holding that the NCAA is not a state
actor.'58 The University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), had disciplined its
basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian after an investigation and recommendation
by the NCAA. 5 9 Tarkanian filed suit against both UNLV and the NCAA
alleging due process violations in his termination. 160
The Court held that UNLV, as a public university, is clearly a state ac-
tor.16' The remaining question was whether, through UNLV's compliance
with NCAA rules and recommendations, the NCAA had transformed into a
state actor as well. 62 The Court answered this in the negative. 163 The Court
rejected the argument that the NCAA was involved in state action because
UNLV adopted the NCAA's governing rules or because UNLV had a small
level of involvement in drafting them.' 64 It concluded that "the source of the
legislation adopted by the NCAA is not Nevada but the collective member-
ship, speaking through an organization that is independent of any particular
State." 65 Lastly, the Court disagreed that UNLV had delegated its power to
the NCAA, noting that the entities were really adversaries in this transac-
tion. 66 The Court summed up the relationship by stating "[i]t would be more
appropriate to conclude that UNLV has conducted its athletic program under
color of the policies adopted by the NCAA, rather than that those policies
were developed and enforced under color of Nevada law.' 67
156. See id. at 178-79.
157. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
158. See id. at 199.
159. Id. at 180-81. The Court described the NCAA's findings as "38 violations of NCAA
rules by UNLV personnel, including 10 involving Tarkanian." Id. at 181. As for discipline
by the NCAA, it had placed the program on probation for two years and threatened further
sanctions if Tarkanian was not dismissed. Id.
160. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 181.
161. Id. at 192.
162. Id. at 193.
163. Id. at 195.
164. See id.
165. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193. In a footnote, the Court suggested that it may have re-
quired a different analysis if the NCAA were made up of only schools within a single state.
Id. at 193 n.13.
166. Id. at 196. The Court said that in disciplinary investigations, the NCAA is an adver-
sary of the institution being investigated, as it is looking out for the interests of all the other
member institutions. Id. It likened this to a state-paid public defender representing a client
against the state. Id.
167. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199.
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C. Privately-Contracted Security Guards and the State Action Doctrine
With this background, this section will show how private security
guards have been treated under the exceptions to the state action doctrine.
Whether a State's police power is an exclusive and traditional government
function remains untested by the United States Supreme Court. 168 This sec-
tion briefly describes the available case law on the subject. It focuses on the
police power delegated to private security guards and the results courts have
reached in such scenarios.
The Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Maryland169 involved a
claim that a private security guard enforced an amusement park's racially
discriminatory policy. 70 However, this particular guard was a deputized
sheriff by the state and wore a badge stating this.17' He nonetheless remained
under control of the park as to his duties. 72 The Court noted that the guard
"purported to exercise the authority of a deputy sheriff."'' 73 Furthermore, the
Court also noted that "[i]f an individual is possessed of state authority and
purports to act under that authority, his action is state action."'174 Thus, the
guard's actions constituted state action in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
175
While the Supreme Court has not revisited this particular issue, the
Griffin holding and the Flagg dicta which specifically listed "police protec-
tion" as an example of a possible exclusive governmental function have pro-
vided guidance for lower courts deciding this issue. 76 The cases turn on the
amount of authority delegated to the private security guards by the state. 
177
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals perhaps described the necessary fac-
tors best in Wade v. Byles. 78 In Wade, a private security guard at a housing
project was involved in an altercation that ended in the guard shooting the
168. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64 n. 14 (1978).
169. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
170. See id. at 131.
171. Id. at 132.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 135.
174. Griffin, 378 U.S. at 135.
175. See id. at 137.
176. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1978); see also Griffin, 378 U.S. at
137. The following cases are not intended to provide a complete overview of the case law by
any means, but instead were selected as examples of how the lower courts have decided the
issue. See, e.g., Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005); Payton v.
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1999); Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d
902 (7th Cir. 1996).
177. Romanski, 428 F.3d at 640; Payton, 184 F.3d at 627; Wade, 83 F.3d at 905.
178. See 83 F.3d at 902, 905.
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plaintiff.'79 The court stated that the powers granted to the defendant, includ-
ing carrying a weapon, arresting trespassers until the police arrived, and
shooting in self-defense, while perhaps traditionally reserved to the state, are
not exclusively reserved to the state. 80 Based on this, the court held that the
defendant "was not a state actor when he [fired the] shot.''
Three years later, the Seventh Circuit confronted a factually different
claim in Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 82 and
found the security guard to be a state actor. 83 In Payton, the security guard
was stationed at a hospital, but he was also a "special police officer" under
city ordinance.' 84 As such, he was required to wear an issued badge and
"'conform to and be subject to all rules and regulations governing police
officers of the city.'" 85 The guard was granted broad authority by the ordin-
ance: "'[They] shall possess the powers of the regular police patrol at the
places for which they are respectively appointed or in the line of duty for
which they are engaged."",186 The court held that this broad authority in-
cluded functions traditionally and "exclusively reserved to the state.' 87 It
found most distinctive the fact that the guards were not confined to a specific
area nor were they limited in their arrest power as was the guard in Wade. 88
Finding "no legal difference exists between a privately employed special
officer with full police powers and a regular Chicago police officer," the
court held that the guards were participating in state action.'89
In Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C.,' 90 the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that private casino security guards were state actors, citing
heavily to the Seventh Circuit's decisions.' 9' Romanski involved a casino
patron detained by the casino's security guards for several hours because she
179. Id. at 903. The defendant worked for a security company hired by the complex. Id.
The company was also named as a defendant in this action. Id.
180. Id. at 906.
181. Wade, 83 F.3d at 907. "If Wade's allegations are true, he may very well have a cog-
nizable tort claim, but it is not one of constitutional dimension." Id.
182. 184 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1999).
183. ld. at 630.
184. Id. at 624-25.
185. id. at 625 (quoting CHI., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-340-100 (2008)).
186. Id. (quoting CH., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-340-100 (2008)).
187. Payton, 184 F.3d at 630.
188. Compare id., with Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 1996). "[Clitizen's
arrests and the rights to carry handguns and use them in self-defense are available to individu-
als outside of the law enforcement community." See Payton, 184 F.3d at 629 (citing Wade, 83
F.3d at 906).
189. Id. at 630.
190. 428 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005).
191. Id. at 640.
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took a token from an unoccupied slot machine.192 As in Payton, a statute-
this time a state statute, not a city ordinance-gave special police authority to
the security guards. 93 This authority included "'the authority to arrest a per-
son without a warrant as set forth for public peace officers." 94 However,
the arrest must occur on casino property, thus, the Michigan statute seems
narrower than the Chicago ordinance in Payton, which had no such limita-
tion.1 95 Nonetheless, the court held that "[w]here private security guards are
endowed by law with plenary police powers such that they are de facto po-
lice officers, they may qualify as state actors under the public function
test.', 196 Based on the statute and the arrest powers of the guards, the court
concluded the police power the guards were given was the exclusive and
traditional power of the state, and the guards were therefore state actors.
97
IV. SECTION 1983 AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
While this article has thus far focused on the state action doctrine and
its exceptions, this Part will discuss 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 has
proven an important tool for plaintiffs seeking remedies for federal constitu-
tional violations and would likely be part of a claim against a PSC, as many
of the state action cases discussed supra involved section 1983 claims.' 98
This Part will examine the history of section 1983 and briefly describe its
requirements and limits. It will also describe the availability of a Bivens
action, a judicially created right that acts as the federal counterpart to a sec-
192. Id. at 632-33. It probably did not help the defendants' case that the patron was a
seventy-two year old woman and the token she took from the machine was worth five cents.
Id. at 632.
193. See id. at 633; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.1080 (2008).
194. Romanski, 428 F.3d at 633 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.1080).
195. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.1080, and Romanski, 428 F.3d at 633, with CHI.,
ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-340-100 (2008), and Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999). The ordinance in Payton allowed the guards "to
'do special duty at any fixed place in the city, or at any place necessary for protection of per-
sons, passengers and property."' Payton, 184 F.3d at 628 (quoting CH., ILL., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 4-340-030).
196. Romanski, 428 F.3d at 637 (citing Payton, 184 F.3d at 630; Henderson v. Fisher, 631
F.2d 1115, 1117-18 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Rojas v. Alexander's Dep't Store, Inc., 654
F. Supp. 856, 857 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)).
197. Id. at 640 (citing and quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353
(1974)).
198. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
293 (2001); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1988); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 165 (1972).
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tion 1983 action.' 99 The relationship between the "state action" requirement
of the Due Process Clause and the section 1983 requirement of "acting under
color of state law" will then be discussed. Finally, this Part will analyze cas-
es involving section 1983 claims against privately run prisons, which will
serve as a basis for comparison to PSCs in Part V.
A. A Brief Background of Section 1983 and Its Relationship to the State
Action Doctrine
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code was originally passed
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and later codified to its present
state.200 The statute states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress..
201
The statute's main purpose is to provide redress for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2°  In order to plead a cognizable claim under §
1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: that he or she was deprived of a
right guaranteed "by the 'Constitution and laws,"' and that the defendant was
acting "'under color of law.' 20 3 Among other relief, a successful § 1983
claim provides for reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff.2°4
Section 1983 and the state action doctrine are related, but are doctrinally
different when considering private parties. °5 In order to be liable under §
1983, a private party must be acting "under color of state law. ' 2°  To fall
within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment, a private party must meet
199. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 407-08 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
200. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
202. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934 (1982) (quoting Lynch v. Household
Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972)).
203. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
205. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 928 n.8.
206. Id. at 935.
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one of the exceptions to the state action doctrine.27 In Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 208 the Court analyzed the relationship between the two standards.
21
The Lugar Court held that if state action was found to be present, then the
"acting under color of state law" requirement of § 1983 would be satisfied as
well.210 It is important to note that the converse of this rule is not necessarily
true; that is, not all valid § 1983 "acting under color of law" claims automati-
cally equate state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
21
'
One more facet of § 1983 must be mentioned. Section 1983 applies to
those only under color of state law.212 It is silent to federal actors.21 3 In Bi-
vens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 214 the
Court found an implied cause of action for damages for certain constitutional
violations by federal actors.215 While the initial Bivens decision was limited
to a violation of the Fourth Amendment,1 6 it has been extended to violations
of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.217 However, the Court has stressed the
extraordinariness of Bivens as a remedy, noting that the only circumstances
in which it has been used are when individual actors violated one's constitu-
tional rights and there was no alternative remedy for the violation.218 The
207. See id. at 926.
208. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
209. See id.
210. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942. "[Pletitioner was deprived of his property through state
action; respondents were, therefore, acting under color of state law in participating in that
deprivation." Id. The Court also commented on the inequity that would result if "state ac-
tion" was not held to equate to "color of law" for § 1983 purposes:
To read the "under color of any statute" langnage [sic] of the Act in such a way as to im-
pose a limit on those Fourteenth Amendment violations that may be redressed by the § 1983
cause of action would be wholly inconsistent with the purpose of § I of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 17 Stat. 13, from which § 1983 is derived.
Id. at 934.
211. Id. at 935 n.18; see also Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1464 (1Oth Cir. 1996); 15 AM.
JUR. 2D CIVIL RIGHTS § 73 (2000 & Supp. 2008).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added).
213. See id.
214. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
215. See id. at 396-97.
216. See id. at 397.
217. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1980) (finding a Bivens action for a
violation by federal actors of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229-30 (1979) (finding a Bivens action for a
violation by federal actors of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). But see Bush
v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (declining to extend Bivens to a First Amendment viola-
tion).
218. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,70(2001).
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two extensions mentioned above are the only two times the Court has found
both factors met.219
B. Privately-Run Prisons and § 1983
This section will analyze the treatment of privately-run prisons under §
1983. The phenomenon of privatizing state and federal prisons provides a
workable analogy to that of privatizing the military in the form of PSCs. 2 0
In both cases, private actors are delegated a certain amount of authority to
control others. One such private actor is Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA).22  CCA, now a publicly traded company, claims it is the nation's
largest provider of jail, detention and corrections services to governmental
agencies with 75,000 total inmates 222 in nineteen states and the District of
Columbia. 3 It also contends that these figures make it the fourth largest
correctional system in the United States, behind the federal prison system
and those of two states. 2
4
Privately-run prisons are not a new invention; rather, they have been in
use since the nation's founding.22 5 Both federal and state governments cur-
rently utilize these facilities.226 However, private prisons under contract with
the federal government have been treated slightly different than private pris-
ons under contract with a state government for state action and § 1983 liabili-
ty purposes.
219. Id. "In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice...
" d.
220. See Corrections Corporation of America, http://www.correctionscorp.comlabout (last
visited Apr. 4, 2009) [hereinafter CCA].
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Corrections Corporation of America, CCA Facility Locations, http://www.corrections
corp.comfacitlities/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
224. CCA, supra note 220.
225. Rachel Christine Bailie Antonuccio, Note, Prisons for Profit: Do the Social and
Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 33 J. CORP. L. 577, 582-83 (2008).
226. id. One author argues that while the use of private prisons by individual states has
begun to decrease, the federal government's use of these entities has significantly increased
over the past decade. Matthew T. Tikonoff, Note, A Final Frontier in Prison Litigation:
Does Bivens Extend to Employees of Private Prisons Who Violate the Constitution?, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 985-87 (2007). This is attributed to the crackdown on federal drug
crimes as well as the increase in detainees after 9/1I. Id. at 986-87.
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1. Section 1983 Claims Against Private Prisons Housing State
Prisoners
In Richardson v. McKnight,227 the State of Tennessee had contracted
with a private corporation to house inmates.228 Two private guards claimed
immunity from alleged § 1983 violations. 229 The Court held that qualified
immunity did not extend to employees of private prisons. 230 It did not ex-
pressly rule on whether the guards' actions were considered those of a state
actor, but ordered the lower court to decide this on standard state action
precedent.23' Justice Rehnquist's dicta in another case suggested that the
claim would be valid: "[T]he private facility in question housed state pris-
oners-prisoners who already enjoy a right of action against private correc-
tional providers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "232
Several courts have agreed with Justice Rehnquist and have not only
held that § 1983 is available, but also that privately-run prisons under state
contract have satisfied the "under color of law" requirement.233 In fact, the
Sixth Circuit held this as early as 1991, well before the quoted dicta in Cor-
rectional Services Corp. v. Malesko234 appeared.235 In so holding, the court
appeared to consider both the public function and the nexus exceptions to the
state action doctrine.236 The Fifth Circuit later agreed after Richardson:
"[c]learly, confinement of wrongdoers-though sometimes delegated to pri-
227. 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
228. Id. at 402.
229. Id. at 401-02; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (holding that
qualified immunity under § 1983 "is available only to [state] officials performing discretio-
nary functions").
230. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 412. The dissent vigorously disagreed, noting:
Today's decision says that two sets of prison guards who are indistinguishable in the ul-
timate source of their authority over prisoners, indistinguishable in the powers that they pos-
sess over prisoners, and indistinguishable in the duties that they owe toward prisoners, are to
be treated quite differently in the matter of their financial liability.
Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at413-14.
232. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko. 534 U.S. 61, 72 n.5 (2001). But see Holly v. Scott,
434 F.3d 287, 292 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) ("It is an open question in this circuit whether § 1983
imposes liability upon employees of a private prison facility under contract with a state. We
need not decide that issue here.").
233. See, e.g., Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
234. 534U.S.at6l.
235. Skelton, 963 F.2d at 102.
236. See id. "As a detention center, Pri-Cor is no doubt performing a public function
traditionally reserved to the state." Id. "'There is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of [Pri-Cor] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself."' Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)).
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vate entities-is a fundamentally governmental function., 237 The Tenth Cir-
cuit has at least suggested the same in dicta. 8
2. Bivens Claims Against Private Prisons Housing Federal Prisoners
The Court was more restrictive of a federal prisoner's rights against a
privately-run prison. 2 3 9 In Malesko, the Court held that Bivens actions were
unavailable to a federal prisoner against a private corporation.24° This was
due, in part, to the fact that the prisoner would not have been able to file an
action against anyone but the individual if it were a federally-run prison.24'
The Tenth Circuit held that Malesko barred a Bivens action against an em-
ployee as well as a privately-run prison itself.242 In Holly v. Scott,2 43 the
Fourth Circuit agreed, noting that the plaintiff had other options under state
law.244 On the other hand, some federal district courts have read Malesko
more broadly and allowed Bivens actions against the individual employees. 245
No circuit has joined this view to date.
V. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The state action doctrine has remained untested against PSCs under
contract with the federal or state governments. In Gantt v. Security, USA,
Inc.,246 the plaintiff claimed that Security, USA, a PSC, violated her Fifth
Amendment rights after informing the company of a protective order against
her ex-boyfriend.2 7 She claimed that she needed to remain indoors and se-
237. Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam).
238. See Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1111 (10th Cir. 2005) (Ebel, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part), vacated en banc, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006). While
this appears only in a concurrence in part, Judge Ebel was using this as an example of the
asymmetry between § 1983 and Bivens in private prison settings. See id. He does not suggest
that there is any question that the § 1983 claim is available. See id.
239. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 72. "The prisoner may not bring a Bivens claim against the officer's employer,
the United States, or the BOP. With respect to the alleged constitutional deprivation, his only
remedy lies against the individual ... ." Id.
242. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108.
243. 434 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2006).
244. Id. at 296-97.
245. See Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 362-63 (D.N.J. 2004); Purkey v. CCA Det.
Ctr., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1149-51 (D. Kan. 2004); Sarro v. Comell Corr., Inc., 248 F. Supp.
2d 52, 63 (D.R. I. 2003).
246. 356 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 2004).
247. Id. at 549.
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cure, but the company forced her to work outdoors, where she was kid-
napped at gunpoint and raped. 48 The court noted that there was no evidence
to show that Security, USA was anything but a private company.24 9
Under this article's analysis, the PSCs will be operating under contract
with either the federal or a state government; a factor not present in Gantt.
While Gantt may stand for the principle that a PSC standing alone is not a
state acto/PSCSr, when it operates under governmental contract for the pur-
pose for governmental security or related objectives, the analysis changes
dramatically. 2 0 This part will analyze whether a PSC meets one of the ex-
ceptions to the state action doctrine and is therefore liable for constitutional
violations. It argues that a court could find that a PSC is a state actor under
either the "public function" or the "symbiotic relationship" exception to the
state action doctrine.
A. PSCs Under the Public Function Test
The first argument that a potential plaintiff could make is that providing
security for United States citizens is an exclusive and traditional government
function. If this is an exclusive and traditional government function, then the
PSC would be liable as a state actor if it violates one's federal constitutional
rights when contracting with a state or federal government to provide servic-
es.
The best way for a potential plaintiff to frame an argument is to com-
pare PSCs, such as Blackwater, to private security guards that have been held
as state actors. The plaintiff could also point to the dicta from Flagg Bros.,
which specifically listed "police protection" as an example of a possible ex-
clusive governmental function.251 However, the Flagg Bros. Court specifi-
cally pointed out that it was not ruling on the matter, and it never had ruled
on whether police protection was a traditional and exclusive governmental
function.252 Thus, the plaintiff would be left to distinguish PSCs based sub-
stantially on the case law from the lower courts.
In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that a deputized security guard, who
used the appearance of police authority at a private amusement park, was a
state actor. 3 Wade held that a private security guard, who only had the
power to carry a gun and arrest trespassers until the police came inside the
248. Id. at 550-51.
249. Id. at 552.
250. See generally id.
251. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978).
252. Id. at 163-64 n.14.
253. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S 130, 135 (1964).
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apartment complex, was not a state actor. 4 The courts in Payton and Ro-
manski found state action by private security guards, but only in the presence
of a broad statutory grant of authority.255
The Blackwater employees in New Orleans were deputized by the State
of Louisiana, which carried with it the power to make arrests and use
force.256 They wore Louisiana law enforcement badges around their necks
and were allowed to carry loaded weapons. 7 This deputization by the state
governor would likely prove analogous to the delegation of police power by
ordinance in Payton and by state statute in Romanski.258 The authority goes
beyond what was given to the guard in Wade.259 There were no similar limi-
tations on location or arrest power.260 A court would most likely find that a
PSC was a state actor in a Katrina-like scenario.
In addition, by a state or federal government contracting for a PSC's
services, another element could be added to the analysis. This is the fact that
the security company is directly contracted with the government, rather than
working directly for another private actor.26' A plaintiff might consider
claiming that this in itself establishes state action and no exceptions are
needed to prove that the PSC is a state actor.262 However, this would be a
difficult argument to make. In Lebron, the Court held that Amtrak, a gov-
263ernment-sponsored corporation, was a state actor. However, a key to that
holding was that the government reserved the power to appoint members of
the board of directors. 264 There is no evidence suggesting that any govern-
ment has any amount of control over Blackwater's board of directors or over
any other PSC.265 Thus, this argument would be difficult for a plaintiff to
make, and would most likely fail.
In sum, the factors discussed above would likely result in a finding of
state action under the exclusive and traditional public function exception to
254. Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902,906 (7th Cir. 1996).
255. See Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir.
1999); Romanski v. Detriot Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005).
256. See SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 324. "'He was even deputized by the governor of the
[Sitate of Louisiana. We can make arrests and use lethal force if we deem it necessary.'...
Blackwater spokesperson Anne Duke also said the company had a letter from Louisiana offi-
cials authorizing its forces to carry loaded weapons." Id.
257. Id.
258. See Payton, 184 F.3d at 624-25; Romanski, 428 F.3d at 633.
259. See Wade, 83 F.3d at 906.
260. Compare id., with SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 324.
261. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1995).
262. Seeid. at 381.
263. Id. at 400.
264. See id.
265. See generally SCAHILL, supra note 22.
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the state action doctrine. While Blackwater, or any other PSC, would not
likely be considered an actual part of a government by contracting with it, a
plaintiff could prove that the authority delegated to PSCs was that of an ex-
clusive and traditional state function.2  With this finding, a PSC would be
liable for federal constitutional violations when acting under such a grant of
authority.267
B. PSCs Under the Nexus Test
If the prior analysis is flawed, or simply unsuccessful in court, a plain-
tiff could also attempt to show that the nexus between the state and the PSC
was so close that the private conduct rose to the level of state action.268
The best argument for a plaintiff would be that the government and the
PSC enjoy a symbiotic relationship, as did the restaurant and the state in Bur-
to.269 She could claim that the PSC gets a lucrative contract. The state gets
security detail without having to train, house, and supervise the private
guards. The state also benefits from the hopeful decrease in crime and in-
crease in public order by having the additional security.
However, to meet the Burton standard, a plaintiff would have to show a
high level of interdependence. 270 To revisit an earlier quotation, "'we all
coordinate with each other-one family.' ' 27' To add to this, the descriptions
of the dress and armor PSC employees possess do not seem to differentiate
them from a state police force or militia.272 To the uninformed, it would like-
ly be difficult to tell whether an individual employee worked for a PSC or
the state.273 A court could consider this evidence of interdependence and that
the state "elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the" PSC
just as it would its own police force.274
A court could also consider the Tarkanian holding when making its de-
cision. In Tarkanian, one problem the Court had was that no state controlled
the NCAA.275 Here, the PSC would have a contract with a specific govern-
mental entity, whether an individual state or the federal government. This
266. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 394-95.
267. See id. at 400.
268. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716, 726 (1961).
269. See id. at 726.
270. See id. at 725.
271. SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 329.
272. See id. at 321-22.
273. See id.
274. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
275. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 (1988).
2009]
124
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss3/1
NOVA LAWREVIEW
would show a higher level of control by the state than was present in Tarka-
nian as a PSC would have a specific authority to abide by.276
The plaintiff might try to invoke the Brentwood "entwinement" excep-
tion as well.277 However, this would prove less successful. There does not
appear to be the pervasive entwinement between the state and the PSC that
was found in Brentwood. 8 In Brentwood, the Court found entwinement
both "bottom up" and "top down., 279 There is no evidence to suggest that
Blackwater's CEO serves on any governmental board due to the relationship.
Likewise, there is no evidence that a governmental actor is involved in the
business of the corporation. The necessary "overlapping identity" between
the PSC and the government is not present.280 Even though the Brentwood
test is sometimes seen as less rigid, and more of a balancing test, than the
other state action tests, 28' this scenario lacks the structural entwinement
present in Brentwood.282 Thus, Brentwood, standing alone, would more like-
ly point to a holding that a PSC is not a state actor.
A PSC might point to Moose Lodge to try to differentiate its actions
from the arguments made above. It could argue that the state is simply li-
censing and regulating its ability to provide security. It would analogize this
to the situation in Moose Lodge where a private club was held not to be a
state actor despite regulation from the state liquor board.283 The PSC would
attempt to distinguish the relationship with the state from Burton and show
that it was more like the one found in Moose Lodge. However, the level of
interdependence might be too much for the PSC to overcome. As previously
discussed, the outward appearance of the PSC's employees is nearly indis-
tinguishable from other soldiers or state officers. The PSC would not remain
a private entity on private property, as the Moose Lodge was;284 it would be
highly visible and possibly on public lands during its missions. The relation-
276. See id.
277. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 297 (2001).
278. See id. at 302.
279. Id. at 300.
280. See, e.g., Megan M. Cooper, Case Note, Dusting off the Old Play Book: How the
Supreme Court Disregarded the Blum Trilogy, Returned to Theories of the Past, and Found
State Action Through Entwinement in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Ass'n, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 913, 923 (2002). However, the author argues that the
extension in Brentwood was unnecessary and state action could have been found through other
exceptions. Id. at 990-91.
281. See James Potter, Comment, The NCAA as State Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood, and
Due Process, 155 U. PAL. REV. 1269, 1290-91 (2007).
282. See id.
283. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972).
284. See id. at 175.
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ship between the government and the PSC would be much closer to that in
Burton than in Moose Lodge.
For the reasons stated, a court should hold that a PSC, when providing
security under contract with a state or federal government contract, is a state
actor under the nexus exception. The strongest argument for this finding
would be that they enjoy a symbiotic and interdependent relationship.
VI. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 1983
The previous part attempted to answer the question of whether a PSC
would be considered a state actor when accused of a federal constitutional
violation by a U.S. citizen. Now, consider a situation in which overzealous
PSCs employees violate the federal constitutional rights of an individual.
Perhaps the employees fire their weapons at an innocent person, as is cur-
rently alleged by Blackwater's actions in Iraq, and deprive that person of life
without due process. A less violent example would be that the PSC decides
to conduct its hiring decisions based on discrimination that would violate the
Equal Protection Clause. In either scenario, a state actor would be liable for
these federal constitutional violations. Relief would most likely be sought in
the form of a section 1983 action against the actors.285 This part recognizes
this "real-world" solution and attempts to illustrate how a lawsuit might pro-
ceed under the precedent guiding section 1983 claims and Bivens actions as
applied to private prisons.
A. Violation of Constitution by PSC with State Government Contract
This part envisions a Katrina-like scenario. A PSC acts under state
government authority to provide security and maintain order in an emergen-
cy situation.
The wronged individual might consider filing a section 1983 action
against the individuals that searched him and against the PSC itself. As part
of his or her claim, it would have to be alleged that the PSC, and its agents,
were acting under color of state law during the illegal activity. 286 As dis-
cussed supra, the plaintiff should be successful in meeting this burden.287
The requirements of a state actor would automatically result in a finding that
the PSC or its agents were acting under color of law.288 Furthermore, there
285. See discussion supra Part III.
286. See supra Part IV.
287. See id. for the argument that a PSC is a state actor under these circumstances.
288. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982); discussion supra Part
III.A.
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are situations where a finding of state action is not required for the actor to
be "under-color-of-state-law. 289
Having decided that section 1983 can be used, it must be decided
against whom. States are immune from suit.2' Thus, the "stripping doc-
trine," a judicially created legal fiction, is used to answer claims against a
state.29' So the plaintiff here must sue the director of the PSC in his personal
capacity in order to recover damages.292 The employee may also be sued
under section 1983.93 It could be argued that Richardson could be applied to
this context as well. If it was, then the employees would not have the de-
fense of qualified immunity available.
B. Violation of Constitution by PSC with Federal Government Contract
This section assumes a similar scenario as discussed above, but now the
PSC's contract is with the federal government. The difference from the
above analysis will occur when deciding who can be liable to suit. The
plaintiff would not have a statutory cause of action under section 1983 avail-
able against a federal actor, but instead, the implied Bivens action. The ques-
tion would be who the plaintiff could file that suit against. If the prison
analogy holds, the answer may very well be no one. Under Malesko, the
PSC could not be sued, as the Court held that Bivens actions do not extend to
private corporations.294 Whether it could be extended to the individual em-
ployees of the PSC is an open question for now, but the majority opinion
seems to suggest not.
295
Thus, while a PSC may engage in the same conduct as a state actor
while contracting with a state or the federal government, following the pri-
vate prison analogy, the availability of suit may depend on the relationship.
289. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 n.j 8.
290. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
291. See generally Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
292. See id. at 159-60.
293. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
294. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,74 (2001).
295. See generally id. At least one author has recognized this limitation of Malesko and
suggests that Bivens actions should be available to foreign citizens who have suffered at the
hands of civilian contractors. See Scott J. Borrowman, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
and Abu Ghraib-Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S. Military Per-
sonnel and Civilian Contractors, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 416-17 (2005). The author sug-
gests that the same action would give rise to a Bivens claim "if committed against a U.S. citi-
zen." Id. at 417. However, the case he cites involves a public prison, not a private one. See
id. at 417-18. It has never been decided by the Court if Bivens extends to employees of pri-
vate prisons.
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While a PSC may engage in state action while under contract with the federal
government, the plaintiff may be left with the same remedies as it would
have been without a PSC held to be a state actor.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article poses a hypothetical that may be tested in the near future. It
offers a hypothetical violation of the federal Constitution by a PSC and then
asks whether that entity could be held to be a state actor if it was operating
under a government contract. This article argues that the answer to that
question is relatively straightforward. A PSC would most likely be held to
be a state actor in that situation. A court could use either the "exclusive and
traditional public function" or the "nexus" exception to the state action test to
so hold. However, a more difficult question is how a potential plaintiff
would be able to seek redress upon this finding. Section 1983 may provide
an avenue for relief for when a PSC is under contract with a state govern-
ment. However, the issue is less clear when a PSC is under contract with the
federal government. The Court has thus far refused to extend Bivens actions
to private corporations. Thus, federal constitutional violations by a PSC un-
der contract with the federal government may still not have a proper remedy,
and PSCs may still be able to operate in a way inconsistent with what a fed-
eral agent would be allowed under the Constitution.
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Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whoseflame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.
"Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she
With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to be free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"
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- Inscription on the Statue of Liberty'
1. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
Sudan is a diverse country with a rich and complex history. Since its
independence from Great Britain in 1956, the people of Sudan have strug-
gled with civil war, environmental issues, medical problems, and poverty.2
Due to decades of instability and high health risks, the people of Sudan have
sought assistance from and refuge in the international community.3 Primari-
ly, this paper will review the facts about the country of Sudan, including the
country's geographical properties, demographics about the Sudanese popula-
tion, health concerns, major historical events, and its current political envi-
ronment. Second, this paper will assess the impact that civil war has had on
Sudan and its people. Finally, this paper will look at the Sudanese refugees
who have settled in Omaha, Nebraska, including their struggles and expe-
riences in this Midwestern community.
B. Terms
In order to properly discuss this topic, it is necessary to examine several
definitions including: assimilation, asylum, immigrant, refugee, and reset-
tlement.4 Assimilation is defined as conforming with the customs and tradi-
tions of a dominant culture, in this case, the culture of the United States.'
The definition of asylum is a place of refuge or sanctuary; protection granted
* B.A. cum laude (2003), J.D. (2006) Creighton University. Member, State bars of
Iowa and Nebraska; Certified Mediator, Nebraska Office of Dispute Resolution. This article
is dedicated to the countless people who have come to our shores in hopes of a better life.
Also, to my husband, E. Michael Lambert, with whom I am honored to share my life, hopes,
and dreams.
I. EMMA LAZARUS, I THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS 198 (BiblioBazaar, LLC 2008).
This poem is entitled "The New Colossus." See id.
2. See generally Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Sudan, https:/l
www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbooklgeos/su.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009)
[hereinafter World Factbook: Sudan].
3. See id.
4. All definitions used in this paper come from the fourth edition of the Modem Dictio-
nary for the Legal Profession, the eleventh edition of the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dic-
tionary, Blacks Law Dictionary, and online dictionaries.
5. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 74 (1 Ith ed. 2006).
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by a government to individuals being persecuted.6 An immigrant is a person
who comes to a country of which they are not a native, usually for permanent
residency.7 A refugee is a specific type of immigrant; a person who flees
from danger or trouble, oftentimes as a result of political upheaval or war.8
Resettlement is the act of the reestablishment of a person or group of people
in a new country.9 These definitions are by no means an exhaustive list of all
the terms used when examining this topic in depth; however, these terms do
provide a frame of reference to begin evaluating the many aspects of this
complex issue.
II. SUDAN: THE COUNTRY THEY LEFF
A. Climate and Geography
Located in North Africa, Sudan is the largest country on the continent
and the tenth largest country in the world. 0 Sudan is located north of the
equator and east of the prime meridian." The highest point in Sudan is the
mountain of Kinyeti, which is located near the Ugandan border in the south;
the lowest point in Sudan is the Red Sea, which borders Sudan on its east
side. 12 Sudan is bordered by Egypt in the north; Kenya, Uganda, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo in the south; the Red Sea, Ethiopia, and Eri-
trea on its east; and Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic to its
west.' 3 Khartoum is the capital of Sudan and is its largest city.'
4
While much of Sudan is dominated by the Nile and its tributaries, there
is often an inadequate supply of potable water. 5 In addition, excessive hunt-
ing threatens the country's wildlife.' 6 Furthermore, the country's various
regions suffer from soil erosion, desertification, and periodic drought. 7
6. See MODERN DICTIONARY FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 70 (4th ed. 2008).
7. See id. at 498.
8. See id. at 788.
9. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1334 (8th ed. 2004).
10. World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2; Financial Standards Foundation, Country
Brief: Sudan (June 30, 2008), http://www.estandardsforum.org/secure-content/country-
profiles/cp_165.pdf [hereinafter Country Brief: Sudan].
11. See World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
12. 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE SUDAN 251-53 (15th ed. 2005);
World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
13. 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE SUDAN 251-52 (15th ed. 2005).
14. Country Brief: Sudan, supra note 10.
15. 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE SUDAN 251-53 (15th ed. 2005);
World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
16. 2 WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS: AFRICA 652 (12th ed. 2007).
17. 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE SUDAN 257 (15th ed. 2005).
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Most of Sudan's terrain consists of flat plains, but there are mountainous
regions in the eastern and western parts of the country.'8 Sudan has arid
deserts in the north, a tropical climate in the south, and a rainy season that
lasts from April to November.' 9
B. Population
According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the current population of
Sudan is roughly forty million.20 Although the Sudanese population increas-
es by 2.143% every year, more individuals are leaving Sudan than moving
there.21 The population statistics of Sudan are comparable to other countries
in Africa where many of the citizens live at or below the poverty line.2 The
median age in Sudan is approximately nineteen, with approximately 40.7%
of its citizens being under the age of fourteen.23 In Sudan, the average life
expectancy is 51.42, with only 2.5% of the current Sudanese population over
the age of sixty-five.24 Roughly 61% of the Sudanese population is literate.25
Sudan is a country inhabited by a diverse range of people with many
different religions, social customs, and religious beliefs.26 In Sudan, there
are two predominate cultures and a variety of minority groups.2 7 Approx-
imately 52% of the country is black, 39% is Arab, and 6% is Beja; the re-
maining 3% of the population encompasses a variety of other ethnic
groups.28 The religious groups are very regionally and ethnically divided;
70% of the population is Sunni Muslim, mostly located in the north, 5% of
Sudanese people are Christian, mostly located in the capital city of Khar-
toum, and the remaining 25% of the population, who retain their traditional
indigenous beliefs,29 live primarily in the south-although missionaries have
converted some of these people to Christianity.30 Among the black Sudanese
18. See id. at 251.
19. See id. at 251, 254; World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
20. World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
26. See CBC News, In Depth Sudan, The Republic of Sudan, http://www.cbc.calnewsl
background/sudan/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
30. 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE SUDAN 256 (15th ed. 2005). The
country's religious divergence is aggravated by the perception among southerners and non-
Arab Muslims that they are second-class citizens. See Ahmed T. el-Gaili, Note, Federalism
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population, there is a major divide between those who have gone through the
process of "Arabization"' and those who have not.32 Sudanese blacks that
have not been "Arabized" have hundreds of ethnic, tribal, and language dif-
ferences. 33 Sudanese living in the north are Arabic-speaking, but are also
fluent in a traditional mother tongue as well.34 In the south, the region con-
tains numerous tribal groups and many more languages than the north.35
C. Culture
Sudanese culture, like many other African cultures, expects that the
genders have very defined, traditional roles.36 In the home, "[l]abor and liv-
ing quarters are divided by gender" either in accordance with the room's
usual purpose or the individual's intended job responsibilities.37 The man is
considered the head of his household and it is his job to protect his family,
build the home, and provide food and a source of income.38 Sudanese wom-
en are responsible for taking care of "all things inside" the home.3 9 Women
have a duty to prepare meals and care for the couple's children.40 The milk-
ing is also done twice daily by the women and children.4' When disciplining
children, mothers will first verbally warn their children, but if they do not
and the Tyranny of Religious Majorities: Challenges to Islamic Federalism in Sudan, 45
HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 524 (2004).
31. See 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE SUDAN 255-56 (15th ed. 2005).
Arabization is the process of transforming countries and territories into regions that speak
Arabic and are a part of the Arab culture, which includes the practice of Islam. See OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 598 (2d ed. 1989). Countries and territories that have gone through or
are in the process of being Arabized include: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, and Syria. See Susan M. Akram & Terry Rempel, Temporary
Protection As an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees,
22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 17 (2004).
32. See 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE SUDAN 270 (15th ed. 2005).
33. See Lino J. Lauro & Peter A. Samuelson, Toward Pluralism in Sudan: A Traditional-
ist Approach, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 93 (1996). Sudan is one of the most ethnically and
linguistically diverse countries in the world; it is composed of 600 tribes and ethnic groups
who communicate in approximately 400 languages and dialects. Id.
34. 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE SUDAN 256 (15th ed. 2005).
35. Id.
36. See Southern Sudan Community Association, Traditional, http://sscaintemational.org/
content.asp?DISPLAY2 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter SSCA, Traditional].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. SSCA, Traditional, supra note 36.
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listen, it is likely children will be physically struck. Children also have
specific roles and responsibilities in Sudanese culture.43 Daughters are ex-
pected to learn from their mothers how to properly run a household in prepa-
ration for marriage.44 When boys are around eight, they go to live with a
male relative and tend cattle.45 Young men also eat, sleep, and spend leisure
time in the barn with other men.46
When boys reach their early teens, they often go through a process
called scarification.47 Scarification is the act of permanently modifying the
body by using scar tissue to create designs, pictures, or words in the skin.48
In Sudan, scarification has been used as a rite of passage in adolescence, the
transformation of a child to a man.49 Once the scarification ritual has been
performed, the man will leave the dried blood as a symbol of his rite of pas-
sage.5° Generally, the longer it takes the wounds to heal, the more pro-
nounced they will be, so the individual tries to keep the wounds open and
healing for as long as possible.5 The ultimate goal of the scarification
process is to develop keloids, or raised scars.52 Keloids are desired for their
visual, 3-D effects and because of the way they feel to the touch. 53 In addi-
tion, scarifications-and the resulting keloids-are usually more visible on
darker skinned people than tattoos.5 4
The entire household is responsible for the upbringing of children. 55 In
the Sudanese culture, babies are typically nursed for two years and any of the
lactating women may nurse the children.56 The first born child of a Sudanese
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. SSCA, Traditional, supra note 36.
47. See Richard Sosis, The Adaptive Value of Religious Ritual, 92 AM. SCIENTIST 166,
166 (2004).
48. Body Alterations, University of Iowa Hospitals & Clinics, http://www.uihealthcare.
com/depts/medmuseumlwallexhibits/body/bodyalterations/bodyalterations.htm (last visited
Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Body Alterations].
49. See Sosis, supra note 47, at 166.
50. See SHARON E. HUTCHINSON, NUER DILEMMAS: COPING WITH MONEY, WAR, AND THE
STATE 185 (1996).
51. See Body Alterations, supra note 48.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Olubimpe Ayeni, Observations on the Medical and Social Aspects of Scarification in
Sub-Saharan Africa, http://www.med.uottawa.ca/medweb/hetenyi/ayeni.htm (last visited Apr.
5, 2009).
55. SSCA, Traditional, supra note 36.
56. Id.
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family is treated as "extremely special," particularly if it is male.57 Children
are traditionally born in their grandmother's home. 8 Sudanese fathers are
not allowed to be present for the birth of their first child, but are usually
present for any subsequent births to assist the midwife.59 Naming of children
is an important process in Sudan. 60 The first name of the child is always
selected by the father, the child's middle name is always the father's first
name, and the child's last name is always the paternal grandfather's first
name.61 If the child is born to a Christian family, eight days after the birth
the baby is taken to church and also given a biblical name.62
The main food staples in the Sudanese diet are milk and meat.63 The
Sudanese view raising cattle with great pride, while horticulture is consi-
dered "degrading" and only done when poverty demands it.64 Cattle are a
symbol of great importance, as the more cattle a man has, the wealthier he is
considered; cattle are also an important part of the bridal dowry.65 The two
crops the Sudanese people regularly grow are maize and millet, also known
as sorghum.66 Millet is boiled into porridge and brewed into alcohol.67 Milk
is an important staple and has many uses in the Sudanese kitchen: It is drunk
fresh, boiled into porridge, soured to use in a relish dish, and churned into
cheese.68 Particularly, in Southern Sudan, food production consumes all of
the population's time, thus the economy is subsistence driven.69
Due to the environment and living habits of Sudan, the only art form
practiced by the Sudanese-who refer to themselves as the Nuer-is music,
specifically singing.7° In Sudan, the year is viewed as the cycling through
the dry and rainy seasons. 71 "The most common time marker" in Sudanese
culture is the age-sets, although the Sudanese have a very short perception of
time and are in many ways a "timeless people. 72 Mostly, time is marked by
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See SSCA, Traditional, supra note 36.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. SSCA, Traditional, supra note 36.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. SSCA, Traditional, supra note 36.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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remembering notable events, although some months are marked by the lunar
cycle of the moon.73
D. Health
Unfortunately, the people of Sudan live in a world where disease is pre-
valent, and because there is insufficient medical care, a wide range of ill-
nesses and conditions result in death. 74 For every 1000 births that occur in
Sudan, 82.43 will result in death75 due to poverty, common childhood ill-
nesses, and the few opportunities to access advancements in medical tech-
nology.76 Like the rest of Africa, Sudan is also battling the AIDS epidemic.
77
Recent studies indicate that there are approximately 320,000 people in Sudan
living with H1V/AIDS, and the virus causes an estimated 25,000 deaths an-
nually.78 The risk of contracting infectious diseases in Sudan is very high;
food and waterborne illnesses are very common. 79 Typhoid fever, diarrhea,
hepatitis A, malaria, dengue fever, meningococcal meningitis, and African
trypanosomiasis are all prevalent in Sudan as well. °
E. Current Political Environment
Since gaining its political independence, Sudan has been ruled by mili-
tary regimes that have governed the country under strict adherence to Islamic
law--called the Shari'ah. 81 Shari'ah is the Arabic word for law, and it go-
verns all public and private activities of individuals living in the state.82 Spe-
cifically, it is a body of rules based on Islam, regulating everything from
politics, economics, and banking, to business law, and contract law. 83 Sha-
73. Id.
74. See 2 WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS: AFRICA 663 (12th ed. 2007).
75. See World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
76. See Dan Kaseje, Professor of Public Health & Vice Chancellor at Grand Lakes Uni-
versity of Kisumu (Nov. 2, 2006) 3-5, 7, available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/
docs/Kaseje2.pdf.
77. See World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See 2 WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS: AFRICA 658 (12th ed. 2007);
World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
82. 22 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 31 (15th ed. 2005).
83. Mohammed Ralf Kroessin, Concepts of Development in 'Islam': A Review of Con-
temporary Literature and Practice 18-19 (Univ. of Birmingham: Int'l Dev. Dep't, Working
Paper No. 20-2008), available at http://www.rad.bham.ac.uk/files/resourcesmodule/@random
454f80f60b3f4/1229939956_working-paper 20 .. web file.pdf.
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ri'ah also governs social and moral issue such as: the role of women, dietary
laws, dress codes, circumcisions, illegal sexual acts, and freedom of speech,
among other things.' Currently, Sudan is ruled by a power-sharing govern-
ment-a coalition of two parties, which is led by the National Congress Party
that came to power by military coup in 1989.85 Since October of 1993, Umar
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir has ruled as Sudan's president.86
F. Major Historical Events
In many ways, Sudan's history has culminated in resulting poverty, civil
war, and related issues. During the Age of Imperialism, Sudan was a colony
of the British Empire.87 When the British ruled Sudan, "it was illegal for
people living above the 10th parallel [latitude line] to go further south, and
people below the 8th parallel to go further north. 88 This law was intended to
prevent the further spread of tropical diseases-particularly malaria-to Brit-
ish Royal troops.89 Sudan finally gained its independence from the United
Kingdom in 1956. 90 Attracted to the Sudanese government's claims that it
operated a purely Islamic state, Osama Bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991.91
He used his money, power, and expertise in construction to make improve-
ments in Sudan, including building a road from the capital, Khartoum, to the
northern town of Shendi.92 Bin Laden scholars assert he lost as much as the
equivalent of 100 million U.S. dollars on business ventures in Sudan.93 At
the request of the U.S. government, Bin Laden was expelled from Sudan; he
then relocated to Afghanistan. 94
In December of 2005, Chad declared war on Sudan, calling for its citi-
zens to mobilize against their common enemy.95 According to the Chadian
Government, this act was a formal response to militants-allegedly backed
by the Sudanese Government-who attacked communities in eastern Chad,
84. Id. at 19, 56-57.
85. World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
86. Id.
87. See 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE SUDAN 267 (15th ed. 2005).
88. Project: Darfur, At a Glance, http://projectdarfurhoboken.org/article.php?id=18 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Project: Darfur].
89. Id.
90. See World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
91. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-
national Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 161, 166 (1999).
92. General Answers: Sudan, http://sudan.generalanswers.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Stephanie Hancock, Chad in 'State of War' with Sudan, BBC NEWS, Dec. 23, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4556576.stm.
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murdering people, burning houses, and stealing cattle.96 This fighting is on-
going and complicated by regional tensions and the Sudanese civil war.97
The people of Sudan have been consumed by civil war since the middle of
the twentieth century.98 Civil war first began in 1955 and lasted until 1972; it
was reignited in 1983 and is still occurring-this topic will be discussed in
detail below.99
III. THE CIVIL WAR
A. Background
Sudan has been "embroiled in two prolonged civil wars" for the second
half of the twentieth century up to the present date.'0° In 1955, a year prior to
gaining independence from the United Kingdom, civil war ensued in Su-
dan.'0 ' This internal fighting is a result of numerous contributing factors.10 2
Primarily, the separation of the northern and southern Sudanese during Brit-
ish colonialism resulted in the outbreak of civil war because it further pola-
rized these two already contentious groups. 10 3 Fighting lasted for seventeen
years until the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, resulting in a
ten-year hiatus from civil war.'04
Fighting broke out again in 1983.' °5 This time, a combination of issues
led to the current violence.' °6 Primarily, the government began enforcing
Shari'ah law and dissolved three federal states in the south.'07 These actions
were directed at non-Muslim, non-Arab Sudanese and fed their resentment of
the government's oppression."' Also, fuel and bread shortages, drought, and
famine contributed to the growing insurgency in the south of Sudan.'0 9
96. Id.
97. See Project: Darfur, supra note 88.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
101. See Project: Dafur, supra note 88.
102. See World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
103. Project: Dafur, supra note 88.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Project: Darfur, supra note 88
109. See id.; World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2.
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B. Darfur Region
The conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan began in February of 2003
and has led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of
millions.11° The United States media has characterized the Darfur conflict as
a battle between Arabs and Africans, but in reality, nearly everyone inhabit-
ing Darfur is both Muslim and black."' In actuality, the fighting in this re-
gion is between ethnic groups, who have divided themselves based on what
languages they speak and whether they are farmers or nomadic herders."
2
These groups are fighting over the use of the region's limited resources.
13
The confusion in the West has come from the fact that these tribal factions
have labeled themselves "African" and "Arab" based on the aforementioned
distinctions, and not on racial or religious differences.
14
In the Western world, this conflict has been described as "genocide"
and "ethnic cleansing;" although the use of these terms is disputed by many
as inaccurate, including the Sudanese government, it has caused over
200,000 to 400,000 deaths. 15 As a result of this unrest, almost two million
individuals have been displaced from their homes, with two hundred thou-
sand refugees fleeing from Darfur to the neighboring country of Chad.
1 6
The World Health Organization (WHO) stated that about 71,000 deaths had
occurred in the region between March and October 2004.117 According to the
WHO, these deaths were a result of starvation and disease.' 
18
In February of 2006, the United Nations Security Council agreed to
send peacekeeping forces to Darfur." 9 Specifically, the resolution called for
a troop presence ranging from 12,000 to 20,000, and in addition, the resolu-
tion allocated new weaponry for the 7,000 African Union troops already
present in the region.1 20 However, President Omar al-Bashir is opposed to a
110. World Factbook: Sudan, supra note 2. See Stop Sudan Genocide, The Darfur Crisis,
http://stopsudangenocide.org/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter The Darfur
Crisis].
Ill. See Emily Wax, 5 Truths About Darfur, WASH. POST., Apr. 23, 2006, at B3.
112. Id.
113. The Darfur Crisis, supra note 110.
114. See Wax, supra note I 11.
115. See The Darfur Crisis, supra note 10; Wax, supra note Il l.
116. See The Darfur Crisis, supra note 110.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Joel Brinkley, Security Council Agrees to Send Troops to Darfur, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4,
2006, at A6.
120. Id.
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U.N. peacekeeping presence in Sudan and is suspected of supporting the
militias in Darfur.1
21
C. Refugees
More refugees come from Sudan than any other country in Africa. 122
As explained above, the reason for Sudanese refugees is twofold: either they
are seeking asylum from the Arabization policies of the military regime rul-
ing Sudan or they are fleeing the ethnic battles of the Darfur region.
D. International Assistance
Scholars have labeled this century "the century of the refugee" because
"war, famine, and political oppression" have caused the most unprecedented
migration of people in human history. 123 Individuals are leaving their coun-
tries due to various forms of oppression, seeking the stability and prosperity
that industrialized countries-like the United States-promise to provide
refugees. 124 Sudan is considered one of the world's leading exporters of ref-
ugees.125 The majority of Sudanese refugees still remain on the African con-
tinent, located primarily in Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire. 126
However, because the United States is one of seventeen countries that have a
refugee acceptance quota; there are Sudanese refugees in the United States as
well. 27
In 1980, the United States Congress passed the Refugee Act which re-
formed federal immigration law to systematically admit refugees into the
121. See Dafna Linzer, Sudan May Allow U.N. Force in Darfur, Military Experts Examin-
ing Overture from Khartoum, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2006, at A8.
122. See Clara Fischer, Migration and Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa-The Securi-
ty-Migration Nexus 1I, RELIEFWEB, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/
db900SID/CJAL-7PMQ7T?OpenDocument.
123. JON D. HOLTZMAN, NUER JOURNEYS, NUER LIVES: SUDANESE REFUGEES IN
MINNESOTA 14 (Nancy Foner ed., Allyn & Bacon) (2000) [hereinafter HOLTZMAN].
124. See id. at 14-15.
125. Id. at 15.
126. See id.
127. See U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, SHAPING OUR FUTURE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE
SELECTION, RECEPTION AND INTEGRATION OF RESETTLED REFUGEES, at 21 (2005), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/437475fec.pdf. The other sixteen countries that have
refugee acceptance quotas are: Argentina, Australia, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada,
Chile, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. Id.
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United States for humanitarian reasons. 128 This Act provided that the United
States would accept up to 70,000 refugees annually and as many as 20,000
from a single region. 129 Through the Federal Refugee Resettlement Program,
the United States government allows a pre-determined number of refugees
each year to come from different regions around the world to move into the
United States and rebuild their lives. 3 ° To obtain refugee status in the Unit-
ed States, the Department of Homeland Security requires individuals to pass
a screening interview and a medical exam. 131 A Sudanese refugee can only
gain admittance into the United States if they are seeking asylum to escape
warfare and/or religious persecution. 32  Even if an individual passes the
screening test, they can still be denied admission if the medical exam reveals
a serious disease, such as AIDS. 133 The United States attempts to settle refu-
gees from the same country together, in hopes that they will develop a com-
munity and make their transition to an American way of life easier. 134
TV. THE SUDANESE POPULATION OF OMAHA, NEBRASKA
A. Background
Omaha currently has the largest Sudanese refugee population in the
country. 135 It is estimated that 6,000 Sudanese refugees have come to live in
Omaha since 1995.136 While some have come directly from Sudan or refugee
camps in bordering countries, the remainder of the Sudanese population has
relocated to Omaha after first arriving in another part of the United States. 37
These individuals decided to move to Omaha, not only because of its large
Sudanese community, but because the city and surrounding area is perceived
128. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
129. Kelly Jefferys, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics,
Annual Flow Report, Refugees and Asylees: 2006, at I tbl. 1 (2007), available at http:/www.
dhs.gov/xiibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Refugee-AsyleeSec5O8Compliant.pdf.
130. See id. at 3; Refugee Act of 1980 § 411.
131. See Jefferys, supra note 129, at 3.
132. See HOLTZMAN, supra note 123, at 14-15.
133. See Jefferys, supra note 129, at 3.
134. See Audrey Singer & Jill H. Wilson, Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan America,
MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, Mar. 2007, http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.
cfm?id=585.
135. GREATER OMAHA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTI-ETHNIC GUIDE 18 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.omahachamber.org/pdf/multiethnicguide.pdf.
136. Id.
137. See id.
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as being safe, a good place to raise a family, and full of economic prosperity
with clean, well-kept neighborhoods.'38
B. The Lost Boys
The Lost Boys is a specific group of approximately 3,800 Sudanese
boys who were brought to the United States after escaping from war-torn
Sudan. 139 Medical examiners have stated that these children "are the most
badly war-traumatized children ever examined."' 4  These boys lost their
families and began their long journey to America when they were around ten
years old; none of them knew if any of their family members were dead or
alive.' 4' These boys were orphaned or separated from their families when
government troops attacked the villages in Southern Sudan where they
lived. 42 The reason these boys survived while other members of the com-
munity were systematically raped and slaughtered was because they were
away from the village, tending herds when the attacks occurred and were
able to escape into the jungle. 43 These boys gathered in the countryside,
traveling by night to hide from soldiers and walking hundreds of miles to
refugee camps in Ethiopia, but when a civil war broke out there, they were
forced to flee again.'" Running from soldiers, the boys jumped into the Gilo
River, where thousands more died, either because they were unable to swim
or because "non-swimmers tried to climb on their backs."'' 45 The few that
were left finally found their way to refugee camps in Kenya and were even-
tually relocated to the United States. 146 These boys, now in their late teens
and early twenties, arrived in this country with only the clothes on their
backs. "'
In Omaha, the Southern Sudan Community Association (SSCA) and the
Heartland Refugee Resettlement Organization coordinate sponsorship efforts
138. See id. at 7.
139. Stephen Buttry, Churches Helping to Keep Pace with Refugees' Arrivals, a Bellevue
Congregation is Among Those Sponsoring the Lost Boys of Sudan, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Sept. 9, 2001, at B.
140. Theresa Fambro Hooks, Chicago Football Classic Starts with Today's Golf Event
and Coaches Lunch, CHi. DEFENDER, Sept. 7-9, 2007, at 14.
141. See Buttry, supra note 139.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Buttry, supra note 139.
147. See id.
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for the Lost Boys. 4 8 In addition to collecting donations of furniture and sup-
plies, these non-profit organizations seek out churches and other groups to
help individual refugees.149 Individual mentors teach the boys to drive, take
them to doctors' appointments, help them register with the Social Security
Administration and apply for jobs. 150 As an example, the six Lost Boys
sponsored by the Thanksgiving Lutheran Church in Bellevue all have jobs,
working up to 60 hours per week.' Also, because these Lost Boys all speak
English and are attended high school in the Kenyan refugee camps, they are
currently studying for their high school equivalency exams.
152
C. The Southern Sudan Community Association
In 1997, the SSCA was started by Tor Kuet-now the SSCA Executive
Director-a Sudanese refugee. 153  The SSCA is located at 4819 Dodge
Street 154 and is incorporated as a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization under the
laws of the State of Nebraska. 155 The SSCA became an official refugee re-
settlement agency in December of 2000.156 The objective of SSCA is to aid
and assist refugees who have escaped Southern Sudan's civil war and reli-
gious persecutions. 57 Specifically, the mission of SSCA is to facilitate refu-
gees in transitioning from Sudanese culture to an American lifestyle.5 8 It is
the goal of the SSCA to help Sudanese refugees become self-sufficient, "to
live and work productively," to contribute positively to the Omaha communi-
ty, to obtain an education, and to pursue "a better life" for themselves and
their families.5 9
The SSCA provides numerous services to assist refugees, helping them
acclimate to an unfamiliar culture.' 6° Specifically, the agency provides a
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Buttry, supra note 139.
152. Id.
153. See Southern Sudan Community Association, Home, http://www.sscainternational
.org/main.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter SSCA, Home]; Southern Sudan Commu-
nity Association, About Us, http://www.sscainternational.org/ content.asp?DISPLAYl3 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter SSCA, About Us].
154. SSCA, Home, supra note 153.
155. SSCA, About Us, supra note 153.
156. Southern Sudan Community Association, Resettlement, http://www.sscainternational.
org/content.asp?DISPLAY9 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
157. SSCA, About Us, supra note 153.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
2009]
143
: Nova Law Review 33, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
variety of courses, including: driving lessons,"' parenting classes, 162 GED
tutoring, and English as a Second Language Classes-also known as ESL
classes. 163 The SSCA also provides immigration assistance through mentors
and cultural support.' 6 The agency also has an after school tutoring program
for children and provides transportation and translation services. 65 In addi-
tion, the agency has a no interest housing loan program, lending up to 1,000
dollars to Sudanese refugees to use for their first month's rent, as a deposit or
for utility bills.' 66 The SSCA's work is carried out through volunteers who
function in a variety of capacities. 167 Primarily, the agency asks its volun-
teers to assist in running major events, teaching classes, mentoring, providing
transportation, and acting as sponsors to individual families. 168 In addition,
the SSCA coordinates a volunteer program with the Nebraska Bar Associa-
tion to provide free legal services at the SSCA office on the first and third
Tuesday of every month between the hours 1:00 P.M. and 4:00 P.M.' 69
V. CONCLUSION
Like many individuals who have immigrated to the United States, the
Sudanese have come to this country from a place of violence and disease in
hopes of creating a better life for their families. Their collective experience
is a testament to the strength and perseverance of their people and their indi-
vidual stories, while heartbreaking, demonstrate a determination of spirit.
Like so many immigrants before them, the people of Sudan have come to the
shores of America with only the clothes on their backs and dreams of peace
and prosperity. Settling in Omaha, these people not only have to adjust to a
new climate-none of them have seen snow before-but also to a modern,
industrialized culture, very different from the traditional rural communities
they left. These new citizens of Omaha show a sense of pride and love for
161. Southern Sudan Community Association, Drivers training, http://www.sscaintemat
ional.org/content.asp?DISPLAY3 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
162. Id.
163. See Southern Sudan Community Association, Volunteer, http://www.sscainternat
ional.org/content.asp?DISPLAY3 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter SSCA, Volunteer].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Southern Sudan Community Association, Housing Loan Program, http://www.ssca
international.org/content.asp?DISPLAYI I (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
167. See SSCA, Volunteer, supra note 163.
168. Id.
169. Southern Sudan Community Association, Legal, http://www.sscainternational.org/
content.aspDISPLAY14 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
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their new community and, despite all they have been through, feel truly
blessed to have found home in a place they did not even know existed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court made a ruling that required
Florida to revise its death penalty statute in order to eliminate the possibility
of arbitrary application and to bring it within constitutional limits.' In revis-
ing Florida's death penalty statute, the Florida Legislature devised a trifur-
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.S., Legal Studies, Nova Southeastern University. The author wishes to thank her parents,
Bryan Barnhart, Cynthia Dibona, and Samantha Stone for all their love and support; Gary
Gershman, J.D., Ph.D., for his endless guidance and encouragement; her colleagues at Nova
Law Review, especially Seth Bogin, for their hard work and dedication; and the faculty of the
Law Center, especially Professor Pearl Goldman, for their support.
I. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
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cated, or "hybrid," type of sentencing scheme? Florida's present sentencing
scheme charges the judge to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circums-
tances present and to reach a determination on which sentence is appropriate,
life imprisonment without parole, or death.3 One of the aggravating circums-
tances enumerated in Florida law is whether "[t]he capital felony was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."4
This article will examine and discuss the evolution of Florida's current
capital sentencing scheme. Particular focus will be given to the statutory
aggravating circumstance of a crime being heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
which, if present, may allow for a possible death sentence.5 This article will
also address the lack of a clear, objective standard to guide both a judge and
a jury in determining when a crime is, or is not, heinous, atrocious or cruel.
It will also explore a combined scientific research initiative called the De-
pravity Scale and its efforts to resolve the absence of a meaningful, objective
standard.
Part II of this article will trace the development of Florida's capital sen-
tencing scheme following the decision in Furman v. Georgia,6 and the ability
of Florida's capital sentencing statute, after Furman, to continually pass con-
stitutional muster. Part mI will examine and discuss various Florida capital
cases, where death sentences have been both affirmed and vacated, to high-
light the varying conceptions of what has been considered heinous, atrocious,
and cruel in Florida courts.
Finally, Part IW will discuss the inception, ideology, and research of the
Depravity Scale, a collaborative scientific effort that aims to provide judges
and juries nationwide with an objective method of defining those crimes that
are heinous, atrocious, and cruel.
II. FLORIDA: BEFORE AND AFTER FURMAN
When the decision in Furman v. Georgia was handed down, the statutes
that were in effect in Florida automatically imposed a death sentence on any
defendant convicted of a capital felony. The only defendants who were
spared the punishment of death were those who received a recommendation
2. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2008).
3. See id.
4. Id. § 921.141(5)(h).
5. Id.
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
7. LaTour Rey Lafferty, Florida's Capital Sentencing Jury Override: Whom Should We
Trust to Make the Ultimate Ethical Judgment?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 468 (1995).
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of mercy from the jury upon return of the verdict.8 In these "recommenda-
tion of mercy" cases, the defendant then received a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment. 9 Thus, the fate of a defendant rested solely with the
jury. 1
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court, in Furman, struck down the
capital punishment statutes of Georgia and Texas." The Court declared the
statutes unconstitutional because their arbitrary application violated the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 12 The majority 3
reasoned that the statutes were applied absent any type of limitation or guid-
ance.' 4 The core of the Furman decision required that the class of defendants
eligible for the death penalty be narrowed, and that a state's capital punish-
ment statute not be administered in a capricious fashion.' 5 It also required
that a state's capital punishment statute achieve this purpose in a manner that
is not arbitrary or discriminatory.16 To align itself with the Furman decision,
the Florida Legislature passed a new death penalty statute which would come
under attack a few years later in Proffitt v. Florida.7
A. Proffitt v. Florida
Following the Furman decision, the United States Supreme Court heard
cases regarding the revised capital sentencing statutes of five states, one of
8. Charles W. Ehrhardt & L. Harold Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Fur-
man: An Exercise in Futility?, 64 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1973); Lafferty, supra note
7, at 468. Moreover, although defendants were automatically allowed appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida, the issue of sentencing was not permissible for review. Id.
9. Ehrhardt & Levinson, supra note 8, at 10.
10. See id.
I1. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. There were three petitioners in the Furman case, each
of whom received the death penalty. Id. at 239. One petitioner received the death penalty for
murder, and the other two for rape. Id.
12. Lafferty, supra note 7, at 467-68.
13. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. The five Justices included in the majority were Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall. Id. Each of the five Justices in the majority
filed a concurring opinion. Id. Additionally, the dissenting Justices also each wrote a separate
opinion. Id.
14. See generally id.
15. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 249. Addressing the discriminatory aspect of the statutes, Justice Douglas said
"[w]hat the legislature may not do for all classes uniformly and systematically, a judge or jury
may not do for a class that prejudice sets apart from the community." Id.
17. 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976).
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which was Florida. 8 In Proffitt, Florida became one of three states whose
death penalty statute gained approval from the United States Supreme Court
in the wake of Furman.19
Florida's current trifurcated capital punishment statute provides that af-
ter a conviction of a capital offense, a separate trial must be conducted to
determine sentencing. 20 During the sentencing trial, the jury is present and
"the trial judge must permit the introduction of any relevant evidence regard-
ing the nature of the crime and the defendant's character."'2' The jury, after
considering any aggravating and mitigating circumstances, must then provide
an advisory sentencing opinion of either life imprisonment or death to the
trial judge.22 In Florida, the jury's advisory sentence is not required to be
unanimous.
23
Following the receipt of the jury's advisory sentence, the trial judge
must then weigh both the "aggravating and mitigating circumstances," if any,
against each other and make the ultimate decision of whether to impose a
sentence of life imprisonment or death.24 This final sentencing carried out by
the judge, notwithstanding the jury's advisory sentence, is known as the
"jury override."'25 Under Tedder v. State,26 the judge is required to give great
18. Gary Scott Turner, Note, Ring v. Arizona: How Did This Happen, and Where Do We
Go?, 27 NOVA. L. REV. 501, 508 (2003). The other four states were North Carolina, Louisi-
ana, Georgia, and Texas. Id.
19. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (2008). Florida law provides that "[u]pon conviction or
adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sen-
tencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment." Id.
21. Lafferty, supra note 7, at 468.
22. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2).
23. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 716 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (Shaw, J., concur-
ring). "In these proceedings it is not necessary that the advisory sentence of the jury be un-
animous." Id.
24. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3). The Supreme Court of Florida has said that:
It must be emphasized that the procedure to be followed by the trial judges and juries is
not a mere counting process of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of miti-
gating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment as to what factual situations require the
imposition of death and which can be satisfied by life imprisonment in light of the totality of
the circumstances present.
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973).
25. Id. at 15.
26. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam). In Tedder, the defendant, Mack Reed Ted-
der, was convicted of first-degree murder. Id. at 909. At the sentencing hearing, the judge
found three aggravating, and no mitigating, circumstances present. Id. at 910. One of the
three aggravators found was "that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Id.
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weight to the advisory opinion of the jury.27 However, if a jury does advise a
sentence of life imprisonment and the trial judge imposes a death sentence,
the judge is then required to provide, in writing, specific findings of fact re-
levant to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If a death sentence
is imposed, under Florida law, it is automatically reviewed by the Supreme
Court of Florida.29 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Florida will also
conduct a "proportionality review," even if the issue of proportionality is not
raised on appeal.3"
In Proffitt, the defendant, Charles William Proffitt, was convicted of
first-degree murder.3' Following his conviction, as required by Florida sta-
tute, a separate sentencing "hearing was held to determine whether [Proffitt]
should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. '32 Under Florida's
newly enacted sentencing scheme, whether Proffitt was sentenced to life
imprisonment or death hinged on whether the aggravating circumstances
present outweighed the mitigating circumstances present.33 Following the
sentencing hearing, the jury rendered its advisory opinion recommending
that Proffitt receive the death penalty. 34 Then, as provided for in the Florida
statute, the judge independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances present.3' The judge found four aggravating circumstances, and
no mitigating circumstances were present.36 The judge then sentenced Prof-
fitt to death.37 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Proffitt' s sentence
was affirmed.3t
27. Id. (holding "[a] jury recommendation under [Florida's] trifurcated death penalty
statute should be given great weight"). This is commonly referred to as the "Tedder stan-
dard." Lafferty, supra note 7, at 470.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2007). An important ruling on the issue of jury over-
ride presented itself in Tedder. See Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 909-11. Here, the Supreme Court
of Florida held that in order for a death sentence to be upheld "following a jury recommenda-
tion of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that
virtually no reasonable person could differ." Id. at 910.
29. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4). The "sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review
by the Supreme Court of Florida... within 2 years after the filing of a notice of appeal. Such
review.., shall have priority over all other cases." Id.
30. England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 407 (Fla. 2006) (citing Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d
1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam)).
31. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 244-45 (1976).
32. Id. at 245-46.
33. Id. at 246.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 246-27.
36. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 246-47. One of four aggravating circumstances found by the
judge was that "the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel." Id. at 246.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 247.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether Florida's recently enacted sentencing scheme was in violation of
Proffitt's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 39 The Court
upheld Florida's statute as constitutional. 40 The Court reasoned that sentenc-
ing determined by a judge and not a jury was an adequate measure to insure
that the death penalty was not applied "in an arbitrary or capricious man-
ner."4' This was because "a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing
than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose sentences similar to those
imposed in analogous cases. 42 As another constitutional challenge, Proffitt
argued that the aggravating circumstance of a crime being especially hein-
ous, atrocious, or cruel was overly vague.43 The Court denied Proffitt's ar-
gument, holding that this aggravating circumstance was sufficiently narrow,
as defined by the Supreme Court of Florida. 4
B. Walton v. Arizona
Another significant decision of the United States Supreme Court, re-
garding a capital sentencing statute similar to that of Florida's, came in Wal-
ton v. Arizona.45 In Walton, the defendant, Jeffrey Walton, along with two
others, robbed the victim, Thomas Powell, at gunpoint.46 Then, Walton and
his two accomplices drove Powell out to the desert.47 Walton exited the ve-
hicle with Powell, walked him out into the desert, forced him to lie on the
ground, and with his foot on Powell's neck, shot Powell in the head. 48
Walton was tried and convicted of first-degree murder.49 Following the
trial, and without the jury in attendance, the judge then conducted a separate
hearing on the issue of sentencing.50 During sentencing, the judge found that
39. Id.
40. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60.
41. Id. at 252-53.
42. Id. at 252.
43. Id. at 255.
44. Id. at 255-56. This "definition," provided by the Supreme Court of Florida, consisted
of statements that "'the Legislature intended something "especially" heinous, atrocious or
cruel when it authorized the death penalty for first degree murder"' and that the aggravator of
heinous, atrocious, or cruel only applied to "'the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is
unnecessarily torturous to the victim."' Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283
So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973)); see also Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
45. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
46. Id. at 644.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 645.
50. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645.
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there were two aggravating circumstances present.5' One of the two aggra-
vating circumstances found was that the crime was "'especially heinous,
cruel or depraved.' 51 The judge, finding no mitigating circumstances, then
imposed the death penalty as Walton's sentence. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Arizona, Walton's sentence of death was affirmed.54
Following receiving his sentence of death, Walton was granted certiora-
ri by the United States Supreme Court and argued that the aggravating cir-
cumstances being decided by a judge and not a jury directly violated his
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.55 In rejecting Walton's constitu-
tional argument and upholding the Arizona statute, the United States Su-
preme Court relied heavily on its decisions in previous challenges to Flori-
da's death penalty statute. 56 The Court reiterated that "'the Sixth Amend-
ment does not require [a jury to make] specific findings authorizing the im-
position of the sentence of death."
57
In its opinion, the Court reasoned that because aggravating circums-
tances are "not elements of the crime," but merely considerations for sen-
tencing, Arizona's statute was not unconstitutional for allowing only the
judge to decide the aggravating circumstances. 58 The Court decided that
these aggravating circumstances were considerations, rather than elements,
because "the judge's findings did not result in a conviction or acquittal. 59
Thus, the Arizona capital sentencing statute was upheld.6°
51. Id.
52. Id. This aggravating circumstance was partially attributable to the testimony given
by a medical examiner "that Powell had been blinded and rendered unconscious by the shot
but was not immediately killed. Instead, Powell regained consciousness, apparently floun-
dered about in the desert, and ultimately died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia
approximately a day before his body was found." See id. at 644-45.
53. Id. at 645.
54. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645. The Supreme Court of Arizona also upheld the finding of
the "heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating factor. Id. at 646. It relied on its previous deci-
sions stating that an aggravating circumstance is present when a victim experiences "'mental
anguish or physical abuse"' before his or her death. Id. The Supreme Court of Arizona found
as evidence of Thomas Powell's anguish the fact that he was walked out into the desert by
Walton at gunpoint, and, as a result of his anguish, urinated on himself. Id. at 646 n.3.
55. Id. at 647.
56. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-48; see also Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41
(1989) (per curiam) (upholding Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), ruling that Florida's
capital punishment statute was constitutional because under the Sixth Amendment, a jury is
not required to make the findings necessary to impose the death sentence).
57. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41).
58. Turner, supra note 18, at 514-15.
59. Id. at515.
60. Walton, 497 U.S. at 649.
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C. Ring v. Arizona
However, in 2002, the role that aggravating factors played in the impo-
sition of the death penalty again came before the United States Supreme
Court in Ring v. Arizona.6' In Ring, the defendant, Timothy Stuart Ring, was
convicted of felony murder in the first degree.62 Following the trial, but prior
to the sentencing hearing, testimony of one of the defendant's accomplices to
the crime was heard by the judge.63 Based on this testimony, the judge drew
the conclusion that the defendant was the one, of all involved, who actually
shot the victim.' The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of
which was that the crime was carried out "'in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner.' "65 Under the jury's verdict, Ring was only subject to a
sentence of life imprisonment. 66 However, the finding of the two aggravat-
ing factors by the judge provided for a sentence of death. 67 Ring was sen-
tenced to death, and his sentence was affirmed following his appeal to the
Supreme Court of Arizona.68
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Ring challenged Arizo-
na's death penalty statute, arguing that allowing a judge, and not a jury, to
make the finding of an aggravating factor was in violation of his rights under
the Sixth Amendment.69 The Court agreed, and reversed Ring's sentence of
death.70 The Court reasoned that if a state could enhance a defendant's sen-
tence based on a finding of fact in order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, that
finding of fact must be made by a jury, and not a judge.7'
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court of Florida has been pre-
sented with claims that Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional
under the Ring decision. 72 Two particularly noteworthy cases where the Su-
61. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
62. Turner, supra note 18, at 519.
63. Id. at 519-20. The accomplice's testimony implicated Ring as the one, of all in-
volved, that shot the victim. Id. at 520.
64. Id.
65. id. (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 594-95).
66. Turner, supra note 18, at 521.
67. Id.
68. Benjamin F. Diamond, Note, The Sixth Amendment: Where Did the Jury Go? Flori-
da's Flawed Sentencing in Death Penalty Cases, 55 FLA. L. REV. 905, 917 (2003). When
Ring was decided, in addition to Arizona, it also made the death penalty statutes of Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska unconstitutional. Turner, supra note 18, at 523.
69. ld. at 521.
70. Diamond, supra note 68, at 917-18.
71. Id. at 918.
72. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 865 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); Smith v. State,
866 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2004) (per cu-
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preme Court of Florida addressed this issue were Bottoson v. Moore73 and
King v. Moore.74 Both Bottoson and King, in different cases, were convicted
of murder and received the death penalty.75 Following their sentencing, both
Bottoson and King received a stay of execution from the United States Su-
preme Court.76 After each was granted a stay of execution, the Supreme
Court of Florida decided Ring.77 After the Ring decision was made, both
Bottoson and King had their certiorari denied by the Court.78
In Florida, the jury is responsible for considering aggravating circums-
tances in rendering its advisory opinion and the judge is charged with deter-
mining which, if any, aggravating circumstances are present in imposing a
sentence.79 Only aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute may
be considered. 0 One aggravating circumstance under Florida law is whether
riam); Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Davis v. State, 875 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Zakr-
zewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 687 (Fla.
2003) (per curiam); Cummings-El v. State, 863 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Jones v.
State, 855 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2003) (per
curiam); Rivera v. State, 859 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Stewart v. State, 872 So. 2d
226 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Owen
v. Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255 (Fla.
2003) (per curiam); Belcher v. State, 851 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Caballero v.
State, 851 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650 (Fla.
2003) (per curiam); Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Harris v. State,
843 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Banks v. State, 842 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2003) (per cu-
riam); Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Lawrence v. State, 846 So. 2d
440 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Jones v.
State, 845 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2003)
(per curiam); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Anderson v. State,
841 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Cole v. State, 841 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2003) (per cu-
riam); Conahan v. State, 844 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d
52 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Lynch
v. State, 841 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2003)
(per curiam); Fotopoulos v. State, 838 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Israel v. State,
837 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Bruno v. Moore, 838 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2002) (per
curiam); Marquard v. State, 850 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Chavez v. State, 832 So.
2d 730 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Washington v. State, 835 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2002) (per cu-
riam); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); King v. Moore, 831 So.
2d 143 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
73. 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
74. 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
75. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 694; King, 831 So. 2d at 144.
76. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 697 (Wells, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 695 (majority opinion).
78. Id. at 697 (Wells, J., concurring).
79. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2)-(3) (2008).
80. Id. § 921.141(5). Florida's statutory aggravating circumstances are as follows:
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"[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' However,
no standardized definition of what heinous, atrocious, or cruel actually
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment
or placed on community control or on probation.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after commit-
ting or attempting to commit, any: robbery; sexual battery; aggravated child abuse;
abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult resulting in great bodily harm, perma-
nent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson; burglary; kidnapping; aircraft
piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or
bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
() The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the
performance of his or her official duties.
(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public official en-
gaged in the performance of his or her official duties if the motive for the capital fe-
lony was related, in whole or in part, to the victim's official capacity.
(I) The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age.
(in) The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced
age or disability, or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodi-
al authority over the victim.
(n) The capital felony was committed by a criminal street gang member ....
(o) The capital felony was committed by a person designated as a sexual predator..
. or a person previously designated as a sexual predator who had the sexual predator
designation removed.
Id. § 921.141(5)(a)-(o).
81. Id. § 921.141(5)(h).
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means for sentencing purposes is currently in existence. 2 This creates a
conundrum because Florida is one of thirty-nine states that allow for either
the death penalty or a more severe sentencing when a crime is heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel.83
Florida began implementing the use of aggravating circumstances to
",narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." '84 However, the
United States Supreme Court also requires that these aggravating circums-
tances provide "'clear and objective standards' that [afford] 'specific and
detailed guidance.'
a8 5
Evidence of the vagueness that surrounds determining if a crime is
heinous, atrocious, or cruel can be found in the Supreme Court of Florida
opinion, State v. Dixon.86 Directly addressing the heinous, atrocious, and
cruel factor, Justice Adkins, writing for the majority, said:
The aggravating circumstance which has been most frequently
attacked is the provision that commission of an especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel capital felony constitutes an aggravated capital
felony. Again, we feel that the meaning of such terms is a matter
of common knowledge, so that an ordinary man would not have to
guess at what was intended. It is our interpretation that heinous
means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means
outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to
inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even en-
joyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be in-
cluded are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the
capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set
the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies-the conscience-
less or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the vic-
tim.87
Again, if a judge determines that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, the judge can override the jury's advisory sen-
82. See Michael Weiner, Response to Simon: Legal Relevance Demands That Evil Be
Defined and Standardized, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 417, 417 (2003) [hereinafter
Weiner, Response to Simon].
83. Id.
84. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 232 (1988) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 877 (1983)).
85. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 428 (1980)).
86. 283 So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 1973), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 782.04(3), as rec-
ognized in State v. Dane, 533 So. 2d 265, 268-69 (Fla. 1988).
87. Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
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tence.88 The constitutionality of Florida's statutory provision allowing the
trial judge, and not the jury, to make the final sentencing determination was
challenged in Spaziano v. Florida.89 In 1976, Spaziano was convicted of first
degree murder.9° The majority vote of the jury was for a sentence of life
imprisonment.9 ' Notwithstanding the jury's recommendation of life impri-
sonment, the trial court judge found there were sufficient aggravating cir-
cumstances present to warrant a death sentence.92 Two aggravating factors
were found, one of which was that the crime "was especially heinous and
atrocious." 93 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Spaziano's sen-
tence of death was reversed due to an error in sentencing.94 On remand, the
trial judge once again found the murder was heinous, atrocious, and cruel
and, for the second time, sentenced Spaziano to death. 95 Once again, Spazia-
no appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida, and this time, Spaziano's sen-
tence was affirmed.96
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Spaziano argued that
Florida's override provision violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.97 The issue presented to the Court was, "whether, given a jury
verdict of life," a trial judge may override the jury and impose a sentence of
death.98 The United States Supreme Court decided a judge could in fact
88. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2007).
89. 468 U.S. 447, 449 (1984).
90. Id. at 451.
91. id.
92. Id. at 451-52.
93. Id. at 452.
94. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 452. The sentencing error was caused when the trial judge did
not allow Spaziano an opportunity to respond after the judge received a presentence report
containing confidential information, and relied on it. See Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119,
1122 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
95. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 453. For a similar scenario, see generally Orme v. State, 677
So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam). In Orme, the defendant, Roderick Michael Orme, after
freebasing cocaine, called the victim, a nurse he had known for some time, for assistance
during a "bad high." Id. at 260. Upon her arrival to the hotel where Orme was staying, Orme
raped, beat, and strangled her. 1d. Orme was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death. Id.
at 261. The judge found that three aggravating factors were present. Id. One of the three
aggravating factors found was that the crime was heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Orme, 677
So. 2d at 261.
96. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 453; see also Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla.
1983) (holding as constitutional the Florida provision allowing a judge to override the advi-
sory opinion of a jury).
97. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457-58.
98. Id. at 458. When Spaziano was decided, the only other states which allowed a jury
override were Alabama and Indiana. Lafferty, supra note 7, at 472.
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override a jury's advisory opinion.99 The Court held that the Florida re-
quirements in place allowing for a judge to override the advisory opinion of a
jury for sentencing were not so broad or vague as to make them unconstitu-
tional.' °° Additionally, the Court rejected Spaziano's Sixth Amendment ar-
gument, holding that the Sixth Amendment does not "guarantee a right to a
jury determination" on the issue of punishment.'O°
]]. CASE STUDIES: RECONCILING HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, AND CRUEL IN
FLORIDA
Various Florida cases can be examined to show the varying conceptions
of what has been considered heinous, atrocious, and cruel. This is of impor-
tance because, as stated by the Supreme Court of Florida, the heinous, atro-
cious, and cruel aggravator is one "of the most weighty in Florida's sentenc-
ing calculus.10 2 However, Florida currently has no method in place to pre-
cisely define these terms. 0 3 The confusion that surrounds what crimes quali-
fy as heinous, atrocious, or cruel was summed up succinctly by Judge Bar-
kett when she stated that:
[M]any death-penalty states require consideration of whether a
murder was committed in an "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" manner. But what does this mean? Must the perpetrator
have intended to torture his victim? Must the victim have suffered
even though suffering was not intended by the perpetrator? This
factor has been applied so broadly that it has led to anomalous re-
sults. 04
99. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 454.
100. Id. at 449. However, Justice Stevens opined that Florida's capital sentencing statute
was "unusual" because "[i]t consists of a determination of guilt or innocence by the jury, an
advisory sentence by the jury, and an actual sentence imposed by the trial judge." Id. at 470
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Id. at 459.
102. Sireci v. Moore, 825 So. 2d 882, 887 (Fla. 2002).
103. See Welner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 417. The United States Supreme
Court has said that "[a] State's definitions of its aggravating circumstances-those circums-
tances that make a criminal defendant 'eligible' for the death penalty-therefore play a signif-
icant role in channeling the sentencer's discretion." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774
(1990).
104. Rosemary Barkett, Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation, 59 FLA. L. REV.
905,927-28 (2007).
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The numerous cases below will attempt to illuminate the lack of un-
iformity in Florida courts in defining exactly what constitutes a crime being
heinous, atrocious, and cruel.
A. We Know Evil: Upholding the Presence of Heinous, Atrocious, and
Cruel
1. Johnson v. State
In Johnson v. State,'0 5 the defendant, Richard Allen Johnson, was con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death." In 2001, Johnson met his victim
at a bar.0 7 Johnson and his victim then spent the night together, and the fol-
lowing day, the two had an argument.'0 8 Johnson then killed his victim by
strangling her both manually with his hands, and also with a ligature.' °9
In determination of his death sentence, one of the aggravating circums-
tances found by the judge was that the murder was carried out in a heinous,
atrocious, or cruel manner."0  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida
upheld the finding of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator and affirmed
Johnson's sentence."'
2. Butler v. State
Another example of a crime being deemed heinous, atrocious, or cruel
is found in Butler v. State. 12 Here, the defendant, Harry Butler, entered the
home of his ex-girlfriend, Leslie Fleming, the victim. 1 3 Butler and Fleming
had a daughter together who was in the bedroom with Fleming at the time
Butler entered the home. 14 Butler then picked his daughter up and took her
into a separate bedroom.' '5
105. 969 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
106. Id. at 943.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 944. Additionally, testimony was given at trial that Johnson stated it took long-
er to break the victim's neck than he thought it would. Johnson, 969 So. 2d at 944.
110. Id. at 945.
Ill. Id. at 962.
112. 842 So. 2d 817, 833 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam).
113. Id. at 821.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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After putting his daughter in another room, Butler then went back into
the room where Fleming was." 6 Butler then both stabbed Fleming multiple
times and then strangled her.1 " Butler was convicted of first-degree mur-
der." 8 The jury rendered an advisory sentence by a vote of eleven to one that
Butler receive the death penalty."1 9 During the sentencing trial, the trial
judge found only one aggravating circumstance present, that the murder was
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 2 ' Several mitigating circumstances were also
found. 2 ' Butler was sentenced to death.
22
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Butler's death sentence, and
the finding of the aggravator, was upheld. 23 The court held that a sentence
of death, even when the only aggravating circumstance found is that the
murder is heinous, atrocious, or cruel, is not disproportionate, even if there
are several mitigating circumstances present. 24
3. Coday v. State
Once again, in Coday v. State, 25 the aggravator of heinous, atrocious,
and cruel was found. 126 In this case, the defendant, William Coday, was con-
victed for the murder of his former girlfriend, Gloria Gomez, and sentenced
to death. 27 Coday and Gomez had an on again, off again relationship.
2 8
After breaking up, Coday lured Gomez to his apartment by lying and telling
Gomez he had cancer. 29 When Gomez arrived, Coday attempted to recon-
cile their relationship. 130 When Gomez refused his advances, Coday "flew
into a rage and punched" Gomez.1
31
Coday then began to strike Gomez with a hammer. 32 During the com-
mission of the attack, Coday struck Gomez with a hammer a total of fifty-
116. Id.
117. Butler, 842 So. 2d at 821.
118. Id. at 820-21.
119. Id. at 822.
120. Id. at 833.
121. Id.
122. Butler, 842 So. 2d at 833.
123. Id. at 834.
124. Id. at 833.
125. 946 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
126. Id. at 1006.
127. Id. at 992.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Coday, 946 So. 2d at 992.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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seven times. 33 Following the strikes of the hammer, Coday then stabbed
Gomez with a knife eighty-seven times.'" Then, while Gomez was likely
still conscious, Coday stabbed Gomez in the throat, and held the knife there
until she died. 35 At trial, expert medical testimony was presented that the
victim was likely alive the entire time. 36 Due to the nature of the attack, the
trial court gave great weight to the aggravating circumstance of the crime
being heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
37
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Coday argued that the find-
ing of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator was improper because "he
did not have an intentional design to torture or inflict pain.' 38  The court
rejected this argument, and upheld Coday's conviction and vacated the sen-
tence, affirming the finding of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator
because Coday's action represented "utter indifference to the suffering of'
the victim.'
39
B. Mistaking Evil: Some Crimes Do Not Rise to the Level of Heinous
1. Robertson v. State
Conversely, cases can be found where the aggravator of heinous, atro-
cious, and cruel was found, and death sentences imposed, only to have them
later vacated on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida. 40 In Robertson v.
State,'4' the defendant, Lavarity Robertson, was convicted of two counts of
133. Id. at 1006.
134. Id.
135. Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1006.
136. Id. In addition to the medical testimony that the victim, Gloria Gomez, was likely
still alive, Coday signed a written confession to the effect that "Gomez was alive until the fatal
stab wound when he thrust the knife into her neck and held it there until she expired." Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1006. In upholding the finding of the heinous, atrocious, or
cruel aggravator, the court said:
In this case, Coday brutally beat Gloria Gomez with two hammers a total of fifty-seven times.
He then stabbed her eighty-seven times. The medical examiner testified that Gomez was alive
for 143 of the 144 wounds, that she was conscious for all of her defensive wounds, and that she
may have been conscious for 143 of the wounds. In Coday's signed, written confession, he
wrote that Gomez was alive until the fatal stab wound when he thrust the knife into her neck
and held it there until she expired. The facts demonstrate at the very least an utter indifference
to the suffering of Gloria Gomez.
Id.
140. See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam); Bonifay v.
State, 626 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam); McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla.
1991).
141. 611 So. 2d at 1228.
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murder and sentenced to death. 42 In 1988, Robertson came upon a couple
sitting in a parked car.143 Deciding to rob the couple, Robertson approached
the driver's side of the vehicle. 44 After demanding money, he shot the first
victim.1 45 The second victim then exited the vehicle screaming, and Robert-
son shot her as well.
46
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed Robertson's death
sentence, finding the aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel was not
present because the murder was not committed with the intent of torturing
the victim or "the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or with the enjoy-
ment of' the victim's suffering. 147 The court went on to say that the heinous,
atrocious, or cruel aggravator is only found in murders that include torture or
murders where depravity, shown by the desire to cause a high degree of suf-
fering, is present.148 Because the murders committed by Robertson were
ordinary shootings, they were not outside the "norm" and as such, not hein-
ous, atrocious, or cruel.
14 9
2. Bonifay v. State
In Bonifay v. State,50 the defendant, James Patrick Bonifay, killed a
clerk who worked at a parts store where his cousin was previously fired
from.' 5' Bonifay and an accomplice each shot the victim once. 5 2 After
shooting the victim, Bonifay and his accomplice then broke open cash boxes
located in the store. 53 In the midst of Bonifay and his accomplice emptying
the cash boxes, the victim, who was still conscious, begged for his life.
54
The victim also told Bonifay that he had a wife and children. 55 Bonifay told
the victim to "shut up" and then proceeded to fire two bullets into the vic-
142. Id. at 1231-32.
143. Id. at 1230.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Robertson, 611 So. 2d at 1230.
147. Id. at 1233.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 626 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam).
151. Id. at 1311. The apparent motive for the killing was the belief of Bonifay's cousin
that the clerk was the cause of him being released from his employment. Id. However, the
record shows that the intended victim was not working on the night of the murder, and another
clerk was killed. Id.
152. Id.
153. Bonifay, 626 So. 2d at 1311.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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tim's head. 156 Bonifay was subsequently convicted of murder, and during the
sentencing phase, the judge found four aggravators present, and sentenced
Bonifay to death. 157 One of the aggravators found was that the murder was
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' 58
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida found that there was no evi-
dence to support the aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 159 Although
the victim begged for his life, the court held that there was no intent "to in-
flict a high degree of pain or to otherwise torture the victim."' 60 The court
went on to explain that a victim begging for his or her life, or the presence of
multiple gunshots, was not an adequate basis to find the aggravator of hein-
ous, atrocious, or cruel, unless "Bonifay intended to cause the victim unne-
cessary and prolonged suffering.' 6 ' Following this finding, Bonifay's death
sentence was vacated and his case remanded for a new sentencing process. 62
3. McKinney v. State
In McKinney v. State, 63 the defendant, Boris McKinney, was convicted
of murder and other charges. 64 In 1987, McKinney robbed the victim and
then drove him to an overpass where he then shot the victim. 65 McKinney
then brought the victim to an alley, where he eventually disposed of the
body, and shot the victim two more times. 66 Following the trial, the court
found that there were three aggravators present. 67 One of the three aggrava-
tors was that the murder was "unnecessarily heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' 68
At sentencing, McKinney received the death penalty.' 69
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1311-12.
158. Bonifay, 626 So. 2d at 1312.
159. Id. at 1313.
160. Id.
161. id. However, even if a victim is interrogated before being shot execution style, this
still will not satisfy the requirement of being heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See Maharaj v.
State, 597 So. 2d 786, 791 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam).
162. Bonifay, 626 So. 2d at 1311-12.
163. 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991).
164. Id. at 81. The other charges McKinney was convicted of included "unlawful display
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, armed robbery, armed kidnapping, armed
burglary of a conveyance, and grand theft of an automobile." Id. at 82.
165. Id. at 84.
166. Id.
167. McKinney, 579 So. 2d at 82.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, McKinney argued that the
aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel did not apply to his case.17 ° The
Supreme Court of Florida agreed. 17' The court held that the aggravator of
heinous, atrocious, or cruel was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
72
The court expressed that "[w]hile it is true that the victim was shot multiple
times, a murder is not heinous, atrocious, or cruel without additional facts to
raise the shooting to the shocking level required by this factor.' ' 173 Because
there were no additional facts, aside from the victim being shot multiple
times, the court held that the aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel was
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.174 Thus, the Supreme Court of Flori-
da subsequently vacated McKinney's death sentence.
175
IV. THE DEPRAVITY SCALE: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO DEFINING
EVIL
The Depravity Scale is being developed by the Forensic Panel, 76 which
is "the only peer-reviewed forensic consultation practice [located] in the
United States.' 7 7 In the United States, many states allow for harsher sen-
tencing and in some cases the death penalty for crimes that are found to be
"depraved," "heinous," or "evil.' 78 However, these terms are ambiguous,
and as such, "these aggravating factors have offered judges and juries little in
terms of guidance.' ' 79 As previously mentioned, in Florida, one of the enu-
merated aggravating factors of a crime is especially heinous, atrocious, or
170. Id. at 84.
171. Id.
172. McKinney, 579 So. 2d at 84.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 85.
176. The Forensic Panel is a peer reviewed forensic practice, founded by Michael Weiner,
M.D., whose members specialize in the fields of psychiatry, psychology, toxicology and neu-
ropsychology, and provide consultation services on court cases. Michael Weiner, The De-
pravity Scale, Forensic Panel, About Us. http://www.forensicpanel.com/aboutus/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Weiner, About Us]. All research conducted for the
Depravity Scale is solely funded by the Forensic Panel. Michael Weiner, The Depravity
Scale, Forensic Panel, FAQ, https:/depravityscale.org/depscale/faq.php (last visited Apr. 5,
2009) [hereinafter Weiner, FAQ].
177. Michael Weiner, Symposium: Hidden Diagnosis and Misleading Testimony: How
Courts Get Shortchanged, 24 PACE L. REV. 193, 193 (2003). Michael Weiner is the Chairman
of The Forensic Panel, a Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry at New York University
School of Medicine and also serves as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Duquesne University
School of Law. Id.
178. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
179. Barkett, supra note 104, at 927.
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cruel.' 80 Although there is no statutory definition of what these terms mean,
the Supreme Court of Florida has said:
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and
vile; and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain
with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of
others. What is intended to be included are those capital crimes
where the actual commission of the capital felony was accompa-
nied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm
of capital felonies-the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is
unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
181
Again, no objective method exists that assesses whether a crime meets
these criteria, or defines just what these words mean. By creating the De-
pravity Scale, the Forensic Panel seeks to undertake the task of scientifically
guiding jurors and judges in determining whether a crime qualifies as hein-
ous or depraved, in an effort to eliminate leaving these determinations up to
subjective personal opinion. 82 "In a system sensitive, at sentencing, to pre-
judice influenced by race, orientation, and socioeconomic factors, mingling
the 'what' of a crime with other factors that had nothing to do with the perpe-
trator's intent, actions, and attitudes undercuts an unbiased, equal justice." '183
"Is it fair for one person to characterize anyone [as] evil without an ob-
jective standardized appraisal of his intent, actions, and attitudes?"'184 Al-
though many people can recognize certain crimes are worse than others, the
Depravity Scale seeks out how to objectively and fairly determine the worst
of the worst. 185 "Standardized definitions must integrate the diversity of our
social, psychological, and cultural influences on our perception of what dis-
tinguishes certain acts for additional accountability-for all criminal cases,
not merely murder."'186 Without clear guidelines, it is not far-reaching to
assume that both judges and juries can have their judgment colored by emo-
tion when deciding whether a particular crime is heinous or depraved. 87
This is why the Depravity Scale enlists input given by the public to allow the
180. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (2007).
181. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973).
182. Welner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 418-19.
183. Id. at417-18.
184. Id. at 420.
185. Welner, FAQ, supra note 176.
186. Welner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 418.
187. See Paul H.B. Shin, Depravity Scale: Weighing the Evil That Men Do, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, May 14, 2006, at 20.
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public "to affect criminal sentencing standards."'' 8 8 An individual, regardless
of his or her familiarity or experience in the legal or forensic science fields,
can participate in Phases B and C of the Scale's research initiative. 18
9
The Depravity Scale focuses on the "what" of the crime, and not the
"who."' 90 The founder of the Forensic Panel, Michael Weiner, feels it neces-
sary for jurors, when deciding whether the aggravating circumstance of hein-
ousness or depravity is present, to be provided with an objective guide to
shield them from deciding based on trial tactics and possible bias.' 91 The
Depravity Scale seeks to distinguish between the worst of crimes in a stan-
dardized and consistent manner. 192 It also aims to change the way the law
enforcement community investigates crimes. 193 The Depravity Scale is a
chart comprised of objective categories of an offender's traits and crime,
such as intent, the act itself, and behavior.' 94 The goal of the Depravity Scale
is to "yield a standardized instrument that focuses inexperienced juries on
evidence."' 195 This is necessary because in order to justify a harsher sentence,
such as death, the fact pattern of a heinous, atrocious, or cruel crime must be
distinguishable from a crime that is not.
196
A. Researching the Evil Side of Crime
The research of the Depravity Scale is broken in to three separate phas-
es: A, B, and C. 197 The research that sparked the Depravity Scale began in
1998.198 In Phase A, the Depravity Scale's founder, Michael Weiner, studied
over one-hundred appellate court decisions, randomly selected, "where jury
188. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Amanda Phillips, Psychology 101: The Mind of a Shooter, 34 L. ENFORCE. TECH. 38,
45 (2007).
193. Id. at 46.
194. Neely Tucker, Giving Evil the Eye; Juries Don't Always Know Heinous Crimes When
They See Them, but This Might Help, WASH. POST, July 23, 2007, at CI.
195. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 420.
196. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
197. Id.
198. Id. The research conducted by the Depravity Scale is overseen by an advisory board.
Id. The advisory board consists of professionals and experts in fields such as psychology,
criminology, forensic nursing, law, computer science, law enforcement, pathology, entomolo-
gy, history, and engineering. Id.
2009]
166
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
findings of 'heinous' or 'depraved' were challenged and upheld."' 99 The
details of the crime in each case were then organized by common features.2"
Next, these features were organized and termed in accordance with
psychiatric diagnostic constructs typically associated with excep-
tionally notorious behavior: specifically, antisocial personality,
psychopathy, malignant narcissism, antisocial-by-proxy, sadism,
and necrophilia. Fifteen items emerged from this exercise of as-
certaining "depraved" intents, actions, and attitudes as had been
signified by American courts, establishing content validity.
20 1
The Depravity Scale is currently in Phase B of its research effort which
consists of releasing a survey to the public. 2 2 Participants are given scena-
rios and asked to rate whether a crime is "'especially,' 'somewhat,' or 'not'
depraved.' 20 3  The participant is provided with twenty-six categories of
crimes. 2°4 The high percentage of people in agreement, approximately
25,000 people who have taken the survey, is surprising. 2 5 Results of the
survey show that ninety-nine percent of all those responding "agree that 'ac-
tions that cause grotesque suffering,' 'intent to emotionally traumatize' and
'actions that prolong suffering,' are depraved. '206 Furthermore, the research
effort of the Depravity Scale recognizes that a number of variables may in-
fluence one's opinion of what is heinous or depraved.20 7 To combat res-
ponses being too heavily influenced by a respondent's demographics, the
199. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 419.
200. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
201. id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. Some of the categories include: emotionally traumatizing someone, maximizing
damage and destruction, causing disfigurement, targeting victims who are vulnerable, reacting
to a trivial irritant, prolonging the suffering of a victim and inflicting exceptional harm physi-
cally. Posting of Marie Price to Depravity Scale Blog, https://depravityscale.org/blog/?m=
200612 (Dec. 20, 2006, 16:37 EST). Additionally, the crime scenarios are given range from
non-violent, such as property crimes, to violent. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176. This is so all
criminal acts, not just murder alone, are included because "[s]tandardized definitions must
distinguish certain acts for greater accountability." Id.
205. Tucker, supra note 194. Those who completed the survey are representative of more
than fifty countries, with the highest number of respondents being located within the United
States. Id.
206. Id.
207. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 419.
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Depravity Scale has implemented control factors in its conduction of re-
search.208
Following Phase B, Phase C shall "establish how the items on the final
[scale] should be 'weighted' upon measuring the factors present in a given
crime. 2 °9 Phase C evaluates the items under research to compare them to
one another.21 ° In order to partially determine an item's "weight," survey
"[p]articipants are asked to rank the items from 'least depraved' . . . to 'most
depraved' . . . when presented together in randomly ordered subgroups. 211
Each survey participant is provided with a random set of unique questions, to
determine "whether participants consistently regard certain items as more
depraved than other items, regardless of presentation order or reference
frame., 2
12
V. CONCLUSION
Florida's trifurcated capital sentencing scheme requires the jury to con-
sider aggravating factors when rendering its advisory sentence of life impri-
sonment or death. a 3 The sentencing scheme also charges the judge to weigh
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in a crime in reaching a
conclusion on which sentence is appropriate, life imprisonment without pa-
role or death.214 One of the fifteen enumerated aggravating circumstances in
Florida is whether "[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. 215 Although the Supreme Court of Florida has said "we feel that the
meaning of such terms is a matter of common knowledge, so that an ordinary
man would not have to guess at what was intended, 216 currently no objective
method exists to define these "common knowledge" terms.21 7
208. Id. The variables for which controls are in place include age, gender, ethnicity, histo-
ry of victimization, state of residence, profession, attitude toward the death penalty, level of
spirituality, education level, location, degree of religious tradition and others. Id. at tbl. I. No
one has "distinguished the social, political, religious, and cultural influences on peoples' per-
ceptions of depravity. Therefore ... to establish intents, actions, and attitudes [the] research
must take into account all potentially confounding variables." Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. Additionally, each participant is only able to partake in the surveys that comprise
Phase B and Phase C one time each. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
213. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(a) (2008).
214. Id. § 921.141(3).
215. Id. § 921.141(5)(h).
216. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973).
217. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
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Because the presence of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator can
mean life or death, judges and juries should have some standard of deciding
objectively which crimes are the worst of the worst.218 To truly bring this
aggravating circumstance into the category of "clear and objective" required
by the United States Supreme Court, 19 courts need some method of defining
just what these terms are to mean.
This is exactly what the Depravity Scale seeks to do by scientifically
guiding jurors and judges in determining whether a crime qualifies as hein-
ous or depraved in an effort to eliminate leaving these determinations up to
subjective personal opinion. "Without standardized direction, jury decisions
on whether a crime is depraved are all too often contaminated by details
about the 'who' of a crime ... as opposed to focusing on 'what' the defen-
dant actually did., 220 The founder of the Forensic Panel, Michael Weiner,
M.D., feels it is necessary for jurors and judges, when deciding whether the
aggravating circumstance of heinousness or depravity is present, be provided
with an objective tool to make these decisions, so they are not influenced on
trial tactics and possible bias.22' This is because "[sitandardizing the already
used terminology of 'heinous,' 'depraved,' and 'evil,' is a matter of fairness
and justice." 2
218. Id.
219. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 428 (1980)).
220. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 417.
221. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
222. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 418.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the
protections of the Constitution."' Although prisoners lose aspects of their
rights to liberty and privacy, incarceration does not eliminate all constitu-
tional rights. 2 The Supreme Court has recognized that when a prison regula-
tion or practice infringes upon a fundamental right, courts will protect pris-
oners' constitutional rights. 3 "'[C]ourts have learned from repeated investi-
gation and bitter experience that judicial intervention is indispensable if con-
stitutional dictates-not to mention considerations of basic humanity-are to
be observed in the prisons."'
' 4
"The basic prisoner interest is in uninhibited communication with attor-
neys, courts, prosecuting attorneys, and probation or parole officers." 5 Since
a prisoner's means of communication with these parties is "restricted sharply
by the fact of incarceration, the essential role of postal communications can-
not be ignored."6 The Supreme Court has determined that prisoners have a
right to receive and send mail. 7 Particularly, a prisoner has a right not to
have his legal mail read.8 "[T]he denial of free and unfettered communica-
tion between inmates and courts and attorneys may constitute a denial of
federal constitutional rights." 9  Such a denial would cause the prisoner to
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. Aaron Craig Lapin has a B.S in Business from University of Florida. The
author wishes to thank his family for their encouragement. The author would also like to thank
his colleagues on Nova Law Review for their hard work and dedication in the editing of this
article. Finally, the author would like to recognize Professor Heather Baxter and Ms. Daniel
Howard for their valuable suggestions and guidance.
I. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). "Prisoners are still 'persons' entitled to all
constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed by procedures that
satisfy all of the requirements of due process." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428
(1974) (Douglas, J., concurring).
2. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1449 (3d Cir. 1995); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country.").
3. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405-06 (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969)).
4. Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1033 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)). However, the judicial system is reluctant
to interfere with prison administration because "'courts are ill equipped to deal with' its
complex nature. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85 (quoting Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405-06).
5. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (Former 5th Cir. 1976).
6. Id.
7. See Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401, 403-04 (1989); Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413-
14.
8. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575 (1974).
9. Barlow v. Amiss, 477 F.2d 896, 898 (Former 5th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 33
171
: Nova Law Review 33, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
PRISONERS' RIGHTS TO LEGAL MAIL
become a victim of the prison's unconstitutional regulations.' ° However,
there is a split among jurisdictions regarding whether the mere opening, but
not reading, of legal mail outside the presence of an inmate violates a prison-
er's constitutional rights. 1
Part II of this paper will provide an overview of prisoners' rights to le-
gal mail. Part 1IH will describe the sources of prisoners' particular rights as-
sociated with legal mail and the scope of those rights. Part IV will describe
the split among United States Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding prisoners'
rights to receive unopened and unread legal mail. Finally, Part V of this pa-
per will conclude that prisoners have a constitutionally protected right to
have their legal mail opened in their presence.
]I. HISTORICAL VIEW ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRISONERS' LEGAL MAIL CLAIMS
A. Wolff v. McDonnell
The Court in Wolff v. McDonnell2 addressed whether prison officials
could open a prisoner's legal mail in a prisoner's presence or whether the
legal mail had to "be delivered unopened if normal detection techniques fail
to indicate contraband."' 3 Prisoners filed a class action suit challenging the
constitutionality of the prison regulations to inspect all incoming and out-
going mail.' 4 Prisoners claimed that their rights under the First, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments would be violated if prison regulations permitted
the opening of their legal mail.'" The prison officials retreated from the pris-
on policy of opening and reading all of the prisoners' legal mail. 16 The pris-
on officials determined that prisoners have a right not to have their legal mail
opened and read. 7 They contended that prisoners' legal mail may be opened
10. AI-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008).
11. See id. at 1328-30. Some jurisdictions have held that opening legal mail outside of a
prisoner's presence is a constitutional violation. Id. at 1329. Others claim that prisoners do
not have a constitutional right to have legal mail opened in their presence. Id. at 1328-29.
12. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
13. Id. at 575.
14. Id. at 553, 574. There was no exception for prisoners' legal mail. Id. at 574.
15. Id. at 575. However, the Court did not address the Sixth Amendment claim because
the Sixth Amendment only protects "the attorney-client relationship from intrusion in the
criminal setting, while the claim here would insulate all mail from inspection, whether related
to civil or criminal matters." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 575.
17. Id.
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"as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners."'' 8 The Court added
that the legal mail should be properly marked as such, so that the prisons do
not have to inspect and sort out those letters that are legal mail.' 9
The Court determined that opening legal mail in the presence of prison-
ers does not constitute censorship, since it insures that legal mail will not be
read.20 "Neither could it chill such communications, since the inmate's pres-
ence insures that prison officials will not read the mail.",2' Additionally, the
opening of legal mail insures that contraband will not enter the prison.22
Thus, the Court determined that "by acceding to a rule whereby the inmate is
present when mail from attorneys is inspected, [the prisons] have done all,
and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires. 23
B. Taylor v. Sterrett
After Wolff, the Fifth Circuit clarified in Taylor v. Sterrett24 the "consti-
tutional bases for the restrictions placed on opening, inspecting, and reading
of an inmate's correspondence with attorneys, various public officials, and
the press.,25 In Taylor, prison officials challenged the district court's restric-
tion, forbidding opening a prisoner's legal mail, except in that prisoner's
presence.26 The court in Taylor concluded that opening legal mail in the
prisoner's presence supports the prisoner's constitutional "right of access to
18. Id. The prison officials conceded that they could not open and read prisoners' legal
mail. Id.
19. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576. Requiring attorneys to identify themselves as attorneys will
allow the prisons to determine that they are members of the bar and would further security and
efficiency. Id. at 576-77.
20. Id. at 577. The Court emphasized that "freedom from censorship is not equivalent to
freedom from inspection or perusal." Id. at 576.
21. Id. at 577.
22. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577. Contraband may be placed inside legal mail and would com-
promise prison safety. See id. The Court also determined that a "flexible test" permitting
opening legal mail only "in 'appropriate circumstances"' is unworkable. Id.
23. Id. The Court did not classify the constitutional basis for opening prisoners' legal
mail in their presence. See id. at 575-76. The Court broadly stated that none of their rights
were violated by opening legal mail in their presence. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576. The Court did
not reach the issue whether such a process was constitutionally required. See id. at 575-76.
24. 532 F.2d 462 (Former 5th Cir. 1976).
25. Id. at 465.
26. Id. at 464.
The sheriff is directed not to open mail transmitted between inmates of the jail and the
following persons: courts, prosecuting attorney, probation and parole officers, governmental
agencies, lawyers and the press. If, however, there is a reasonable [probability] that contra-
band is included in the mail, it may be opened, but only in the presence of the inmates.
Id. However, the reasonable probability restriction was removed. Id. at 469, 475.
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the courts. 27 In reaching this result, the court in Taylor "weigh[ed] the bur-
den on the prisoner's access to the courts against the legitimate governmental
interest of prison security. '28 Before a prisoner can succeed with a right to
access claim, "it must be clear that the state's substantial interests cannot be
protected by less restrictive means." 29  The government interest was "jail
security as affected by the introduction of contraband into the jail and by the
communication of escape plans or other" criminal activities.30  "The basic
prisoner interest is in uninhibited communication with attorneys.'
Inspection of legal mail is limited to locating contraband and the con-
tents of the mail are not to be read. 32 Prohibiting reading of legal mail pro-
motes the prisoner's interests in "uninhibited communication" between at-
torneys and prisoners and ensuring that "judicial proceedings" involving
prisoners are "conducted fairly. 33 Given these interests, simply prohibiting
prison officials from reading legal mail still inhibits a prisoner's attorney-
client relationship. 34 "[T]he fact that prison officials are entirely trustworthy
is irrelevant. The controlling factor is that attorneys or prisoners may fear
that prison employees who read inmate correspondence will abuse the sensi-
tive information to which they have access.
The court in Taylor determined that by opening prisoners' legal mail in
their presence, a compromise is established between the interests of both the
27. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 475.
28. Id. at 472.
29. Id. "Jail security alone is unquestionably a substantial or compelling governmental
interest. Whenever a jail practice or procedure furthers the interest of jail security in a manner
that is necessary or essential to that interest, there is no constitutional violation." Id. at 472
n. 14. The court in Taylor "[took] the terms 'necessary' or 'essential' to mean that there [was]
no alternative means of protecting jail security that [was] reasonably available to prison offi-
cials. This is the least that should be required when a fundamental interest such as access to
the courts is at stake." Id.
30. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 473.
31. Id. at 475.
32. Id.
33. Id.
The basic prisoner interest is in uninhibited communication with attorneys, courts, prosecuting
attorneys, and probation or parole officers. Both pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners
have a vital need to communicate effectively with these correspondents. This is to insure ulti-
mately that the judicial proceedings brought against or initiated by prisoners are conducted
fairly. Since the prisoner's means of communicati[on] with these parties are restricted sharply
by the fact of incarceration, the essential role of postal communications cannot be ignored.
id.
34. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 475-76. "The inhibitory effect remains because the medium
through which sensitive legal communications are to be transmitted is unshielded." Id. at 476.
35. Id. (citing Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696, 697 (1st Cir. 1972)). The prisoners may
fear that their sensitive information will be "exposed to third party interception." Id.
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prison administration and the prisoners. 36  "Prisoners are not inhibited in
using this traditional communication medium to pursue their defense or to
present their legal grievance. And jail officials are not denied the use of any
mail procedure shown to be essential to jail security. ' 37 Thus, the prisoner's
presence ensures that legal mail will be unread and prison officials are as-
sured that no contraband enters the prison.38 In Taylor, the prison officials
failed to satisfy their burden that reading legal mail is essential in order to
prevent a security breach. 39  Therefore, consistent with the regulations in
Wolff, the court in Taylor recognized a prisoner's right not to have his or her
legal mail read, and therefore implemented prison regulations requiring that
opening legal mail must be done in the prisoner's presence.4 °
C. Turner v. Safley
The Court in Turner v. Safley4" drastically changed a prisoner's ability
to persevere in his or her constitutional claims. 42 Turner established that a
prison regulation restricting prisoners' constitutional rights is valid if the
regulation "is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 43 The
Turner Court established four factors to determine the reasonableness of a
prison regulation:
[1)] a "valid, rational connection"44 between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest;
36. Id. at 477.
37. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 477.
38. Id. The head of the jail, Chief Rowland, believes that censorship of mail minimally
affects jail security. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 414 (N.D. Tex. 1972)).
39. Id. The court in Taylor determined that prison officials
have not made a persuasive showing that abuses of incoming mail pose a realistic threat to jail
security or any other legitimate governmental interest that is cured by reading this mail or hav-
ing the ability to do so. The actual abuses cited in the appellants' briefs involve contraband,
not information contained in letters that can be discovered only by reading them. Thus, the
abuses allegedly cured by the reading, perhaps selectively, of inmate mail are hypothetical.
Id.
40. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 475; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575 (1974); see also
Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 758 (Former 5th Cir. 1978) (following Taylor's holding
that "incoming [legal] mail could be opened only to inspect for contraband and in the presence
of the inmate recipient"). -
41. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
42. See id. at 89.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
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[2)] whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that
remain open to prison inmates;
[3)] the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right
will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of
prison resources generally;
[4)] the absence of ready alternatives .. .[to the] prison regula-
tion.45
Two years later, in Thornburgh v. Abbott,46 the Court held that incoming
prisoner mail regulations shall be analyzed under Turner's "reasonably
related" test.
47
III. RIGHTS INVOLVED IN PRISONERS' LEGAL MAIL CLAIMS
A. Right of Access to the Courts
The United States Supreme Court has held "that prisoners have a consti-
tutional right of access to the courts. 48 An inmate's right to "'unfettered
access to the courts is as fundamental a right as any other he may hold....
All other rights of an inmate are illusory without it .... "",s Prison regula-
tions may not interfere with prisoners' access to the courts. 50 A prisoner's
interests in access to the courts are "to challenge their convictions, advance
the timing and terms of their release from confinement, reform prison condi-
tions, or conduct or assist in the preparation of their defense."5
45. Id. at 89-90.
46. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
47. Id. at 404 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). In Thornburgh, the
Court applied Turner's reasonably related test to a prison regulation of incoming publications.
Id. at 403-04.
48. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
578 (1974) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969)); see also Johnson, 393 U.S. at
489; Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
49. McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1337 (Former 5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Adams v.
Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973)).
50. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 471 (Former 5th Cir. 1976); see also McCray, 509
F.2d at 1337.
51. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 470.
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1. Source of the Right
Notions of prisoners possessing a right to access the courts began in
1941 .52 In Ex parte Hull,53 prison officials read prisoners' legal mail that was
addressed to the courts.54 Prison officials would only mail the contents to the
courts, if in their opinion, it was worthy of being sent.55 As a result, prison-
ers' legal mail was intercepted thereby interfering with their ability to com-
municate with the courts and their right of access to the courts was hin-
dered.56 The Court determined that the regulation was invalid stating that
prison officials may not interfere with a prisoner's right of access to the
courts for a writ of habeas corpus. 57
In Bounds v. Smith,58 the Court established "that prisoners have a con-
stitutional[ly] [protected] right of access to the courts. '59 Bounds never pur-
ported to explain the exact constitutional source.6° Recently, courts have
determined that the right of access arises under the Sixth Amendment, 6' First
Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, and Fifth
Amendment.6
2
a. Right to Petition
In the colonial era, citizens primarily used their right to petition by peti-
tioning their legislatures.63 In modern times, the United States Supreme
Court determined that the Petition Clause includes the right to access the
52. See Hull, 312 U.S. at 549. The Supreme Court recognized that "the state and its
officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of
habeas corpus." Id.
53. Id. at 546.
54. Id. at 548.
55. Id. at 548-49.
56. See Hull, 312 U.S. at 549.
57. id.
58. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
59. Id. at 821; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-78 (1974); Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483,489 (1969); Hull, 312 U.S. at 549.
60. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 833-34 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The only reference to the
constitutional source was the prisoners' complaint, which stated that their inability to have
meaningful access violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 818 (majority opinion).
61. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576.
62. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (1Ith Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citing Christo-
pher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002)).
63. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1453 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated in part by Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
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courts.64 The United States Supreme Court has dealt with the right to peti-
tion as encompassed within the First Amendment. 65 Thus, the First Amend-
ment right to petition is where the right of access to the courts originated.66
b. Right to Counsel
The attorney-client privilege cannot be restricted in a manner that hind-
ers a prisoner's ability to access the courts. 67 The Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees individuals, in criminal proceedings, effective assistance of counsel.68 A
prison regulation that infringes upon a prisoner's First and Sixth Amendment
rights does not need to be considered independently. 69 Therefore, any intru-
sion upon a prisoner's right to effective counsel by reading his or her legal
mail is integrated within a parallel abridgement of the right to access the
courts .7 0
c. Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the
right of access to the courts. 7' "The constitutional guarantee of due process
64. Id. at 1453. Right of access encompasses both the legislative branch and the courts.
Id.
65. Id.; see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (stating that the right to
petition guarantees freedom of expression). "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
66. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1453.
67. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 473 (Former 5th Cir. 1976).
68. See Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1453-54 n.4; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
576 (1974) ("As to the Sixth Amendment, its reach is only to protect the attorney-client rela-
tionship from intrusion in the criminal setting.").
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
69. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 472.
70. Id.
71. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1454.
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction the-
reof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to
the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for
violations of their constitutional rights. 72 Prisoners are required to be given
reasonable opportunity to search and obtain attorney assistance.73 Prisoners'
interest in having their legal mail unread is a "liberty" interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 74 Thus, prisoners' right to their legal mail is pro-
tected from arbitrary prison regulation.75 Prison regulations that interfere
with the availability of attorney representation or obstruct other aspects of a
prisoner's ability to access the courts are unconstitutional.76
2. Scope of the Right
A prisoner's access to the courts must be "adequate, effective, and mea-
ningful" to be constitutionally valid.77 The degree to which each of these
elements must be met remains obscure.78 The Supreme Court extended the
right of access to encompass only the preparation and transmission of legal
documents to the courts.7 9 The prison regulation must reasonably provide
prisoners with an "adequate opportunity" to present violations of their consti-
tutional right of access to the courts.80 All prisoners must be given the op-
portunity to adequately present their legal claims fairly.8 ' This is achieved
by "meaningful access" to the courts.82
A prisoner must be "actually denied" access to the courts in order for
his or her claim to succeed.83 Specifically, the prisoner must show proof of
actual injury.84 Initially, courts followed a demarcation between ancillary
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 418.
75. Id.
76. Id. at419.
77. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977).
78. Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 1993).
79. Id.; see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576(1974).
80. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825.
81. Id. at 823 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974)).
82. Id. (citing Ross, 417 U.S. at 612).
83. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1454-55 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Hudson v. Robin-
son, 678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982), superseded by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349
(1996)).
84. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. The actual injury requirement is derived from the constitu-
tional principle of standing. Id. The doctrine of standing ensures that the courts do not inter-
fere with coordinate branches of the government. Id.
It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have
suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the polit-
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aspects of access to the courts, which merely impact convenience or comfort
without depriving access to the courts, from prison regulations that are cen-
tral to a prisoner's right of access to the courts.85 Regulations that are central
to a prisoner's access to the courts do not require actual injury, but ancillary
claims do require proof of actual injury.86 Repeatedly violating the confiden-
tiality of a prisoner's legal mail is central to the right of access to the courts,
and thus it is unnecessary to show actual injury for the prisoner to establish
an infringement of that right.87
Therefore, "the only way to ensure that mail is not read when opened,
and thus to vindicate the right to access, is to require that it be done in the
presence of the inmate to whom it is addressed. 88 Interfering with a prison-
er's legal mail threatens the principle, often exclusive, means that a prisoner
can implement his or her constitutional right.89 Prisoners must be assured
that their legal mail is kept confidential and secure in order for access to the
courts to "be effective, adequate, and meaningful." 9
However, the demarcations between ancillary and central affects to the
right of court access were dismissed.9' In Lewis v. Casey,92 the Supreme
Court held that all prisoners' claims based on a denial of the right to court
access must show proof of actual injury.93 Thus, both ancillary and central
effects require proof of actual injury. 94 Actions by prison officials that hind-
er a prisoner's pursuit of a non-frivolous claim satisfy the requirement of
proof of actual injury.95 Therefore, the prisoner must exhibit that his or her
ical branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the
laws and the Constitution.
Id.
85. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1455 (citing Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1041 (3d Cir.
1988)).
86. Id. (citing Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1041-42).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1456 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974)).
89. Id.
90. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1455.
91. Oliverv. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997).
92. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
93. Id. at 349. Lewis superseded the Bieregu ruling. See generally id; Bieregu, 59 F.3d
1445. However, it only superseded the holding regarding access to the courts and not the First
Amendment free speech claim. Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358-59, n.6 (3d Cir. 2006).
Actual injury need not be shown in First Amendment free speech claims. Id. at n.6. Howev-
er, proof of actual injury must be shown for access to the courts claims. Oliver, 118 F.3d at
177-78.
94. Oliver, 118 F.3d at 177. Due to the decision in Lewis, "even claims involving so-
called central aspects of the right to court access require a showing of actual injury." Id. at
177-78.
95. Jones, 461 F.3d at 359 (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-53).
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ability "to secure judicial relief' through access to the courts has been in-
fringed or frustrated "in some consequential way. 96
B. Right to Free Speech
1. Source of the Right
"'The United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but
while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free
speech as the right to use our tongues.' 97 The First Amendment prohibits
the states from "abridging the freedom of speech. 98 The mail provides a
medium for the exercise of free speech, and the sending and receiving of
mail is a First Amendment right.99 A prisoner's First Amendment rights are
not lost when he or she enters the prison.'0° The Supreme Court has deter-
mined that interference with prisoners' legal mail implicates the First
Amendment right to free speech.'0 '
2. Scope of the Right
The Supreme Court has held that censorship of prisoner mail is justified
if the following criterion is met: "First, the regulation or practice in question
must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of expression. . . . Second, the limitation of First Amendment
freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection
of the particular governmental interest involved."'0 2
96. Id.
97. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1451 (quoting United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic
Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting)), abrogated by
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
99. AI-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11 th Cir. 2008).
100. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
822 (1974)). For example, prisoners' First Amendment rights are violated when prison offi-
cials decline to deliver prisoners' incoming mail because it is in a foreign language. Bieregu,
59 F.3d at 1452 (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 581 (10th Cir. 1980)).
101. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.
102. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). "[A] prison inmate retains those
First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legi-
timate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell, 417 U.S. at 822. Prison offi-
cials "must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the
substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation." Procunier, 416 U.S.
at 413.
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Repeatedly opening prisoners' incoming legal mail outside their pres-
ence infringes upon communication with the courts-a free speech right pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 10 3 The confidentiality of prisoners' legal
mail is breached when opened outside of their presence. 1°4 "Such a practice
chills protected expression and may inhibit the inmate's ability to speak,
protest, and complain openly, directly, and without reservation with the
court. 1°5 Regardless of the prison official's assurances that prisoners' legal
mail will not be read, prisoners' freedom of expression is still ultimately sa-
crificed."°6 Thus, the single way to guarantee that a prisoner's legal mail will
remain unread when opened requires that their mail be opened in the pres-
ence of the prisoner to whom the mail is addressed.'0 7
Unlike access to court claims, the actual injury requirement does not
pertain to First Amendment freedom of speech claims. 10 8 In Lewis, the Su-
preme Court stated that to succeed in a claim for interfering with access to
the courts, the prisoners must show they were actually injured.' °9 However,
nothing was stated in Lewis that would indicate that a prisoner claiming that
their legal mail was opened outside of his or her "presence and thereby vi-
olat[ing] his First Amendment rights need allege any consequential injury
stemming from that violation, aside from the violation itself."' 10 Thus, "pro-
tection of an inmate's freedom to engage in protected communications is a
constitutional end in itself."'' .
C. Right to Privacy
Reading prisoners' legal mail outside their presence may infringe upon
prisoners' rights to privacy." 2 An individual's right to privacy is not lost due
to incarceration. 1 3 If prisoners lose their fight to private communication,
103. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1451. In Bieregu, the prisoner complained that his legal mail was
opened fifteen times outside his presence. Id. at 1452.
104. Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006).
105. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1452.
106. Jones, 461 F.3d at 359.
107. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974).
108. See Jones, 461 F.3d at 359.
109. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
110. Jones, 461 F.3d at 359.
111. Id. at 360.
112. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1456 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated by Lewis, 518
U.S. at 349; Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1443 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
113. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1456 n.5 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-99 (1987)). In
Turner, a prisoner's right to marry was not lost due to incarceration. See Turner, 482 U.S. at
98.
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then recidivism is fostered rather than rehabilitation.1 4 "[P]ersonal informa-
tion in the hands of prison officials may result in ridicule, harassment, and
[even] retaliation."''15
IV. SPLIT OF AUTHORITY IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals are split regarding the issue
of whether prisoners have a constitutionally protected right to receive their
legal mail unread and opened only in their presence. 16 There is not an abso-
lute determination of whether a prisoner automatically deserves such
rights." 7 Instead, the Supreme Court in Turner initiated a reasonableness test
to determine whether a prison regulation infringes upon a prisoner's constitu-
tional rights. 18 A prison regulation that impinges upon a prisoner's constitu-
tional rights will be valid if it is determined to be reasonably related to a legi-
timate penological interest." 9 Post-Turner, there has been a split among the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding whether the mere opening,
but not reading, of legal mail outside the presence of an inmate violates a
prisoner's constitutional rights.120
114. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1456 n.5.
115. id.
116. AI-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1328-29 (11 th Cir. 2008).
117. See id. at 1327.
118. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
119. Id. The Turner Court established four factors to determine the reasonableness of a
prison regulation:
[1)] a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest;
[2)] whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to
prison inmates;
[3)] the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally;
[4)] the absence of ready alternatives ... [to the] prison regulation.
Id. at 89-90 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
120. AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1328-29.
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A. Circuits That Recognize Prisoners' Constitutional Rights to Receive
Legal Mail Unread and Opened in Their Presence
1. Eleventh Circuit
In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Al-Amin v. Smith,'
2
'
discussed a prisoner's constitutional rights to legal mail. 2 2  Thirteen enve-
lopes that were all specifically marked as "legal mail" from an attorney were
repeatedly opened before they reached the prisoner. 2 3 The prisoner alleged
that "his constitutional rights to access ... the courts and free speech" were
violated by the repeated opening of his legal mail outside of his presence by
prison officials. 24 The prison policy regarding prisoner mail was that cor-
respondence between prisoners and their attorneys was privileged mail.125
Specifically, the prison policy forbade prison officials from opening a pris-
oner's legal mail, and its contents could only be opened in the prisoner's
presence.26 The prison regulations authorized only external inspection of the
legal mail, and even if the mail was opened in the prisoner's presence, prison
officials still could not read the mail.
27
The court in AI-Amin relied on Taylor and Guajardo v. Estelle128 as
binding precedent in assessing prisoners' constitutional rights to legal
mail. 129 The Supreme Court in Wolff established that a prisoner has a consti-
121. ld. at 1317.
122. Id. at 1325.
123. Id. at 1322. The prisoner filed grievances because his mail was opened outside of his
presence. Id. at 1321. In response to the grievances, the warden was notified to treat the
prisoner's legal mail as privileged and that the mail must be opened in his presence. Al-Amin,
511 F.3d at 1321. Despite the grievance ruling, prison officials continued to open the prison-
er's legal mail even though he filed multiple grievances regarding the unauthorized opening of
his legal mail. id. at 1322.
124. Id. at 1320.
125. Id. A prisoner's "attorney includes 'any attorney with whom the inmate has had, or is
attempting to establish, an attorney client relationship' and who is licensed to practice in state
or federal courts." Id.
The district court noted that for mail to be treated as privileged legal mail, the state may
require: (1) that legal mail be specially marked as originating from an attorney with the attor-
ney's name and address; and (2) that an attorney desiring to communicate with a prisoner first
identify herself and her client to prison officials to assure that letters marked privileged are ac-
tually from members of the bar.
Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1324 n. 15; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974).
126. Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1320.
127. Id. The external inspection is done by using a fluoroscope, manually inspecting the
mail for contraband, or by using a metal detecting device. Id.
128. 580 F.2d 748 (Former 5th Cir. 1978).
129. AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1325-27. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit "adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down
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tutional right to receive unopened and unread legal mail. 130 The court in Tay-
lor relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff, that opening legal mail
in the presence of prisoners ensures that their legal mail will remain un-
read. 31 The court in Al-Amin, followed the rulings in Taylor and Guajardo,
holding that "a prisoner's constitutional right of access to the courts requires
that incoming legal mail from his attorneys, properly marked as such, may be
opened only in the inmate's presence and only to inspect for contraband.' ' 32
However, the prison officials claimed that the holdings of Taylor and
Guajardo were no longer viable because of the intervening decision by the
Supreme Court in Turner.'33 The court in AI-Amin applied Turner's reasona-
bleness factors to determine whether the prison official's regulations were
reasonably related to a legitimate prison interest.13' As to Turner's first fac-
tor, the court in Al-Amin recognized that the government has an interest in
keeping prisons secure. 35 Though, it is unlikely that attorneys pose a securi-
ty risk of sending contraband. 36
Additionally, the prison officials never stated "a legitimate security in-
terest" for opening a prisoner's properly marked legal mail outside of the
prisoner's presence. 137 Prison officials can inspect for contraband if legal
mail is opened in the prisoner's presence, and the prison's own policy re-
quires a prisoner's legal mail to be opened in the prisoner's presence. 38
"Assuring the inmate of the confidentiality of inmate-attorney mail by open-
ing such mail only in the inmate's presence actually advances the state's
interest in promoting institutional order and security."'3 9 Thus, Turner's first
factor failed because there was no rational connection between the practice in
the prison and a legitimate prison interest.140
prior to close of business on September 30, 1981." Id. at 1326 n. 18 (citing Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207, 1209 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
130. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577.
131. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (Former 5th Cir. 1976); Al-Amin, 511 F.3d
at 1327 n.20.
132. Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1325; see Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 758 (Former 5th
Cir. 1978); Taylor, 532 F.2d at 475.
133. AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1326.
134. Id. at 1327-28 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)).
135. Id. at 1331.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1331.
139. Id. (citing Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1457 (3d Cir. 1995)).
140. Id.
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As to Turner's second factor, Al-Amin did not have another means of
exercising his right of access to the courts.14 ' AI-Amin's ability to access the
courts required that his communications with his attorneys remain confiden-
tial.142 Regardless, if prison officials promise "to open but not read" legal
mail, courts have observed that prisoners lack trust in that promise and are
fearful that their legal mail will be read.1 43 "Opening attorney mail only in
the inmate's presence ensures that the inmate's correspondence with his at-
torney is not inhibited or chilled by his fear that this correspondence may be
read by prison officials."'
144
As to Turner's third factor, the court found that there was no proof that
opening legal mail in a prisoner's presence burdens guards, inmates, or the
distribution of prison resources. 45 The prison policy instituted had already
required that all legal mail be opened in the prisoner's presence. 46 "While
opening all prison mail in an inmate's presence would pose an impermissible
burden, [the court in Al-Amin concluded that] properly marked attorney mail
does not."'' 47 Thus, opening a prisoner's legal mail in the prisoner's presence
does not impose an impermissibly large burden on the prison. 148 As to
Turner's "fourth factor, opening an inmate's attorney mail in his presence
itself is the easy alternative; it 'fully accommodates the prisoner's right at de
minimis cost to valid penological interests.' '1 49 Thus, the court in Al-Amin
determined that Taylor and Guajardo are not undermined by Turner and
remain "valid, well-established law.' 5 ° As such, in the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, prisoners "have a constitutionally protected right to have
their properly marked attorney mail opened in their presence."'
' 5
'
Al-Amin would have succeeded in his right to access the courts claim
but for the actual injury requirement instituted by the United States Supreme
Court in Lewis.' 52  AI-Amin only made conclusory allegations that the
141. Id. Turner's second factor "is whether there are alternative means of exercising the
right that remain open to prison inmates." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
142. Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1331.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 476 (Former 5th Cir. 1976)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1331.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987)).
150. Id.
151. Id.; see Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465, 1467-68 (11th Cir. 1991); Guajardo v.
Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 758 (Former 5th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475
(Former 5th Cir. 1976).
152. Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1332; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
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opening of his legal mail compromised his case.'53 Furthermore, AI-Amin
did not specifically demonstrate how any of his legal matters were
damaged.'- 4 As such, the court concluded that AI-Amin did not successfully
show the indispensable actual injury requirement to succeed in his access to
the courts claim.
55
However, the court in AI-Amin determined that his First Amendment
right to free speech was violated by the prison officials' continued practice of
opening his legal mail outside his presence. 56  The court in AI-Amin
determined that the right to access claims and the right to free speech claims
are independent of one another.5 7 A prisoner's presence in a prison does not
strip that prisoner of his First Amendment right to free speech.'58 AI-Amin's
ability to use the mail is a medium for him to express his right to free
speech.59  "[G]iven their incarceration and often distance from their
attorneys, prisoners' use of the mail to communicate with their attorneys
about their criminal cases may frequently be a more important free speech
right than the use of their tongues.'
' 60
Furthermore, the court in Al-Amin relied on the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals' holding in Jones v. Brown,' 6' which determined "that a state
prison's 'pattern and practice' of opening attorney mail outside the inmate's
presence 'interferes with protected communications, strips those protected
communications of their confidentiality, and accordingly impinges upon the
inmate's right to freedom of speech.""' 162 The court in AI-Amin determined
that to maintain a constitutional claim for violation of a prisoner's free
speech rights, a separate showing of actual injury is not required beyond the
violation itself. 63 Specifically, the court in AI-Amin agreed with the Third
Circuit's conclusion that a separate showing of actual injury is not required
for claims of free speech violations. 64  Thus, "AI-Amin has a First
153. AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1333.
154. id. There was nothing provided by AI-Amin that showed "specific cases or claims
being pursued, nor any deadlines missed, nor any effect on AI-Amin's legal claims." Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1334.
158. See id. at 1333. "[lit is well established that a prison inmate 'retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system."' Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1333-34.
161. 461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006).
162. AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1334 (quoting Jones, 461 F.3d at 359).
163. Id. at 1333.
164. Id. at 1334.
[Vol. 33
187
: Nova Law Review 33, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
PRISONERS' RIGHTS TO LEGAL MAIL
Amendment free speech right to communicate with his attorneys by mail,
separate and apart from his constitutional right to access to the courts."
1 65
Additionally, the court in Al-Amin relied on Lemon v. Dugger,'66 which
stressed that a prisoner's basic interest is unconstrained and effective
communication with his or her attorney.' 67
2. Third Circuit Court of Appeals
"Of all communications, attorney mail is the most sacrosanct. ' 168 The
main decisions in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that discuss prisoners'
rights to legal mail are Bieregu v. Reno 169 and Jones.7 ° The earlier decision,
Bieregu, involved a prisoner's claim that prison officials violated his rights
by repetitively opening his properly marked legal mail outside his
presence.17' The court in Bieregu reviewed numerous courts of appeals
decisions that determined that opening legal mail outside of a prisoner's
presence violates the Constitution. 17 2 The Third Circuit determined that the
source of a prisoner's right to receive his or her legal mail unread and opened
in his or her presence derived from both the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech and the right to access the courts. 173 The Third Circuit
noted a potential source in the right to privacy. 174
In Bieregu, the court stated that the right of court access is included
within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the
First Amendment right to petition clause. 175 The court in Bieregu failed to
recognize the decision in Hudson v. Robinson,176 which required that a
prisoner be "'actually denied' access to the courts" to claim his right to
access the courts had been violated.177 Alternatively, Bieregu followed the
Third Circuit's later decision in Peterkin v. Jeffes, 178 which imposed a
demarcation between ancillary aspects of access to the courts, which merely
165. Id.
166. 931 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991).
167. See Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1331-32 (quoting Lemon, 931 F.2d at 1467).
168. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1456 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated in part by Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
169. Id. at 1445.
170. Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 355-56 (3d Cir. 2006).
171. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1448.
172. Id. at 1450.
173. Id. at 1456-58.
174. See id. at 1456 n.5.
175. See id. at 1453-54.
176. 678 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1982).
177. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1454-55 (quoting Hudson, 678 F.2d at 466).
178. 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988).
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impact convenience or comfort without depriving access to the courts, from
prison regulations that are central to a prisoner's right of access to the
courts. 179 Regulations that are central to a prisoner's access to the courts do
not require actual injury, but ancillary claims require proof of actual injury. 8°
The court in Bieregu determined that repeatedly violating the
confidentiality of a prisoner's legal mail are central to the right of access to
the courts.8 8 Therefore, Bieregu concluded that prison officials repetitive
reading of a prisoner's legal mail does not require the prisoner to show proof
of actual injury in order for the prisoner to establish an infringement of that
right."'82 Similar to the former Fifth Circuit's Taylor decision, the court in
Bieregu determined that "the only way to ensure that mail is not read when
opened, and thus to vindicate the right of access, is to require that it be done
in the presence of the inmate to whom it is addressed."' 83
The recent 2006 decision in Jones assessed the constitutional validity of
a new prison policy requiring the opening of prisoners' legal mail outside
their presence. 84  The state enacted this new policy to safely secure its
prisons from the threat of anthrax attacks fueled by the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. 85 Prior to this change in policy, all legal mail was required
to be opened in the prisoner's presence. 186 The court in Jones analyzed the
vitality of Bieregu in relation to Lewis. 187 Jones determined that Lewis had
no effect on Bieregu's First Amendment free speech claims.188 Bieregu's
179. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1455 (quoting Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1041).
180. Id. (citing Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1041-42).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1456 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974)); see Guajardo
v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 758 (Former 5th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475
(Former 5th Cir. 1976). Reading prisoners' legal mail would likely violate the right of court
access "even more than simply opening and inspecting it." Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1456.
"[lInterference with attorney mail probably infringes the right of court access even more than
interference with court mail, whether the correspondence relates to a criminal conviction, a
subsequent collateral proceeding, or a civil suit to protect an inmate's constitutional rights."
Id.
184. See Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 355-56 (3d Cir. 2006).
185. See id. at 356.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 359.
188. Id. Jones reaffirmed Bieregu's holding that
[a] state pattern and practice, or, as is the case here, explicit policy, of opening legal mail out-
side the presence of the addressee inmate interferes with protected communications, strips
those protected communications of their confidentiality, and accordingly impinges upon the
inmate's right to freedom of speech. The practice deprives the expression of confidentiality
and chills the inmates' protected expression, regardless of the state's good-faith protestations
that it does not, and will not, read the content of the communications. This is so because "the
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ruling that no proof of actual injury needs to be shown for First Amendment
free speech claims remains well established law. 8 9
Following Lewis, the Third Circuit in Oliver v. Fauver 90 ruled that in
order to sustain a claim for denial of access to the courts the prisoner must
show evidence of actual injury. 9' Thus, in doing so, it is clear that Bieregu
was "effectively overruled."'' 92 The particular evidence necessary to satisfy
the actual injury requirement was not elaborated on in Jones beyond the
broad statement that the prisoner must have been "hindered in an effort to
pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim."' 93
The court in Jones determined that "while the health and safety of
inmates and staff are legitimate penological interests, if there is no
information suggesting a significant risk of an anthrax attack, there is no
reasonable connection between those interests and the policy of opening
legal mail in the absence of the inmate addressee."' 94 Therefore, the prison
officials failed to meet their burden under Turner's first step. 95 Thus, in
Bieregu and Jones, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a prisoner
has a constitutional right to receive his or her legal mail unread and opened
in his or her presence. 196 Such prisoners' rights are grounded in both the
right to access the courts and the right to free speech.' 97
3. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
Recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sallier v. Brooks'98 de-
termined that a prisoner's interest in communicating confidentially with an
only way to ensure that mail is not read when opened ... is to require that it be done in the
presence of the inmate to whom it is addressed."
Jones, 461 F.3d at 359 (quoting Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1456).
189. Id.
190. 118 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1997).
191. Jones, 461 F.3d at 359 (citing Oliver, 118 F.3d at 177-78).
192. Id. at 359 (quoting Oliver, 118 F.3d at 178). However, Bieregu's First Amendment
free speech ruling is still good law. Id.
193. Id. "[Tihe inmate must show that his or her exercise of the right at issue, the right of
accessing the courts to secure judicial relief, has been infringed in some consequential way."
Id. (citing Lewis v. Casey 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996)).
194. Jones, 461 F.3d at 364.
195. Id. The regulations were not "'reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests."' Id. at 360 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
196. See id. at 359; Biercgu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1456 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated in part
by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,349 (1996).
197. Jones, 461 F.3d at 359; Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1456.
198. 343 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2003).
20091
190
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
attorney is a primary element of the judicial process. 99 Therefore, legal
mail, as a matter of law, implicates a prisoner's constitutionally protected
right to receive mail from an attorney.2°° "There is no penological interest or
security concern that justifies opening such mail outside of the prisoner's
presence when the prisoner has specifically requested otherwise. ' '201 As
such, it is widely held throughout the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that
prisoners have a constitutionally protected right to receive legal mail unread
and opened in their presence. °2
4. Other United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
Numerous other United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, including the
First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth, have all held that a prison-
er has a constitutional right to receive his or her legal mail opened in his or
her presence.0 3 In Smith v. Robbins,2° the First Circuit determined that legal
mail from attorneys may not be opened outside the prisoner's presence be-
cause the prisoner's presence ensures that the legal mail will remain un-
read. 205 The First Circuit further noted that otherwise, prisoners will fear that
their legal mail will be read. 206 The Second Circuit determined in Davis v.
Goord2 7 that interfering with a prisoner's legal mail implicates a prisoner's
right to access the courts.20 8
199. Id. at 877; see Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1012 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[a]
prisoner's right to receive mail is protected by the First Amendment").
200. Sallier, 343 F.3d at 877; see Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that "prison officials should have treated the legal materials delivered to [the
prisoner] as 'legal mail' and, therefore, should not have examined the contents outside [the
prisoner's] presence").
201. Sailier, 343 F.3d at 877-88; see Muhammad v. Pitcher, 35 F.3d 1081,1085-86 (6th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the prison policy of opening mail from the state attorney outside of a
prisoner's presence is unconstitutional because the practice "is not reasonably related to [a]
penological interest"); Knop, 977 F.2d at 1011 ("[T]he court ordered implementation of a
system-wide policy insuring that legal mail will be opened only in the presence of the
addressee if that is the addressee's wish.").
202. Sallier, 343 F.3d at 877-78; Kensu, 87 F.3d at 175; Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1085-86;
Knop, 977 F.2d at 1011.
203. See AI-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008); Bieregu v. Reno, 59
F.3d 1445, 1456 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated in part by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349
(1996).
204. 454 F.2d 696 (1 st Cir. 1972).
205. See id. at 697.
206. See id.
207. 320 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 2003).
208. Id. at 351. However, the Second Circuit also concluded that only two incidents of
prison officials interfering with legal mail "are insufficient to state a claim for denial of access
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Additionally, the Seventh Circuit, in Kaufman v. McCaughtry,2°9 deter-
mined that when prison officials open a prisoner's properly marked legal
mail outside his or her presence, it potentially violates the prisoner's rights. 10
The Seventh Circuit further determined in Castillo v. Cook County Mail
Room Department1 that opening the prisoner's legal mail on three occa-
sions outside the prisoner's presence implicates a "colorable claim" violation
of the prisoner's constitutional rights.2t 2 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit in
Powells v. Minnehaha County Sheriff Department213 concluded that there is a
cause of action for a constitutional violation when prison officials open pris-
oners' legal mail outside their presence.214 The Eighth Circuit in Jensen v.
Klecker' 5 determined that prison officials' repeated opening of a prisoner's
legal mail outside the prisoner's presence violated the prisoner's rights.216 In
addition, the Tenth Circuit, in Ramos v. Lamm, 217 determined that opening
prisoners' legal mail outside their presence violates their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 2'8 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit in Stevenson v. Koskey
219
stated in its dissenting opinion that reading prisoners' legal mail may infringe
upon prisoners' rights to privacy.220
B. A Circuit That Fails to Recognize Prisoners' Constitutional Rights to
Receive Legal Mail Unread and Opened in Their Presence
I. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' Brewer v. Wilkinson Ruling
Post-Turner, the Fifth Circuit, in Brewer v. Wilkinson,22 ' reassessed the
Taylor and Guajardo holdings.222 In Brewer, the prisoners claimed that the
prison officials' practice of opening prisoners' legal mail violated their con-
to the courts because [the prisoner] has not alleged that the interference with his mail either
constituted an ongoing practice of unjustified censorship or caused him to miss court dead-
lines or in any way prejudiced his legal actions." Id. at 352.
209. 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005).
210. ld. at 686.
211. 990 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
212. See id. at 305, 307.
213. 198 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
214. Id. at712.
215. 648 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
216. Id. at 1182-83.
217. 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980).
218. Id. at 582.
219. 877 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1989).
220. Id. at 1443 n.2 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
221. 3 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 1993).
222. Id. at 822-23, 825.
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stitutional rights.223 Specifically, the prisoners claimed that the prison offi-
cials' practice infringed upon their access to the courts and their First
Amendment rights.224 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that prisoners' rights
of access to the courts are constitutionally protected rights.225 However,
Brewer "acknowledge[d] that what we once recognized in [Taylor] as being
'compelled' by prisoners' constitutional rights-i.e., that a prisoner's incom-
ing legal mail be opened and inspected only in the prisoner's presence-is no
longer the case in light of Turner.,226 Accordingly, Brewer held "that the
violation of the prison regulation requiring that a prisoner be present when
his incoming legal mail is opened and inspected is not a violation of a pris-
oner's constitutional rights. 227
Brewer affirmed the district court's decision that summary judgment
was proper because appellants had failed to make out "a cognizable constitu-
tional claim. 22 8 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit failed to recognize the distinc-
tion between free speech and access to courts claims. 229 Specifically, the
Fifth Circuit failed to recognize the actual injury requirement differences
between free speech and access to the courts claims.230 The court in Brewer
noted that the prisoners' pleadings were deficient for numerous reasons. 231
Brewer mentioned that the prisoners alleged that their legal mail was opened
and inspected.232 But, they did not allege that the mail was read.233 Addi-
tionally, they did not allege "that their ability to prepare or transmit a neces-
sary legal document ha[d] been affected by this opening and inspection. ' ' 3
Furthermore, they did not allege that their legal mail had been censored.235
Lastly, the prisoners acknowledged the prison's "'legitimate penological
objective' of prison security. 236
Despite Brewer's acknowledgment of the prisoners' deficient pleadings,
the Fifth Circuit, nevertheless, overruled Taylor.237 Brewer held that the
prisoners "have not stated a cognizable constitutional claim either for a deni-
223. Id. at 817-18.
224. Id. at 818.
225. Id. at 820.
226. Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 825.
231. See Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Brewer, F.3d at 825.
237. ld.
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al of access to the courts or for a denial of their right to free speech by alleg-
ing that their incoming legal mail was opened and inspected for contraband
outside their presence. 238 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Brewer is an ano-
maly.239 Bieregu acknowledged that its holding was different than Brew-
er's.24 Most importantly, Bieregu stated that its holding "comports with the
results reached by the majority of courts of appeals to consider these precise
or similar issues, not to mention the results reached by our own district
courts."24' The majority of circuit courts have held that prisoners have a con-
stitutionally protected right to have their legal mail opened in their pres-
ence.242 Therefore, Brewer is inconsistent with the majority of courts.243
V. CONCLUSION
Legal mail is sacred.2 4 Prisoners may lose certain legal rights upon en-
trance into prison; however, prisoners still retain many constitutional rights
that "free citizens" receive and enjoy.245 Mail is a prisoner's primary form of
communication.246 Interfering with a prisoner's legal mail threatens the main
avenue, often the only avenue, that a prisoner has to implement his or her
constitutional rights.2 47 Prisoners' constitutional rights to access the courts
and free speech are violated by prison officials opening their legal mail out-
side their presence. 248 So, to assuage such fears that his or her mail will be
read, circuit courts have required that legal mail be opened in a prisoner's
presence.249 This practice balances both the need for prison security and the
prisoner's need for uninhibited communication with attorneys. Most im-
portantly, requiring legal mail to be opened in the prisoner's presence en-
sures that prisoners will not fall victim to unconstitutional prison regula-
238. Id.
239. See Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1458 (3d Cir. 1995); see also AI-Amin v. Smith,
511 F.3d 1317, 1328-30(1lth Cir. 2008).
240. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1458.
241. Id.
242. Id.; see also Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1329.
243. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1458.
244. See id. at 1456.
245. See id. at 1449.
246. See id. at 1455.
247. Id.
248. AI-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1325-34 (11 th Cir. 2008).
249. See id. at 1331.
250. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 477 (Former 5th Cir. 1976).
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tions.25' This process is neither burdensome nor interferes with prison secu-
rity.25
2
The majority of United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have deter-
mined that prisoners have a right to receive their legal mail unread.253 Courts
have further elaborated that such a right requires the mail to be opened in the
prisoner's presence to ensure that its contents remain untainted. 4 Only one
of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals found it constitutional to cen-
sor a prisoner's legal mail and even managed to overturn a binding precedent
in its circuit.255 However, its holding remains an anomaly among United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals. 256 The majority of United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals have determined that there is no "rational connection"
between the prison practice of opening a prisoner's legal mail outside his or
her presence and a legitimate government interest.25 7 Such a practice hinders
their constitutional rights of access to the courts and free speech.25 8 As such,
prisoners have a constitutionally protected right to have their legal mail
opened in their presence.2 59 Therefore, a prisoner's right to legal mail is not
shed upon entrance into the prison gates.2 °
251. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1455.
252. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 477.
253. See Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1458.
254. See AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1331.
255. See Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 1993).
256. Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1458; see also Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1328-30.
257. AI-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1331.
258. Id. at 1325-34.
259. Id.
260. See Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1449.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Child pornography has "a devastating and lasting effect on children"
emotionally and physically.' Under Florida law, child pornography is de-
fined as "any image depicting a minor engaged in sexual conduct."2 Sexual
conduct is, in part, conduct such as: "deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bes-
tiality, masturbation,. . . sadomasochistic abuse, [sexual battery], actual lewd
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. Laura Salpeter has a B.S. in Psychology and a M.S. in Criminal Justice
from the University of Central Florida. The author wishes to thank her family and friends for
their continued support, encouragement, and guidance. She also wishes to thank her col-
leagues on Nova Law Review and the faculty of the Law Center, especially Professor Olym-
pia Duhart for her mentoring and inspiration.
1. Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Child Pornography, http://www.missing
kids.com/missingkids/servletlPageServlet?LanguageCountry=en-US&Pageld=1504 (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Missing Kids].
2. FLA. STAT. § 847.001(3) (2007).
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exhibition of the genitals, [and] actual physical contact with . . . clothed or
unclothed genitals." '3 With the increasing use of technology, the Internet has
provided our society with great knowledge and opportunity to learn.' How-
ever, it has also greatly increased the sexual exploitation of children, more
specifically, the continuance of viewing and distribution of sexually ex-
ploited children. 5 Prior research exhibits that more than seventy-seven mil-
lion children are connected to the Internet, and one in seven of those children
have been solicited by a sexual predator online.6 Further, recent statistics
indicate that child pornographic material on the Internet has grown to reach
estimates of as much as twenty percent.7
Both Congress and the states have enacted laws in an attempt to control
the issue of sexual exploitation of children. 8 However, few laws have sur-
vived the First Amendment and the United States Commerce Clause argu-
ments raised by civil rights groups.9 Due to the invalidation of much child
exploitation legislation, Congress and the states struggle to narrowly con-
struct provisions of new bills in order to protect children.' ° Despite the con-
stitutional issues raised by civil rights groups, the 2008 Florida Legislature,
having a strong governmental interest in protecting children, passed Senate
Bill 1442 (SB 1442) to provide additional protection to victims of child por-
nography both in civil and criminal proceedings."
This article discusses the history and issues surrounding child exploita-
tion laws and the changes SB 1442 intends to make. This article will first
present an overview of the child exploitation problem and discuss the devel-
opment and progression of legislation both federally and in the State of Flor-
ida. Next, this article will analyze the constitutionality of SB 1442. In order
to determine the constitutionality of SB 1442, this article will discuss both
the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
3. Id. § 847.001(16).
4. Missing Kids, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Office of Att'y Gen. of Fla., Child Predator CyberCrime Unit, http://myfloridalegal.
com/pages.nsf/Main/DF75DF6F54BDA68E8525727B00645478 (last visited Apr. 4, 2009)
[hereinafter CyberCrime Unit].
7. Missing Kids, supra note 1.
8. See Richard H. Martin, Comment, State Regulation of Pornographic Internet Trans-
missions: The Constitutional Questions Raised by Senate Bill 144, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1109,1109 (2002).
9. See id. at 1109-10.
10. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
11. See Fla. S. Comms. on Crim. and Civil Just. Appropriations, Judiciary, Crim. Just.,
and Senators Dockery and Baker, CS for SB 1442 (2008) Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact
Statement I (Apr. 15, 2008) (on file with comms.) [hereinafter SB 1442 Bill Analysis and
Impact Statement].
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tution. This article will additionally evaluate the impact of SB 1442 on the
victims and the State of Florida. Finally, this article will conclude with rec-
ommendations toward any present or potential concerns surrounding SB
1442.
H. HISTORY AND PRESENT SITUATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
Until the mid-1800s, "children were viewed primarily as chattel" and
not people. 12 Children were seen as expendable, replaceable, and exchange-
able and therefore, children's rights were non-existent. 3 Parents or guar-
dians, "under most Western legal systems," were entitled to sell, beat, and
exploit their children.1 4 The shift from negative societal attitudes of children
began in the nineteenth century and was based upon the concern of care and
protection for the child.15 This new ideology was emphasized by philoso-
phers who proposed that children were malleable and needed to be sur-
rounded by positive experiences. 16 Nationally, this concern grew from the
establishments of orphanages and schools to the protection of sexually ex-
ploited children.
17
The various rights of children need to be respected and upheld by legis-
lation and the practices of society.'8 In order for these rights to be respected,
both Congress and the states have enacted legislation in an attempt to moni-
tor and control society. 19 However, technology and the growing use of the
Internet for means of communication have led to abundant grounds for child
pornographers and the need for new legislation. 0
A. The Use of the Internet
The Internet has provided our society with a new medium of communi-
cation which has led to a vast amount of knowledge and opportunity.2'
However, the Internet has also dramatically impacted the growing problem
12. Cynthia Price Cohen, The Developing Jurisprudence of the Rights of the Child, 6 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. I, 9 (1993).
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 9.
18. SeeMartin, supranote8, at 1109-11.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 1109-10.
21. Missing Kids, supra note I.
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of the sexual exploitation of children.2 The eruption of the Internet has sig-
nificantly complicated law enforcement abilities to control the exchange of
pornographic material.2 3 According to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (NCMEC):
A greater number of child molesters are now using computer
technology to organize and maintain their collections of these il-
legal images. In addition they are also using the Internet to in-
crease the size of these collections .... When these images reach
cyberspace, they are irretrievable and can continue to circulate for-
ever. Thus the child is revictimized as the images are viewed
again and again. 24
According to the Online Victimization Report, which surveyed over fifteen
hundred children, one in five children are solicited while online.25 Further,
the survey indicated that one in thirty-three children are aggressively soli-
cited with attempts to contact the child offline through mail, telephone, or
meeting with the child in person.26 However, very few incidents were ever
reported to a parent or the authorities. One theory is that molesters will
gradually introduce sexual images or "content into their online conversa-
tions" in an attempt to "lower the child's inhibitions."28 Once the child be-
lieves that his or her peers have engaged in these sexual activities, he or she
begins to see the behavior as acceptable and is more willing to participate.29
Now that the sexual exploitation has taken place, the molester has the am-
munition to blackmail the child for expansion of his or her collection.30 The
Internet has become a valuable tool for molesters to reach a level of respect
from other molesters.3' For example, once a personally manufactured image
has been placed on the Internet, the respect status is achieved and other
molesters will begin trading their own illegal images among fellow exploi-
32ters.
22. Id.
23. Mehagen Doyle, Bad Apples in Cyberspace: The Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of
Children over the Internet, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 119, 120 (1999).
24. Missing Kids, supra note I.
25. DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., ONLINE VICTIMIZATION: A REPORT ON THE NATION'S
YOUTH ix (2000), available at http://www.missingkids.com/en-US/publications/NC62.pdf.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Missing Kids, supra note 1.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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A number of children found an encounter with a molester distressing,
whether sexual exploitation occurred or not.33 In order to reduce these en-
counters, our society needs to better protect the children, increase the number
of incidences reported to authorities, and educate both parents and children
on the problem of sexual exploitation and the Internet.
34
B. Federal Law and the Exploitation of Children
Congress, in recent years, has passed numerous amounts of legislation
in an attempt to protect children from sexual exploitation.35 The first of
Congress's attempts occurred in 1996 when the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA) was passed. 36 The CDA was passed as part of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 and prohibited knowingly transmitting porno-
graphy to children.37 Specifically, the CDA regulated access to sexually ex-
plicit "obscene or indecent" material on the Internet by criminalizing the
sending or displaying in an accessible area of such material to anyone under
the age of eighteen.38 However, in 2000, in United States v. Playboy Enter-
tainment Group, Inc.,3 the United States Supreme Court found the CDA
unconstitutional because it violated First Amendment rights. 40 More specifi-
cally, the Court agreed that the CDA was overly broad and vague because
while there is a "governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials .... that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppres-
sion of speech addressed to adults."
41
Congress additionally enacted the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 (CPPA) to expand child pornography laws to prohibit virtual child por-
nography.42 This Act was overruled in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition43
because the Court found that the CPPA "abridges the freedom to engage in a
substantial amount of lawful speech [and] is overbroad and unconstitutional"
33. See FINKELHOR ET AL., supra note 25, at ix, 1.
34. Id. at ix.
35. Martin, supra note 8, at I iI.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1111-12 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994)).
38. Id. at 1112 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994)).
39. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
40. Id. at 827.
41. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997).
42. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-
26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
43. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
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under the First Amendment.4 Therefore, the Court held that virtual child
pornography was not grounds to find actual child pornography. 45
Due to the unconstitutionality of the CDA, Congress passed the Child
Online Protection Act (COPA).46 COPA was intended to limit the scope of
material "harmful to minors."' In particular, COPA required commercial
websites to inquire about the user's age before allowing him or her to enter
the Internet site, thereby prohibiting any entity or individual in knowingly
making available any sexually explicit material that would be considered
"harmful to minors."48 Similar to the CDA and the CPPA, COPA was ex-
amined on the basis of vagueness and unconstitutionality. 49 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined COPA was overly
broad and unconstitutional and the United States Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's decision. 50
During the litigation of COPA, Congress passed the Children's Internet
Protection Act (CIPA), which required school libraries receiving any federal
technology funds to install software on their computers that blocked porno-
graphy.5 The American Library Association argued that the Act was un-
constitutional on its face and the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania agreed.52 However, the United States Supreme
Court held that CIPA was constitutional because school libraries are required
to make determinations regarding the material viewable on the Internet and
CIPA only supported the libraries' duty to make content based decisions
viewed by patrons.5 3
Congress has further enacted legislation for the protection of children
against predators in an attempt to prevent the sexual exploitation altogether.54
For example, Congress passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
44. Id. at 256.
45. See id. at 258.
46. See Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-31).
47. See id. § 231(e)(6) ("The term 'material that is harmful to minors' means any com-
munication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of
any kind that is obscene ... .
48. Id. § 231 (a).
49. ACLU v. Ashcroft (ACLU i), 542 U.S. 656, 670-673 (2004).
50. ACLU v. Ashcroft (ACLU 1), 322 F.3d 240, 271 (2003), aff'd 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
51. Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(l)(B) (2000).
52. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States (Library 1), 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407, 495 (E.D.
Pa. 2002).
53. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n (Library If), 539 U.S. 194, 208 (2003).
54. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § I, 117 Stat. 650, 650 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 33
201
: Nova Law Review 33, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
CHILD EXPLOITATION
to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT) in 2003, which
expanded law enforcement wiretapping authority.55 PROTECT was intended
to prevent child abduction and sexual exploitation, instead of punishing the
violators.56
Additionally, Congress, in their attempts for prevention, enacted the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA).5 1 COPPA pre-
vented any commercial website from accessing any personal information
from a child under the age of thirteen.58 Although COPPA does limit online
material to children, it fails to limit a child's ability to claim an age of legali-
ty without verification. 59
Furthermore, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006 (AWCPS) in response to violent crimes related to sexual
exploitation of children. 60 This Act aims to prevent child abuse and child
pornography and to encourage and promote Internet safety.61 Masha's Law
is a provision within the AWCPS, which provides a civil remedy for victims
of child pornography, both minors and adults, from those offenders who have
downloaded the victim's images and raises the minimum penalty from fifty
thousand dollars to one hundred fifty thousand dollars.62
Moreover, Congress has taken additional steps in order to protect child-
ren of other countries.63 In 2006, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2423, which
forbids any United States citizen from traveling abroad to engage in sexual
activity with a minor.6" Further, that same day, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422, which bans the use of the mail, Internet, or other means to persuade,
coerce, or entice any person under the age of eighteen in unlawful sexualbehavior.6
In addition to Acts passed by Congress, many states have attempted to
enact legislation to address child exploitation issues. There still remains a
55. See id. § 201.
56. See generally id. §§ 101-108.
57. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681-728 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506).
58. Id. §§ 1302-1303.
59. See id.
60. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 1, 120
Stat. 587, 587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
61. Id.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2006).
64. Id.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006).
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need for a state legislation that can withstand the constitutional challenges of
either the First Amendment or the Commerce Clause in federal court.66
C. Florida Law and the Exploitation of Children
According to the Federal Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force,
"Florida ranks fourth in the nation in volume of child pornography." 67 In
response, Attorney General Bill McCollum (McCollum) began the Child
Predator CyberCrime Unit in 2005.68 The purpose of this unit is to increase
the safeguard precautions taken to ensure the prevention of child pornogra-
phy, Internet-based sexual exploitation, and the prosecution of sexual preda-
tors. 69 The success of this unit has led to the arrests of more than fifty child
predators or facilitators of child pornography.7°
The Child Predator CyberCrime Unit has opened the doors for Florida
to enact legislation to guarantee the unit's success. 7' For example, the Cy-
berCrimes Against Children Act of 2007 was enacted through the efforts of
McCollum and made the State of Florida a leader in the fight to end the sex-
ual exploitation of children. 72 This Act increases the penalties for the posses-
sion or distribution of Internet child pornography and creates a penalty for
those predators who actually travel to meet a child with "the specific pur-
pose" of exploiting them.73 The Act also increases the penalties for "groom-
ing" 74 themselves to seduce a child.75 The success of this Act has led to the
expansion of the CyberCrime Unit, with locations throughout the State of
Florida.76
In 1990, the Florida Legislature enacted the Conditional Release Pro-
gram Act which provides that certain re-offenders, including sexual exploita-
tion offenders, are subject to terms and conditions established by the com-
mission after their release from the correctional institution.77 Further, in
66. See generally ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
67. CyberCrime Unit, supra note 6.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See generally id.
72. CyberCrime Unit, supra note 6.
73. Id.
74. See id. (stating that "'grooming' is intended to make a child believe the offender is
closer in age to the child, therefore encouraging the child to feel more comfortable conversing
with the offender").
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(i)-(2)(c) (2007).
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1997, the Conditional Release Program Act was amended to include stricter
restrictions for sex offenders. 8 These conditions included: prohibitions
from operating a motor vehicle, using a post box office, taking an annual
polygraph test, a submission to an HIV test, and the use of an electric moni-
tor if the commission deemed it necessary.
79
Furthermore, after the kidnap, rape, and murder of nine-year-old Jimmy
Ryce, the Florida Legislature passed the Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil
Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators Act (Jimmy Ryce Act). 80 This
Act is intended to deem certain sex offenders as "sexually violent predators"
in which they are involuntary and indefinitely committed to a mental health
facility after they have served time in the correctional facility.8 This Act
only applies to offenders "who have been convicted of a sexually violent"
crime prior to the new offense.
82
The State of Florida recognized that when innocent people suffer any
personal injury or death in an effort to prevent criminal activity, they may
incur negative impacts such as: disabilities, financial hardships, or the need
of public assistance.83 Therefore, Florida enacted the Florida Crimes Com-
pensation Act in 2007.84 This Act is intended to aid, care, and support vic-
tims of crime.85 It also provides a way for innocent children who are sub-
jected to exploitation to receive assistance from the Florida Attorney Gener-
al's Division of Victim Services.86
Further, the State of Florida enacted the Computer Pornography and
Child Exploitation Prevention Act which criminalizes knowingly: transmit-
ting, viewing, enticing, luring, seducing, or soliciting any child or parent of a
child by computer to obtain obscene material pertaining to the sexual exploi-
tation of children.87 Additionally, this Act punishes any person who travels
or attempts to travel to meet a child with the intention to engage in unlawful
sexual conduct with the child.88
Florida, having "the nation's third highest population of sex offenders,"
became the first State to enact statewide residence restrictions against sexual
78. See id. § 947.1405(7)(b).
79. Id.
80. FLA. STAT. §§ 394.910-932 (2007).
81. Id. § 394.910.
82. Id. § 394.925.
83. See FLA. STAT. § 960.002 (2007).
84. Id. § 960.01.
85. Id. § 960.0021(2)(a).
86. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note I1, at 4-5.
87. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135(1), (3) (2007).
88. Id. § 847.0135(4).
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predators whose victims were children.89 While a majority of states have
enacted one statute for sex offenders, Florida maintains two different sta-
tutes: one for general sexual offenders and a "more stringent set of restric-
tions" for sexual predators.9 ° The restrictions against general sex offenders
prohibit certain sex offenders "in which the victim of the offense was less
than [sixteen] years of age, to reside within 1000 feet of any school, day care
center, park, or playground."9' However, these restrictions apply only to
those sex offenders convicted for the offense on or after October 1, 2004.92
The restrictions against sexual predators are more severe and apply to a
smaller category of sex offenders than general sex offenders. 93 Sexual preda-
tors are classified as those "who present an extreme threat to. . . public safe-
ty". 94 Those labeled sexual predators and whose victims were under the age
of eighteen at the time of the crime are prohibited from "'living within 1000
feet of a school, daycare center, park, playground, [public school bus stops],
or other place[s] where children regularly congregate"' if the convicted
crime was committed on or after October 1, 1995.9
Moreover, Florida has enacted many state statutes in an attempt to con-
trol the sexual exploitation of children. For example, Florida Statutes sec-
tion 92.56 provides that the confidentiality of the victim of child exploitation
is protected from civil and criminal proceedings and the State may use a
pseudonym 96 for the victim in a sexual exploitation case.97  Additionally,
Florida Statutes section 775.082 provides minimum penalties for criminals,
including sexual exploitation, who reoffend by punishing them to life in
prison or death.98 Further, Florida Statutes section 948.31 requires an evalu-
ation to determine whether certain sex offenders are in need of a probationer
or outpatient counseling program. 99 If deemed necessary, the court will pro-
89. See Steven J. Wernick, Note, In Accordance with a Public Outcry: Zoning Out Sex
Offenders Through Residence Restrictions in Florida, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1147, 1188 (2006).
90. Id. at 1160-61.
91. FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2007).
92. Id. § 794.065(2).
93. Wernick, supra note 89, at 1162.
94. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(3)(a) (2007). "Repeat sexual offenders, sexual offenders who
use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who
present an extreme threat to the public safety." Id.
95. Wernick, supra note 89, at 1162.
96. FLA. STAT. § 92.56 (2007). Keeping confidential "[a]ll court records, including tes-
timony from witnesses, that reveal the photograph, name, or address of the victim." Id. §
92.56(1).
97. Id.
98. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(I) (2007).
99. FLA. STAT. § 948.31 (2007).
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vide an outpatient counseling requirement for a term or indefinite condi-
tion.1 °°
Florida has become "one of the leading states" in the nation fighting
child exploitation and enacting legislation to prevent and protect children.''
However, although Florida has taken a stand, the fight against child exploita-
tion has only begun. Both federal and state legislation must continue to grow
with the quickly changing times and revolutionized technology.
II. SENATE BILL 1442
In the 2008 session, the Florida Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1442
(SB 1442), which provides additional protections to victims of child exploi-
tation "in civil and criminal proceedings, as well as a civil remedy for vic-
tims of child pornography."'' 02 Specifically, SB 1442: 1) allows the victim to
protect his or her confidentiality by allowing "the use of a pseudonym in
court records and proceedings;" 2) removes stricter requirements for convic-
tion of the offender and lessens the proof for conviction to "the person sell-
ing or transferring the custody of a minor knew that the minor being sold
would engage in prostitution, perform naked for compensation, or otherwise
participate in the trade of sex trafficking;" 3) relocates a provision in Florida
Statutes section 800.04(7)(b) to the computer pornography statute in Florida
Statutes section 847.0135(5); 4) requires law enforcement officers to provide
material found during investigation to the Child Victim Identification Pro-
gram (CVIP) within the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
(NCMEC); 5) "[r]equires prosecutors to enter certain information into the
Victims in Child Pornography Tracking Repeat Exploitation database;" 6)
creates a civil remedy for victims of child pornography and guarantees these
victims minimum damages of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars; 7)
permits "the Office of the Attorney General to pursue cases on behalf" of
victims; 8) amends the Florida Crimes Compensation Act to expand the defi-
nition of "crime;" and 9) allows victims to file a victim's compensation
claim.103
SB 1442 is patterned after "Masha's Law" found in the federal Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, which gives a civil remedy
against offenders who download the victim's child pornography images.
°4
Masha's Law was named after Masha Allen whose abuse was distributed
100. See id.
101. CyberCrime Unit, supra note 6.
102. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note II, at 1.
103. Id. at 1-2, 5.
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
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worldwide on the Internet when she was sexually abused by her adoptive
father Matthew Mancuso. 10 5 Prior to Masha's Law, civil penalties for sexual
exploitation of a child were less than the penalty for downloading music ille-
gally.' O Masha's Law successfully increased the monetary damages from a
minimum of fifty thousand dollars to one hundred fifty thousand dollars and
allowed minors to recover damages while they were still under the age of
eighteen.' °7 With the passage of SB 1442, Florida has become the first state
to allow victims of child pornography to recover civil damages in a Florida-
based court from offenders who download images of their sexual exploita-
tion."'
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SURROUNDING SENATE BILL 1442
While many states have attempted to control the growing issue of child
exploitation, few have succeeded. With the increasing use of technology and
the ability to communicate via the Internet, state enacted legislation of child
pornography has come under constitutional attack for violations of freedom
of speech and interfering with interstate commerce.' °9 Freedom of speech is
a constitutionally protected right under the First Amendment." ° Legislation
may deprive a person from freely expressing himself or herself if it prohibits
against a "clear and present danger", child pornography, or obscenity."'
Further, Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 2 A state law will be held un-
constitutional if it places an undue burden on interstate commerce, is discri-
minatory, or is preempted by federal law.' 13
105. Office of Att'y Gen. of Fla., McCollum, Legislators: Victims of Child Pornography
Deserve Voice in Court, Civil Damages, Feb. 19, 2008, http://myfloridalegal.comlnewsrel.nsfl
newsreleases/224531 1D54E6EB873852573F400567E2B [hereinafter McCollum].
106. Id.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2255.
108. McCollum, supra note 105.
109. See generally ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
I11. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982); see also Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449-50 (1969).
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
113. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
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A. The First Amendment Implications
To guarantee freedom of speech, the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging
the freedom of speech;" however, this right is not absolute.114 Content-based
regulations of speech" 5 are typically held unconstitutional and are subjected
to strict scrutiny.1 6 Nevertheless, the regulation of speech will be sustained
under the First Amendment if: the government has a compelling interest to
regulate the speech; it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state inter-
est; and the regulation is the least restrictive alternative.' 17 Further, any regu-
lation encroaching on speech that imposes a criminal penalty must be "ade-
quately defined" by state law and requires scienter."18 SB 1442 regulates the
images of child pornography and therefore, is a content-based regulation and
will be subjected to strict scrutiny. 119
1. The State's Interest in Regulation
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held obscene materi-
al to be outside the scope of the protections of the First Amendment. 20 The
Court recognized that the original states prosecuted for "libel, blasphemy,
and profanity."' 12' Further, throughout history the Court has "remained firm
in the position that 'the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting disse-
mination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination
carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling
recipients or of exposure to juveniles.""122 In New York v. Ferber,123 the Su-
preme Court identified five rationales to why "the States are entitled to
greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children."'2 4
First, the state has a compelling interest in 'safeguarding the physical and
114. U.S. CONST. amend 1.
115. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64 (explaining that content-based regulations of speech
are accepted if "the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive inter-
ests").
116. See, e.g., People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 131 (N.Y. 2000).
117. Id. (citing Sable Commc'n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
118. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
119. See SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note Ii, at 1-2.
120. E.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
121. Id. at 754.
122. Id. at 754-55 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973)).
123. Id. at 747.
124. Id. at 756.
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psychological well-being of a minor.""" Second, research indicates that
child pornography is directly linked to the abuse of children. 26 Third, the
marketing and promotion of child pornography provide an economic motive
that is essential to the production of such illegal material and it is unlikely
that freedom of speech extends to a violation of a criminal statute. 12 7 Fourth,
child pornography and children engaged in lewd acts do not constitute an
important literary, educational, or scientific purpose. "[T]he value of permit-
ting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged
in lewd exhibitions is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."'128 Lastly,
classifying child pornography outside the scope of what is protected by the
First Amendment freedom of speech is not inconsistent with precedent. 129
Research indicates the use of children for pornographic material is
harmful to the physical, psychological, and emotional health of the child. 130
The child victim may experience: genital bruising, lacerations, depression,
anger, withdrawal, nightmares, pelvic and back pains, feelings of guilt and
responsibility, betrayal, and low self esteem.' 3' Legislative judgment has
repeatedly found relevancy in combating child pornography and has sus-
tained legislation to protect the physical, psychological, and emotional health
of children, even where freedom of speech is questioned. 132 SB 1442 is in-
tended to provide additional protections to victims of child pornography in
both criminal and civil proceedings to further the prevention of sexual ex-
ploitation and abuse, and therefore, violators of SB 1442 fall outside the
scope of the First Amendment protections. 1
33
Child pornography is directly linked to child abuse in such that it sup-
plies a permanent record of the initial occurrence and the harm is intensified
by the distribution of the material. 34 This distribution of material must be
eliminated in order to control the sexual exploitation of children. 35 There-
fore, the most practical approach to eliminate the production of child porno-
graphy is to impose criminal penalties and prosecute those who advertise,
sell, promote, encourage, and support the product. SB 1442 creates a new
125. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-757 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
126. Id. at 759.
127. Id. at 761-62.
128. ld. at 762.
129. Id. at 763.
130. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 & n.9.
131. Missing Kids, supra note I.
132. E.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
133. See SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note II, at 1-2.
134. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
135. Id.
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civil remedy that allows the recovery of damages from those who produce,
promote, or possess illegal images concerning the victim.'36 The First
Amendment does not limit a state in prosecuting those who promote, pos-
sess, or encourage the exploitation of children;.37 therefore, SB 1442 falls
within the permissible scope aimed at protecting children.
Title 18, section 2251 of the United States Code makes it a federal of-
fense for "[a]ny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any minor to engage in.. . any sexually explicit conduct for the pur-
pose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct."' 3 s Additionally, the
interest of the First Amendment to support the distribution of commercial
material, which would normally outweigh a governmental interest in regula-
tion, does not apply when the commercial activity is illegal. 139 Therefore, the
restrictions SB 1442 places on the marketing and promotion of child porno-
graphy are imperative to the valid limitation it places on the production of
child pornography.
The First Amendment extends to material that provides an important
and necessary scientific, educational, or literary purpose. 140 The Court in
Ferber indicated that it is unlikely child pornography and the sexual depic-
tions of children exhibiting lewd conduct would provide any important and
necessary scientific, educational, or literary purpose; and the First Amend-
ment interest is narrowly limited to those works portraying children that are
important and necessary. 141 SB 1442 proscribes lewd or lascivious exhibition
of children over the Internet to the computer pornography statute in section
847.0135 of the Florida Statutes, computer pornography,1 42 which legislative
judgment has previously deemed to have"exceedingly modest, if not de mi-
nimis" value.
14 3
The determination of what classification of speech is 'protected by the
First Amendment ... depends on the content of the speech' that is being
regulated.' 44 Any legislation that impinges on speech must be adequately
defined by state law or authoritatively construed.145 However, a content-
based classification of speech may fall outside the protection of the First
Amendment because the restriction significantly "outweighs the expressive
136. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note 11, at 7.
137. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006).
139. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-62.
140. Id. at 762-63.
141. Id.
142. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 (2007).
143. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
144. Id. at 763 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)).
145. Id. at 764.
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interests."' 146 Child pornography has been recognized by precedent as a cate-
gory outside the scope protected by the First Amendment. 47 SB 1442 stands
for the position to safeguard the welfare of children by specifically providing
for civil and criminal protections, 48 and it is permissible to consider the ma-
terial SB 1442 aims to secure without the protection of the First Amendment.
2. Means and Ends
The regulation of speech will be sustained under a First Amendment
challenge if the statute is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state inter-
est. 149 In other words, the statute must not be overbroad or vague.' 50 Any
regulation of speech must be adequately defined in such a manner that a per-
son of common intelligence can decipher between whether his or her "con-
templated conduct is lawful" or criminal in nature. 15 A statute that is vague
fails to warn a person that a conduct is criminal and is subject to First
Amendment challenges. 52 Further, a statute which regulates more speech
than regulation allows under the Constitution is said to be overbroad and will
be subjected to the overbreadth doctrine.'53
There are two ways in which a statute may be challenged for vagueness:
on its face and as applied. 54 If the legislation prohibits a constitutionally
protected right, then the facially vague challenge applies. 55 If the law does
not have sufficient clarity to the conduct prohibited or fails to warn a person
that the conduct is criminal, then the legislation is challenged as applied. 56
In order to determine vagueness, the statute must be examined in a con-
textual background, analyzing the full law and understanding the intention of
the law. 157 If the legislation "fails to draw reasonably clear lines"'5 8 to the
conduct being prohibited and does not provide a "fair and non-discriminatory
146. Id. at 763-64.
147. Id. at 756.
148. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note 11, at I.
149. People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 131 (N.Y. 2000) (citing Sable Commc'n of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
150. Id. at 128-30.
151. State v. Maxwell, 825 A.2d 1224, 1230 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (quoting
State v. Cameron 498 A.2d 1217, 1219 (N.J. 1985)).
152. See id.
153. See People v. Arndt, 814 N.E.2d 980, 994 (!11. App. Ct. 2004).
154. Maxwell, 825 A.2d at 1230.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1230-31.
157. Id. at 1230.
158. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
[Vol. 33
211
: Nova Law Review 33, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
CHILD EXPLOITATION
application of the laws,"15 9 then the legislation will be void for vagueness.
SB 1442 specifies provisions it intends to broaden, amend, replace, and
create. Further, SB 1442 identifies specific purposes of each provision, the
conduct considered illegal, and the remedies available to the victims.'
60
Moreover, SB 1442 leaves no hypothetical application of the law and expli-
citly states the minimum amount a victim will receive with a successful
claim.161
The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the government from banning con-
stitutionally unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is
prohibited or chilled in the process. 62 In order for legislation to be consi-
dered overbroad, it must "significantly compromise" a fundamental right.
63
The overbreadth doctrine should only be used as a last resort and has been
depicted as a "strong medicine. ' ' "6  Further, commercial activity, such as
advertising and promoting, rarely will be susceptible to the overbreadth doc-
trine. 65 SB 1442 provides protections to victims of child pornography and
punishes those who promote, produce, or possess images involving victims
of child pomography.' 66 The conduct of promoting, advertising, or produc-
ing images that exploit children is an unlawful conduct and, therefore, does
not have any constitutional protections. 67 Further, because SB 1442 regu-
lates a commercial activity, it is unlikely that the overbreadth doctrine is en-
forceable. 68
3. Least Restrictive Alternative
Even if a state has a compelling interest in the regulation it seeks to en-
force, it must still be the least restrictive method to achieve the state's pur-
pose.' 69 If there is a less restrictive method of regulation that is equally as
effective and accomplishes the same purpose as the state's legislation, then
159. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morrison, 958 F.2d 1242, 1266 (3d Cir.
1992).
160. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note I1, at 6.
161. Id. at9-10.
162. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982).
163. Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984).
164. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,613 (1973).
165. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 766 (1976).
166. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note 1I, at 2.
167. People v. Arndt, 814 N.E.2d 980, 994 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
168. See generally SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impacts, supra note II.
169. Pamela J. Stevens, Note, Community Standards and Federal Obscenity Prosecutions,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 693, 697-98 (1982).
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the legislation is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 70 Debatably,
the only effective means of regulating child exploitation is a ban of porno-
graphy in totality. 7 ' However, courts are unlikely to ban an entire industry
of sales when the use of an alternative might be equally as effective, and
therefore, state legislation is aimed at protecting children by regulating the
production, possession, and distribution of child exploitation. 172
The distribution of child pornography has long been seen as a victimless
crime, and thus, victims did not receive rights under civil or criminal law.173
Specifically, defendants argue that "minors depicted [in child pornography]
were not 'directly and most seriously affected' by [the] transmission of the
pictures.',174 Contrary to this argument, courts have identified three ways in
which the distribution of child pornography is directly harmful to the vic-
tim.7 5 First, "'[t]he materials produced are a permanent record of the child-
ren's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circula-
tion."" 76 Therefore, the continuance of sexual exploitation of the child is
directly linked to the distributor and possessor of child pornography.' 77
"Second, the mere existence of child pornography represents an invasion of
the privacy of the child depicted."' 7 8 The distribution and possession of child
pornography invades the privacy interest and continues the "disclosure of
personal matters.' 79 Lastly, "the consumer of child pornography instigates
the original production of child pornography by providing an economic mo-
tive for creating and distributing the materials."'' 80 In other words, the pro-
duction of child pornography could not exist without the promotion and dis-
tribution of child pornography and vice versa.'8 ' Therefore, the possession,
promotion, or distribution of child pornography is directly correlated to the
victimization of the child. 82
The regulation of child pornography seeks "to prevent the abuse and
misuse of children.' 83 Evidence illustrates that "the 'victimization' of the
170. Id.
171. Id. at 698.
172. Id.
173. See United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 644 (11 th Cir. 1999).
174. Id.
175. United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1998).
176. Id. at 929 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)).
177. Id. at 930.
178. Id.
179. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
180. Norris, 159 F.3d at 930; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
181. See Norris, 159 F.3d at 930.
182. See id.
183. Stevens, supra note 169, at 698.
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children involved does not end when the pornographer's camera is put away,
... '[t]he pornography's continued existence causes the child victims contin-
uing harm by haunting those children"' in future years.' 8 The states have a
compelling interest to prevent the production of child pornography and the
most effective means to stop production is to stop the market that has "led to
the creation of the images in the first place."' 8 5 Therefore, by punishing
those who have a direct link to the production of child pornography, SB 1442
is taking the least restrictive way of lessening the harm suffered by exploited
children.
B. The Commerce Clause Implications
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.' 86 The Commerce Clause is an enabling
power given to Congress to regulate nearly any activity, as long as it in-
volves interstate commerce. 7 Conversely, the Dormant Commerce Clause
is a judge-made doctrine which recognizes a state's interest in safeguarding
the health and safety of its citizens, but prevents states from discriminating
against interstate commerce. 88 The Dormant Commerce Clause is a block-
ing power which limits a state's ability to regulate interstate commerce.
8 9
Precisely, "the [D]ormant Commerce Clause's fundamental objective [is to]
preserve[] a national market for competition undisturbed by preferential ad-
vantages conferred by a State upon its residents or resident competitors."' 90
There have been numerous courts which invoke the Dormant Com-
merce Clause to overrule legislation which prohibited the transmission of
pornographic material.' 9' The rationale being that a state regulation of the
Internet must fall within the broad enabling powers of regulating interstate
commerce. 92 However, the Court in People v. Foley'93 found that while the
Internet was a part of interstate commerce, the regulation of communication
184. Norris, 159 F.3d at 929-30.
185. United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 644 (11th Cir. 1999).
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
187. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978).
188. See id. at 623.
189. See id.
190. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997).
191. See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
192. Julie Sorenson Stanger, Comment, Salvaging States' Rights to Protect Children from
Internet Predation: State Power to Regulate Internet Activity Under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 2005 BYU L. REV. 191, 220 (2005).
193. 731 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2000).
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over the Internet does not necessarily burden interstate commerce.' 94 Fur-
ther, the United States Supreme Court uses the "Pike balancing test" to de-
termine if the regulation burdens interstate commerce. 9" This test requires a
state to illustrate that there is a legitimate local public interest in the regula-
tion of the activity and there is not an excessive burden on interstate com-
merce. 1
96
In New York v. Ferber,97 the United States Supreme Court held that
"[iut is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in 'sa-
feguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compel-
ling."" 98 SB 1442 allows for compensation for victims who suffer psycho-
logical and physical injury as a result of online sexual exploitation which
satisfies the first prong of the "Pike balancing test."
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,99 the Court held the criteria for determin-
ing whether legislation burdens interstate commerce is as follows:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will ... depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on inter-
state activities. 200
SB 1442 has an interest in providing "protections in civil and criminal pro-
ceedings" to the victims of child exploitation. 20 ' The state has a local interest
to lessen the harm suffered by exploited children, and by punishing the direct
source of exploitation without banning pornography altogether, it allows SB
1442 to have a minimal impact on interstate activity.
V. THE IMPACT OF SENATE BILL 1442
According to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), because of SB
1442, there are over thirty children who will be able to seek OAG representa-
194. Id. at 132-33.
195. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)
196. Id. at 142. The "Pike balancing test" emerges as a general rule that "[w]here the
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
197. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
198. Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of
Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596,607 (1982)).
199. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
200. Id. at 142.
201. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note 11, at I.
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tion, qualify for victim compensation, and seek damages against the produc-
ers, promoters, or possessors of child pornography. 20 2 SB 1442 will make the
State of Florida the first to enact legislation protecting victims from the dis-
tribution and possession of child pornography. °3 Further, SB 1442 impacts
victims and the State of Florida in three respects: socially, economically,
and physically. 2
°
A. Victim Relief
Presently, child pornography is seen as a victimless crime in which vic-
tims do not receive financial, emotional, and physical support.25 Further,
these victims are not provided with information regarding criminal and civil
cases surrounding their exploitation or with the opportunity to be heard at
trial. 206 However, a "victim" is "anyone who suffers either as a result of
ruthless design or incidentally or accidentally. 2 °7  SB 1442 identifies the
children of sexual exploitation as the victims and provides criminal and civil
relief.208
First, SB 1442 will have an immense social impact on victims and their
families. °9 SB 1442 will compel officers to provide information and images
to the NCMEC and CVIP, and to request any information from the NCMEC
in order to identify and contact any victims. 2'0 Further, such information is
to be entered into the Victims in Child Pornography Tracking Repeat Exploi-
tation database which will expand registry information to prevent and protect
children and their families.21' Moreover, SB 1442 allows victims the use of a
pseudonym in both court proceedings and records which allows them to
maintain their privacy while still having a voice at trial.212 Additionally, SB
1442 increases provisions relating to exploitation of children using a com-
puter.13 These changes will increase the protections for victims, make it
harder for children to be reached and exploited, improve law enforcement's
202. Id. at 2.
203. McCollum, supra note 105.
204. See generally SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note II.
205. McCollum, supra note 105.
206. Id.
207. United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 929 (5th Cir. 1998).
208. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note I1, at I.
209. See generally id.
210. Id. at2.
211. Id. at 6.
212. Id.
213. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note 11, at 6.
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ability to investigate child exploitation cases, and ensure that victims main-
tain a sense of privacy.
Next, SB 1442 will have a positive economic impact on victims and
their families. Specifically, SB 1442 creates legislation that allows victims
of child pornography to sue a promoter, possessor, distributor, or producer of
such images and recover monetary damages of no less than one hundred and
fifty thousand dollars, including attorneys' fees.214 Additionally, victims will
receive compensation for counseling or any mental health treatment as a re-
sult of the sexual exploitation. 215 Further, SB 1442 allows the OAG to pur-
sue cases of child exploitation for the victim, and defendants are prohibited
from using the defense that they "did not commit the abuse depicted in the
images" in the recovery of damages.1 6 These changes will provide victims
with a civil remedy for the possession and distribution of illegal material and
will allow them to recover actual damages per incident.
217
Finally, SB 1442 will have a supportive physical impact on victims.
218
Particularly, SB 1442 expands the definition of "crime" relating to sexual
exploitation over the Internet, amends the definition of "victim" from indi-
viduals under the age of sixteen to under the age of eighteen, and adds a de-
finition for "identified victim of child pornography" to mean any person
"[w]ho, while under the age of [eighteen], was depicted in any child porno-
graphic image; [w]ho has been identified by law enforcement; and [w]hose
image has been provided to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children's Child Victim Identification Program., 2 9 These changes will pro-
vide a greater number of individuals to seek redress for personal, physical, or
psychological injury from sexual exploitation. 220
B. The State of Florida
Currently, there is no state which entitles victims of a state-based child
exploitation case to seek remedies in state courts. 22' Florida has become one
of the leading states in the nation in fighting child exploitation and enacting
legislation to prevent and protect children.222 With the enactment of SB
1442, Florida is "again taking the lead and standing up for these children
214. Id. at 7.
215. Id. at8.
216. Id. at 7.
217. See id.
218. See SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note 1I, at 7-8.
219. Id.
220. See id.
22). See McCollum, supra note 105.
222. Id.
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who so desperately need us on their side., 223 SB 1442 will have a minimal
economic impact and a positive social impact for the State of Florida.224
SB 1442 will have a minimal economic impact for the State of Flori-
da.225 According to the OAG, the maintenance of the new database will be
managed by existing staff and developed by existing technology, which is
cost-effective. 26 Further, the additional casework brought by the new reme-
dies in SB 1442 will be handled by the Civil Litigation and Child Predator
Cybercrime units, which will diminish the need for new employees.2 27 Last-
ly, to help compensate costs for continuing litigation, the OAG may "seek
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. '22 8 The changes and costs that the State
of Florida expects to endure because of SB 1442 will only be an insignificant
impact.
Further, SB 1442 will have a positive social impact for the State of Flor-
ida. Florida is already one of the leading states to combat child exploitation
and child abuse. 229 The enactment of SB 1442 will make Florida the first
state to treat children as victims in a state court.2 30 Florida, being the leader
against cybercriminals, 23' will provide a model for the nation which will al-
low the positive social impact to grow from the State of Florida to the nation
as a whole. 32
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although Florida has taken a stand by enacting SB 1442, the fight
against child exploitation has only begun. Both federal and state legislation
must continue to grow with the quickly changing times and revolutionized
technology. Further, child exploitation is not a state issue nor is it an issue
that is only dealt with by the United States. Child pornography is a global
issue and requires a global solution.
One of the easiest and most effective ways to prevent child exploitation
is to educate children and parents. Knowledge will provide children and
parents the ability to recognize a dangerous situation and prevent a potential
223. Id.
224. See SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note 1I, at 2.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. McCollum, supra note 105.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id.
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situation.233 Although parents should bear the responsibility for teaching
their children safety information, much of the prevention efforts have be-
come school-centered.2 34 Research has indicated that school-related pro-
grams set to reduce victimization of children have the best effect when the
child is in elementary school or younger.235 Moreover, parents need to know
the law surrounding the people who work with children and promote person-
al safety by asking for background checks and further risk assessment of
individuals. 36 Additionally, parents need to know the simplicity for an of-
fender to seduce a child and need to educate their children on the amount of
personal information they publicize on the Internet.237 Parents should also
look into installing monitoring devices or restrictions if a child is on the In-
ternet unsupervised.238
Another easy, yet overlooked, way to prevent child exploitation is
through Internet Service Providers (ISPs). 239 ISPs provide the means for
which child pornography is accessed and distributed over the Internet; there-
fore, they should help to find a solution."n ISPs could begin by removing
any obvious illegal material from their server and providing law enforcement
with personal information from the contract about who is uploading the ma-
terial.2 ' Further, ISPs could place a clause in the contractual agreement to
forbid the production, possession, or distribution of any obscene material
with penalties for any illegal use. 42 Moreover, law enforcement agents are
having trouble retaining records through ISPs because they are only keeping
their records for no more than two days.243 If ISPs would retain their records
or keep track of all contact information from one subscriber, the investiga-
tion could continue and prosecution would flow more smoothly. 244
Lastly, child exploitation needs a global solution. "'[[In at least twenty-
six nations, including Ireland, Hungary, South Africa, and France,"' the pos-
233. Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Child, Guidelines for Programs to Reduce Child
Victimization: A Resource for Communities When Choosing a Program to Teach Personal
Safety to Children 4 (1999), available at http://www.missingkids.comlen-US/publications/NC
24.pdf.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 5.
236. id. at 7.
237. Doyle, supra note 23, at 139.
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239. See id. at 143.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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session of images of child exploitation is not a criminal offense.245 Although
the United States has taken a stand and enacted legislation to prevent citizens
from traveling abroad to engage in child exploitation, 6 the possession of
such explicit material should be criminalized globally and every nation
should join to arrest, convict, and punish those who produce, possess, and
distribute child exploitation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Child exploitation laws have come a far way since the 1800s when
children were seen as chattels and not people.247 The various rights of child-
ren need to be respected and upheld by legislation and the practices of socie-
ty. Child pornography has become the fastest growing business-estimated
to make billions of dollars a year. Florida has repeatedly taken a stand to
fight against the exploitation of children, and the enactment of SB 1442 is
another way in which Florida is attempting to fix oversights in child exploi-
tation legislation. The NCMEC has identified more than thirty children who
will receive additional protections 4 8 because of SB 1442, and hopefully this
is a model for the other states to enact similar legislation in the near future.
Although SB 1442 is likely to be challenged on constitutional rights, it will
more than likely prevail. SB 1442 provides victims and the State of Florida
with a positive social and physical impact and a minimal amount of econom-
ic impact. There is rarely a simple solution to such a global problem; how-
ever, the enactment of SB 1442 is an effective way to combat the growing
use of the Internet and technology and to provide a safer place for children.
245. Id. at 142.
246. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006).
247. Cohen, supra note 12, at 9.
248. SB 1442 Bill Analysis and Impact Statement, supra note I1, at 2.
20091
220
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss3/1
